

The Strength and Limits of Neoliberal Dominance

An Analysis of the Public Debate on Economic
Liberalization in Western Europe

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1

The Public Debate on Economic Liberalization in Western Europe: Introduction

This study is an analysis of the public debate on economic liberalization in Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K., and Switzerland at the beginning of the new millennium. The study is thus based on the issue economic liberalization, which will be understood in a broad way. It includes policy fields with regard to employment politics, privatization, trade and financial market regulation, as well as industrial policy.

Over the past decades the liberalization of trade, finance, and investment across the world has made unprecedented progress. Structural economic processes like economic globalization and post-industrialization have profoundly transformed Western European politics since the 1970s. These transformations are not only intertwined with far-reaching economic liberalization steps, but also altered the conflict constellations among the crucial agents who negotiate economic reforms. This study seeks to systematically explore these conflict constellations in the realm of the public debate. More specifically, it will be examined how the institutional context of countries as well as the characteristics of the single actors are shaping public conflicts on economic liberalization.

Economic liberalization is an inherently political phenomenon (see [Berger, 2000](#)). However efficient markets may be in satisfying the needs of their participants, they tend to centralize resources, create inequalities regarding the access of individuals to them, and produce harmful externalities ([King and Pearce, 2010](#)). Markets can thus provoke considerable resentments and conflictive interests. Economic markets should thus be perceived as embedded into the political sphere ([Rodrik, 1997](#); [Ruggie, 2008](#)). Yet it is similarly true that, in the last decades, they have increasingly moved “away from centralized authoritative coordina-

tion and control toward dispersed competition” in advanced economies (Streeck, 2009, p. 149).

Furthermore, not all countries react similarly to the changing economic environment. Thus, economic liberalization reforms are especially conflictive in Western European countries since they struggle more than other countries with the consequences of permanent austerity, i.e., the fiscal stress induced by demographic aging and a slowdown in economic growth (Pierson, 2001). As a matter of fact, economic liberalization has thus become a focal issue in both public and scholarly debates in Western Europe. And it comes as no surprise that such a salient issue provokes heavily diverging interpretations of its perils and promises. On the one extreme, economic liberalization is celebrated as pioneering worldwide economic development or even paving the way to a new era of a liberal peace. On the other extreme, it is blamed to undermine both democratic politics and the sustainability of capitalist economies, especially in the last crisis prone years.

Instead of participating in this inflated debate, this study aims at researching more mid-range phenomena regarding the structure and content of public debates on economic liberalization. How do public disputes on economic liberalization matter in a Western Europe that struggles with its multi-layered political system, i.e., with the democratic deficit at the European level and the increasing helplessness of national governments vis-à-vis volatile economic markets? More precisely, this debate analysis will address the questions, *where* does *who* campaign for *what* and *why*. The first question (where) implies the inclusion of the institutional context into the analyses, i.e., the impact countries and arenas have on the debate. The second question (who) is concerned with the types of actors that enter the debate to shape it according to their interests. The third question (what) refers to the actors’ strategies regarding policy positions and valence campaigning, while the fourth question (why) focusses on frames actors use to justify their policy stances.

These questions will be addressed in comprehensive empirical analyses using political-economic macro data as well as media content analysis data on six Western European countries, namely Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K. and Switzerland. The content analysis data provide information on the policy positions, actor references, and frames of all actors appearing in the debate on economic liberalization

between 2004 and 2007. The macro data in addition offer insights on the economic development, party positions and the intensity of liberalization reforms, strikes and protests in the respective countries from the 1970s until today.

In contrast to most popular literature and recent scholarly work, this study starts from the perspective that the key question regarding the politics of economic liberalization rather is not whether or when the worldwide diffusion of economic liberalism leads to the dissolution of national political systems into one neoliberal economic model. The importance of national differences for policy making undoubtedly has declined since the 1970s, but a multitude of national peculiarities still exists (Schmitter and Grote, 1997; Huber and Stephens, 2001). This is not surprising since liberalized markets met Western European countries which historically have developed different regulatory regimes as well as ways to intermediate interests and to decommodify the consequences of free markets (Schwartz, 2001, p. 31). Accordingly, there is a plurality of policy goals and therefore multiple possible conflict dimensions regarding economic liberalization. While the strong cross-national convergence pressures towards economic policy making guided by free market prerogatives cannot be neglected, national diversities in Western Europe will thus nevertheless persist. The crucial question is thus rather how the trends towards the liberalization of economic activities are reintegrated into the existing national systems.

This study takes therefore both the convergence pressures and national varieties in the public debate on economic liberalization into account by caring about the complex relationship between political strategies of actors and institutional contexts (see Schmidt, 2010; McCartney, 2009). More precisely, the overarching expectation is that Western European debates on economic liberalization are dominated by a neoliberal mainstream in favor of further market liberalization, which, however, is both *embedded* and *strained*. On the one hand, the mainstream is embedded, because it depends on the institutional context of the debates, different actors with distinctive communicative strategies articulate pro-liberalization stances. On the other hand, the mainstream is strained, since varying actors are at the forefront of struggling against further liberalization steps in different countries and arenas.

In sum, by focussing on the competition among the full range of interests amounting to the debate on economic liberalization, this study strives for a deep and comprehensive analysis at the same time. This means that the full set of discursive strategies in public debates and all relevant institutional contexts are integrated into one single framework of analysis. Located at the intersection between the political economy and political communication literature, the main focus of the study lies on the disparities of the debate in different countries, the characterization of discursive strategies by actors, and the identification of debate coalitions. These debate coalitions can be defined by the similarity of policy positions, framing strategies and actor references of the actors engaged in the debate. Substantively, the configuration of these coalitions which is emerging in the debates helps to determine the potentials of policy reforms in different countries.

1.1 Designing the Inquiry

In recent years, there has been growing scholarly interest in the role of public debates. Debates “play a powerful causal role in determining the trajectory of policy change and, as such, should be treated as objects of enquiry in their own right” (Smith and Hay, 2008, p. 359). In addition, political communication research has long observed that the media logic increasingly dominates policy making processes (Mancini and Swanson, 1996; Kriesi et al., 2007). In today’s established democracies, political choices are therefore increasingly affected by political competition in mass-mediated public debates (Sniderman, 2000, p. 75). However, while there are studies on debates in policy fields like immigration, abortion, and Europeanization, there is little known about public debates on economic liberalization (see Ferree et al., 2002; Medrano, 2003; Helbling et al., 2010).

In most simple terms, a *public debate* can be defined as the sum of all public communications related to a particular issue (Helbling et al., 2012). A debate is thus a thematically delimited part of the broader public sphere, which Gerhards and Neidhardt (1991) define as a comprehensive system of communicative exchanges about all kinds of issues. More specifically, a public debate is the result of a communication process involving a multitude of actors which take positions, refer to each

other, and justify these positions with interests and values. Such a definition owes a lot to conceptions established by Ferree et al. (2002) and Anderson (1978). While Ferree et al. (2002, p.9) speak of a “public discourse about topics and actors related to either some particular policy domain or to the broader interests and values that are engaged”, Anderson (1978, p.23) defines public communication as the “realm of discourse” in which “the deliberation of public policy” takes place.

Both definitions, on the one hand, stress the systemic character of public communication. This means that actors engaged in a debate are generally well aware of the opinions and arguments of other actors. Ultimately, this implies that the actors’ preferences can be empirically compared by pitting their publicly made statements against each other. On the other hand, both definitions similarly speak of discourse. Here, the term debate is put forward to describe public political communication, since it underlines the confrontational character of public communication. Public communication may but does not have to take the form of discourse, i.e., informed deliberation on an issue. Very likely, public communication contains disputes, misunderstandings and strategic behavior as well, since nothing more than the control of the decision making process is at stake (Helbling et al., 2012).

From a more methodological perspective, we can think of a debate as a *window of observation* that allows the analysis of the structure and dynamic of public conflict on a specific issue. Compared to other empirical assessments of policy conflicts, a focus on public debates debate has a number of advantages. First, a debate is not related to specific events. The polling day, for example, is the referential event to all studies of electoral campaigns. A debate analysis, instead, covers more than the specific dynamics of such events and should also reflect ordinary politics. Therefore, a higher stability of the results regarding overall conflict patterns can be expected. Second, a debate includes the whole universe of potentially relevant actors since it does not restrict the range of participants prior to the empirical analysis. Unlike direct democratic campaigns, for example, a debate is not related to a specific arena with its typical actors. And third, by definition, a debate is not subject to exogenous time limitations. Basically, a debate has its natural origin when the first actor starts to speak about the issue at stake, has peaks and discontinuities, and ends when the last statement was made. It is mainly due to pragmatic reasons that the analyses in this study are restricted

to specific time periods. A debate analysis thus has only one crucial anchor: the a priori chosen issue.

A debate can also be perceived as the publicly visible part of a policy subsystem, which, according to Sabatier and Weible (2007a, p. 192), is inhabited by a specific set of actors who regard themselves as a “community who share an expertise in a policy domain and who have sought to influence public policy in that domain for an extended period.” The policy subsystem of this study is defined by the issue economic liberalization, which includes a broad range of policies regarding privatization, competition and industrial policy, employment regulation, social partnership, and trade and financial market regulation, which will all be studied within the same analytical framework. Such a comprehensive conceptualization is necessary, since conflicts on market liberalization can arise on different policies across countries. While, for example, one country may experience conflicts on economic liberalization with respect to employment regulations, others might be distinguished by disputes on their free trade regime. A study that focuses on a broad range of policies thus better allows to grasp the scope and intensity of political conflicts on economic policies across different national settings.

Following a discursive institutionalist perspective (see Hay, 2001), we assume that both the consideration of the historical development as well as the inclusion of the full variety of societal, economic, and political interests are necessary to study such a complex phenomenon as the public debate on economic liberalization. This presupposes a comprehensive design which cares about the historical context and innovates with the study of all arenas and actors that influence the course of the debate. On the one hand, the analysis will thus be embedded into an elaboration of the development of economic liberalization by means of a thorough literature review and secondary data analyses. This allows to combine approaches derived from comparative political economy with theories established by the political communication literature in order to formulate specific expectations on the debate analysis. On the other hand, the following debate analysis is designed in a flexible way to leave it open in which arenas, i.e. the institutionally defined sites where the debate is taking place, the debate runs and which actors participate. Although the restriction of the scope of analysis is often criticized as a weakness of studies of political conflict (Sabatier and Weible, 2007b), only few

studies have taken this seriously so far.

Besides the historical embedding and flexible design, this book offers a rich empirical account of the debate on economic liberalization, which brings together a variety of research techniques. The data basis is provided by an extensive content analysis of newspaper which was established by a team of researchers including the author (see [Kriesi et al., 2012](#)). In addition, the aggregation of the data is done more accurate than in similar studies of political communication (e.g. [Ferree et al., 2002](#)). More precisely, we will use multiple weights to control for biases induced by differing statement frequencies across countries and newspaper articles as well as the varying importance of single issues for the debate, before the data are analyzed with descriptive statistics and multivariate models such as count regressions, clustering and factor analyses.

The design of the inquiry allows a rigorous assessment of a more comprehensive set of discursive strategies than usual. More specifically, we distinguish between going public, policy position taking, valence campaigning, and framing. These four strategies are seen as the essential building elements of debate coalitions, which, in turn, mark the structure of debates. Actors first have to enter the mass-mediated debate by using either institutionalized channels of communication or mobilization strategies in order to gain support for their interests (going public). Subsequently, actors need to make their policy positions visible and to campaign for their reputation and personal competence (policy position taking and valence campaigning). Finally, the framing strategies, i.e. how the actors justify their statements and invoke ideological cues, is included as the fourth discursive strategy. While framing, going public, and policy position taking in one or another form are long-standing devices in political communication to study public conflicts, this book carves out the importance of valence campaigning, which is often poorly treated as scandalization or negative campaigning.

The country sample of this study pits the three biggest European economies, i.e., France, Germany and the United Kingdom (U.K.), against three small Western European countries, namely Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Austria. The three big countries play a pivotal role in the global economy, which is evident in the fact that they are responsible for half of the European Union's gross domestic product ([IMF, 2010](#)). Beyond their pure economic strength, these economies are also distin-

guished by their different historical pathways of economic development. The U.K., next to the United States, is the most frequently cited example of a liberal market economy with overwhelmingly arm's length relationships between business, interest associations and public authorities. By contrast, most scholars point to Germany when they want to refer to a coordinated market economy, i.e., a capitalist regime with close and mainly cooperative relationships between interest associations (Emmenegger and Marx, 2011). France, finally, is considered an exemplary case of a market economy around an entrepreneurial state, where modernization strategies have traditionally relied on major industrial projects with far-reaching state intervention.

The three small economies, on the other hand, represent typical cases of coordinated and adaptive Western European economies with a small workforce and traditionally high export market dependency (Katzenstein, 1985). In addition, both Switzerland and the Netherlands can be seen as liberal-leaning variants in comparison with other continental European political economies. They differ with respect to important political-economic characteristics like a high market capitalization, a comparatively low influence of trade unions and relatively flexible employment regulations (Schnyder and Heemskerk, 2008; Hall and Ginigerich, 2009). Switzerland as the only non-EU member state further allows an evaluation of how much the European integration process affects the debates on economic liberalization. Austria, on the other side, with its traditionally very important public sector, the social-democratic roots of its welfare state, and its exceptionally strong interlinkages to the emerging Eastern Europe raises quite contrasting questions regarding the influence of specific country characteristics. In sum, the variety of country specific factors in the sample provides a feasible test of the general argumentation regarding the transformation of public debates in Western Europe.

Turning to the periods of observation of this study, most analyses will be concerned with the first years of the 2000s, but some considerations are also devoted to the historical development of conflicts on economic liberalization. With respect to economic liberalization, the first half of the 2000s lies in a period of an intensification of political conflicts. New and more contentious policies are debated between adherents of the mainstream that push for liberalization as well as actors challenging this neoliberal dominance. In contrast to the rapid liberalization steps in the

1990s, we accordingly can observe a stagnation of the liberalization processes in the first years of the new millennium.

At the turn of the second millennium, there is thus a substantial shift in the politics of economic liberalization. The rapid liberalization steps of the 1980s and 1990s occurred in economic domains where advanced economies have advantageous market positions, e.g., communications and financial services. In the early 2000s, however, the debates turned to politically sensitive economic domains. First, some highly salient events regarding the loss of national control over core industries provoked a lot of skepticism towards the opening of national markets: Hostile foreign take-over of industrial giants caused fears of a sell-off of domestic industries in France (Péchiney) and Germany (Mannesmann), while the U.K. and Switzerland painfully experienced the collapse of national economic monuments (MG Rover and Swissair, respectively). Second, the liberalization of the agricultural sector looms large in the debate in the early 2000s. Most notably, WTO member states have been engaged in the Doha Development Round to lower market barriers for agricultural products since 2001. The negotiations have actually been stalled since the ministerial meeting in Cancún in 2003, also because Western European governments made too few concessions regarding their protected agricultural markets.

Third, labor markets increasingly became the center of attention in the six countries in the first decade of the 21st century. The French and German governments similarly tried to introduce broad labor market reforms. While the German government managed to implement the *Agenda 2010* reform in 2003 despite intense protests from the radical left and unions, the French government withdrew its reform, the *Contrat Première Embauché*, in view of the fierce conflicts with the labor movement in 2006. Finally, the 2005 *Bolkestein directive*, the attempt to liberalize the service sector within the Single European Market, was heavily criticized by the left to trigger a race to the bottom with regard to labor market regulations.

Consequently, political opposition towards further liberalization therefore has steadily grown in Western Europe in the first years of the 2000s. The global justice movements have been on stage since their protests peaked at the WTO summit in Seattle 1999. In a similar vein, the radical left had a slight revival in the electoral arena in Europe (e.g.,

die Linke in Germany or the *Socialistische Partij* in the Netherlands). Further, populist right-wing parties increasingly started to adopt more protectionist policies, e.g., the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* in Austria or the *Front National* in France (Kriesi et al., 2012). This makes the chosen period of observation an interesting time to explore the public debates on economic liberalization. The first historical chapter will also take the long-term perspective from the 1970s until the mid-2000s into account. This introductory longitudinal comparison will assess the impact of globalization, post-industrialization, and state transformation on political contestation. Here, macro data and data from content analyses of election campaigns are used.

Since the data collection in the project from which the debate and election data originate was terminated at the end of 2007, the financial and subsequent economic as well as public debt crises are not covered by the analyses. However, it is still unclear how these shocks are changing the substantive nature of the debate on economic liberalization in Western Europe.

1.2 Outline of the Argument

A comprehensive assessment of the public debate on economic liberalization is challenging because the relationship between long-term processes and policy outcomes do not always seem straightforward. On the one hand, difficulties arise because that public debates are continuously evolving and are varying across different contexts. Thus, they are a moving target whose characteristics change depending on the specific time, country and arena where they take place. On the other hand, the insecurities regarding the conceptualization of the debate are due to the fact that most research on globalization, post-industrialization, and different capitalist regimes lack an empirically sound understanding of the interactions between long-term developments, institutions, and public debates (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000). Thus, the heuristic model which guides this research and is presented in Figure 1.1 tries to take a more comprehensive perspective. More precisely, the model outlines the main factors and relationships at work in the study of the economic liberalization debate. The empirical exploration of the debate in the second part of this book will focus on the aspects which are set apart by a dark background, i.e., the conflict dimensions, contexts and discursive strategies of the debates.




Figure 1.1 Heuristic Model of the Debate Analysis: The Impact of Long-Term Challenges and Institutions on Public Debates

Sketched in very bold strokes, issue specific long-term developments are assumed to transform the general structure of conflict and – in combination with the institutional contexts of countries and arenas – shape the opportunities of specific actors to engage in the debate. The actors, in turn, apply their sets of discursive strategies to gain influence on the decision making processes which lead to policy change. One basic assumption is therefore that exogenous political-economic pressures as well as the specific contexts inherent to countries and arenas do not deterministically translate into policy change. By contrast, policy change is the result of discursive competition among actors, i.e., a process of social learning in which conflicts on policies, values and norms play a crucial role (Hall, 1993; Hay, 2000). Such processes increasingly take place in the public.

With respect to the left side of the analytical model in Figure 1.1, the relevant exogenous pressures with respect to the debate on economic liberalization consist of globalization (understood as umbrella term for Europeanization and internationalization), post-industrialization (summarizing structural economic change like tertiarization and the feminization of the workforce), and the changing role of the state in the economy (privatization and welfare state transformation) (see Figure 1.1). While most scholars agree that at least one of these developments are consequential for today's policy making processes in advanced economies (Krugman et al., 1995; Kollmeyer, 2009; Iversen and Cusack, 2000). However, there is still a heightened debate going on among political economists on the

causal relationships between the long-term developments and debates, i.e., the puzzle remains unsolved *how* conflicts have changed and which impact the developments did had on the structure of conflict.

Some scholars maintain that the long-term developments have paved the way for the spread of economic liberalism, which could steadily progress since the end of the Cold War. This literature concludes that advanced economies on the long run are heading towards a Kantian capitalist peace, since economic liberalism is singled out as a commonly shared ideological belief in the light of growing economic interdependence (Fukuyama, 1992; Ohmae, 1995; Reich, 2007). Neo-Gramscian accounts, by contrast, agree with the basic interpretation of dominant convergence pressures but perceive this development as the result of a hegemonic project of transnationally oriented elites (van der Pijl, 1998; Forgacs, 2000; van Apeldoorn, 2002). Most of the studies from both camps, however, tend to overestimate the transnational congruence of capitalist interests at the expense of neglecting the still considerable national varieties of political conflicts, i.e., the still virulent fractions within capitalist interests and the ongoing contestation of economic liberalization from outsiders (e.g. Overbeek, 2004).

The research pursued in this study thus takes a more differentiated perspective and starts from the assumption that a broad variety of conflicting interests and ideologies are clashing in debates over potential policy changes. It is expected that there is a strong neoliberal dominance on economic liberalization, but it is neither supposed to be as hegemonic nor tacitly accepted as previous analyses have concluded. In other words, the conflict constellations specific to the debate on economic liberalization are expected to emerge because a variety of actors continuously strive for the supremacy of their interests, policy stances, and ideas and no actor completely prevails over the others.

Not only the conflict constellations, but also the dimensionality of the debate are supposed to have changed. Globalization, post-industrialization, and the transformed role of the state in the economy have had massive redistributive consequences, which are likely giving rise to new conflict dimensions (Przeworsky and Yebra, 2005). Most notably, there is ample evidence that the classical left-right divide between support for economic freedom and market mechanisms and support for redistribution, social protection, and full employment does not structure conflicts

on economic policies as clearly as it did until the 1970s (Gourevitch, 2002). However, while it is a common assumption in the literature that the structure of conflict on economic issues has not remained the same, there is no consensus in the literature on how conflicts changed in response to the exogenous political-economic pressures.

Some scholars argue that both the structural potential of old cleavages as well as the formation of new conflict dimensions is undermined by the increasing individualization and alienation among citizens in affluent democracies (e.g. Mair, 2008). Others maintain that the most important divide has shifted to cultural issues like immigration, thus leaving economic issues like the liberalization of markets to be merely valence issues on which all parties agree (Kitschelt, 2007; Kriesi et al., 2008). All this points to the expectation that the conflict dimensions of the economic liberalization debate have become more fluid and almost unpredictable. Even more astonishing is therefore that most of the comparative and international political economy literature still implicitly or explicitly theorizes political conflict in a unidimensional way between a political left and right (e.g., Beramendi and Anderson, 2008; Pontusson and Rueda, 2010; Milner and Judkins, 2004; Dutt and Mitra, 2005).

It is argued in this study that the key to understand this increasing complexity is to pursue a multidimensional approach, taking different levels of decision making and multiple political divides into account. Scholars in the tradition of Ruggie (1982) and Rodrik (1997), to begin with, are primarily interested in how strongly markets are dis- and re-embedded, i.e., whether conflicts on economic regulations remain largely national or whether they are extended to the European or even international levels (see Block, 2007, p. 5f.; Tarrow and Caporaso, 2009). Yet even if the political opportunities have increased at the European and international levels, national public debates have become transnational in their country specific ways (Koopmans and Erbe, 2004). Moreover, many channels to gain influence on policy making remain centered at the national level and the European and international levels thus are still not crucial to some policy areas (Kriesi et al., 2007).

However, not only the linkage between long-term developments and the overall transformation of conflicts on economic liberalization (i.e., the constellations and dimensions; see Figure 1.1) has remained contested in the literature, also the interaction between long-term trends

and institutional patterns is not carved out clearly enough. In this context, the most influential theoretical frameworks in comparative political economy emphasize the divergent paths thesis ([Kitschelt, 1999](#); [Hall and Soskice, 2001](#), p. 444). The essence of this argument in the light of a debate analysis is that differences among countries are persistent because the countries' institutions are continuously creating different opportunities for actors, which, in turn, opt for distinct policies in response to exogenous economic pressures. Over the long run, the institutional frameworks and corresponding market structures of different countries become complementary to each other, since they constitute efficient equilibria for economic development.

Such a view contests much of the early research on globalization, which argues that market internationalization is forcing advanced economies to converge to a single neoliberal model (e.g. [Moses, 1994](#)). But also more recent accounts of institutional change emphasize that there is a tendency to overstate the reproduction of institutional differences ([Streeck and Thelen, 2005](#); [Hays, 2009](#)). As a matter of fact, the comparative political economy literature is therefore far from an agreement how strongly path dependency keeps advanced economies on diverging paths.

A comprehensive assessment seems difficult since researchers often overestimate the coherence within the institutional constellations: countries do merely represent a coherent set of institutional configurations, rather, they represent complex configurations of quite improbable combinations of institutions ([Herrigel, 2007](#), p. 481). In the end, adherents of convergence and proponents of divergence have not been able to develop a common research agenda that acknowledges the presence of both distinct institutional differences as well as the consequential shifts from solidaristic to competitive forms of economic policy making (see [Thelen and Kume, 2006](#)). The key is to exactly specify how long-term developments interact with the institutional context to shape the opportunities, constraints and strategies of the relevant actors ([Häusermann, 2010a](#); [Schmidt, 2010](#)). In other words, institutional change has to be connected with discursive processes in order to explore the potentials of policy change. Thus, "the research agenda [...] should not just be to seek to convince political scientists theoretically that ideas and discourse matter – by now all neo-institutionalists seem to have accepted this to some degree –, but to show empirically how, when, where, and why ideas matter for institutional change, and when they do not" ([Schmidt, 2010](#),

p. 21). This study sets out to show how discursive processes matter with regard to conflicts on economic liberalization.

More precisely, there is often a conceptual gap between institutional change and discursive processes since the formation of actor preferences is not specified clearly enough. Preferences are usually conceptualized on the mere basis of a “teleological means-ends schema” (Jackson, 2010, p. 77), leading to too rigid preference definitions separated from the dynamic context that shapes the actors’ discursive strategies. Thus, political decisions are the result of complex interactions between institutions and an increasingly diverse set of actors (Cerny, 2009, p. 433f.). This means that actors may rely on interpretations of institutionalized values, norms, and power configurations, but their preferences may as well be shaped by strategic short-term considerations (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Herrigel, 2008; Jackson, 2010, p. 65). In sum, as Cerny (2009, p. 421) emphasizes, “in all these explanations [in the political economy literature], the role of actors as agents strategically shaping change has been neglected”.

Moving ahead in the causal chain of the heuristic model in Figure 1.1, it is further assumed that debate coalitions can be identified which reflect the impact of institutions and actor strategies on the public debate. More specifically, debate coalitions can be distinguished by tracking the actors’ efforts in terms of going public, policy position taking, valence campaigning, and framing (see Sabatier, 1998; Zakharov, 2009; Helbling et al., 2012). Going public refers to the actors’ ability to access the public debate. Further, policy position taking and valence campaigning describe the actors’ stances on economic liberalization and vis-à-vis other actors, respectively. Framing, finally, means the capability of actors to justify their policy stances in consistence with their ideological beliefs. These four discursive strategies lead to the formation of debate coalitions.

In addition to going public and policy position taking, which are considered by most content analyses of public conflicts, the content analysis data used in this study also allow for the study valence campaigning as well as framing. First, valence campaigning, i.e., references of actors to other actors, are rarely included in data collections (but see Kriesi, 2011, for an exception). Yet such actor specific references can decisively shape the success of actors with regard to the communication of their substantial interests. Second, this analysis additionally deals with

the framing strategies on the actor level. Most media frame studies chose entire articles as the units of measurement (De Vreese, 2005). This means that such studies are not able of specifying the ownership of frames, i.e., to differentiate in detail which actor uses which frame. In this study, by contrast, framing is assessed at the propositional level. This allows to investigate not only *how* a debate is framed, but more importantly, *who* owns which frame. Moreover, the focus on frame ownership allows to reveal ideological inconsistencies with respect to the framing of economic liberalization, whereas most other framing studies usually assume that a shared frame leads to coherent policy stances (see Noy, 2009). Yet the debate on economic liberalization shows how similar policy positions can be taken from actors that do not share the same core beliefs. Consider Labour and Conservatives in the U.K. during the 1990s: both parties were in favor of liberalization although for different reasons, i.e., they relied on a third way or Thatcherist reasoning, respectively.

With respect to the question of which actors are involved in the formation of debate coalitions, the comparative political economy research often implicitly assumes that only few are relevant. Most notably only public authorities, parties, or interest groups are assumed to debate and negotiate economic policies. Such an a priori definition of the crucial players regarding economic policy making may be reasonable for some research purposes, but from the viewpoint of an inclusive analysis of public conflicts, there should essentially no restrictions regarding relevant actor types (Bartolini, 2005, p. 25 – 27). Moreover, while it is commonly acknowledged that “normally hundreds of actors from interest groups, governmental agencies, legislatures at different levels of government, researchers, journalists, and judges” (Sabatier 2007: 3) usually are involved in the different stages of the policy process, this dictum is seldom applied in research designs.

Indeed there are some actors which are usually not rigorously enough considered in studies of political conflicts on economic liberalization. One important actor type which is often left aside are corporations (Blyth, 2003). It is mostly assumed that corporations have a voice in politics through their corresponding interest groups, yet the question so far remains unanswered to what extent this is really the case. In addition, the role of experts, public welfare groups and social movements in policy making processes on economic liberalization has rarely been explored in much detail, too. Other actors which should also be more systematically

included are foreign governments as well as supra- and international bodies, since international levels of policy making have become more important (Crouch and Farrell, 2004). The simple fact that we do not know how important different actors are for public debates on economic liberalization requires the inclusion in a systematic and comparative research design. Examples of studies which include a large variety of actors can be found for other policy fields (e.g., Europeanization and abortion, (see Ferree et al., 2002; Koopmans, 2007)) and case studies of single countries (e.g., see Burstein and Linton (2002) for the U.S.A.)

Moreover, we have very little systematic knowledge about the interactions of more than two different actors during the policy processes. The globalization literature, for instance, tends to restrict the analysis to the interactions among governments and/or parties (e.g., Garrett, 1998; Dutt and Mitra, 2005), whereas neoinstitutionalists mostly draw their attention to the relationship between interest groups and public authorities (e.g., Hancké et al., 2007). These neglects are rather surprising in light of concepts like policy coalitions or politics as networks, which, in principle, try to explain policy change as result of widely ramified political competition involving all kinds of political actors (Sabatier, 1998; Koger et al., 2009).

To conclude, the comprehensive perspective on long-term developments, institutional contexts, and discursive strategies which is applied in this study allows a systematic assessment of the nature of public debates in the six countries under study. This way, it can exactly be shown how countries, arenas, and actors are shaping the potentials for policy change regarding economic liberalization.

1.3 Structure of the book

The analytical model as outlined above will guide both the theoretical elaborations (chapters 2 through 4) as well as the empirical analyses (as of chapter 6) in a stepwise fashion. Chapter 2 establishes the historical foundations of the debate analysis and develops the basic expectations regarding the course of the debate on economic liberalization. The literature review in this chapter will focus on the development of the economic situation in Western Europe in the last four decades and its interplay with the role of the state in economic policy making. Chapter

2 will further discuss the formation of the pro-liberalization mainstream and its challengers as well as new divides which structure the economic liberalization debate. Chapter 3 contains the outline of the interplay between the institutional context of countries and arenas with public debates. In the last theoretical chapter (chapter 4), the implications of the transformative pressures and institutional contexts of conflicts for the actors' strategic repertoire will be presented. Consequently, hypotheses about the actors' discursive strategies are developed. Chapter 5, finally, presents the methods guiding the data collection and aggregation as well as their empirical evaluation.

In the following, the empirical analysis of the debate on economic liberalization will proceed in four steps. First, chapter 6 maps the terrain. It offers an account of the structure of debates by analyzing the degree of internationalization and the dimensionality of the conflict on economic liberalization in the different countries and arenas. Moreover, chapter 6 presents an assessment of the actors' going public strategies, i.e., how well different actors are able to enter the debate. The analysis proceeds with the analysis of the policy positions in chapter 7, valence campaigning in chapter 8 and the framing strategies in chapter 9. This chapter centers on the questions, which perceptions do the different actors have regarding liberalization and whether the policy coalitions share a consistent framing. In each of these chapters, the importance of countries and arenas will be explored, before the discursive strategies will be studied as a function of actor and coalitional characteristics. To make the research process as transparent as possible, all analyses are documented chapter by chapter using commented syntaxes for R and Stata, which can be retrieved together with the data sets from www.bruno-wueest.ch.

Chapter 11, finally, brings it all together. It summarizes the most important empirical evidence and discusses the ramifications of the findings in the light of the broader research context.

Part One

A Framework to Analyze the Economic Liberalization Debate

2

Long-Term Transformations and the Economic Liberalization Debate

To explain today's conflicts on economic liberalization, it is necessary to have an understanding of the economic and political development in Western Europe during the last decades. The first part of this chapter thus describes the major developments which are crucial to establish expectations on the structure of debates: economic globalization, post-industrialization, and the transformation of the role of the state with respect to economic policy making. The fundamental starting assumption is that the crucial processes currently reconfiguring political conflicts started with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970 ([Iversen and Cusack, 2000](#); [Kriesi et al., 2008](#)). More specifically, after the abandonment of the international regime which was characteristic to the golden post-war era, political and economic changes profoundly reshaped the preferences and conflict constellations of political actors ([Berger, 2000](#)).

The second part chapter of this chapter will outline the main expectations regarding the impact of the three major transformative pressures on political conflict regarding economic liberalization. A first question in this regard is concerned with the dimensionality of the public debate. Since the traditional, all-encompassing left-right divide seems to have lost much of its structuring capacity for conflicts on economic liberalization, newly emerging conflict lines will be discussed in detail. The major expectation is that conflicts on economic liberalization are two-dimensional. More precisely, it will be explained why the internationalization of the economies and the involvement of the state in economic affairs are emerging as new major conflict dimensions structuring the debate on economic liberalization.

In the third part of the chapter, the expectations regarding the basic actor constellations in the debates are established. The convergence of mainstream parties, coupled with the increasing transnationalization of policy making, is hypothesized to lead to a pro-liberalization mainstream that dominates the debate landscape. Yet public debates are not only the terrain of the pro-liberalization mainstream, but also of challengers. Following the labor in decline argument, the importance of the labor movement for conflicts on economic liberalization is waning. But it is still the most likely challenger in the debate. In contrast, many observers point to social movements and right-wing populists as the new main opponents of economic liberalization. The argument developed in this study is that two main groups of challengers, namely the traditional left and protectionist right coalition, shake up the public debate on economic liberalization.

2.1 Evolving Economic Globalization and Post-industrialization

A concise way of describing the relevant political-economic long-term changes for the debate on economic liberalization is by distinguishing globalization and post-industrialization processes. On the one hand, advancing economic internationalization and intensifying political integration can be subsumed as processes of globalization (Held and McGrew, 2000; Dreher et al., 2008; Kriesi et al., 2008).¹ On the other hand, developments like tertiarization² and the feminization of the workforce³ can be understood as processes of post-industrialization (Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Oesch, 2006; Häusermann, 2010a). These two trends intensely reshaped Western European economies, which additionally face the permanent challenges of declining birthrates, demographic aging, and soaring social security costs that hamper their national competitiveness (Schmidt, 2001; Pierson, 2001, p. 420).

The worldwide consolidation of trade and financial markets as well as the proceeding internationalization of production can be understood

¹ Since cultural and societal aspects of globalization like growing immigration from culturally different countries or increases in private correspondence have little influence on debates regarding economic policy making, these aspects will be left aside in the following discussion.

² I.e., the increasing importance of the service sectors for the economy.

³ I.e., the massive entry of women into the working population.

as constitutive elements of economic globalization (see [Perraton et al., 1997](#)). Figure 2.1 presents standardized indices for economic globalization along with tertiarization and two indicators for the general development of the economic situation in the six Western European countries under study (France, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.K.).

First, the index on the development of international economic flows includes data on trade, foreign direct investment flows and stocks, portfolio investment, and income payments to foreign nationals ([Dreher et al., 2008](#)).⁴ Second, service sector production as a percentage of GDP and the share of service sector employment in total employment as reported in the OECD structural analysis database⁵ were used to calculate the index of tertiarization. Third, the economic misery index combines unemployment as well as inflation into a composite measure of the economic difficulties that kept the six countries busy.⁵ And finally, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity is shown in figure 2.1.⁵ All indices are standardized to a scale ranging from 0 to 100.

The intensity of international economic flows that affect the Western European countries more than tripled in the time from the 1970s until today, while the growth of the tertiary sector was similarly steady and even slightly stronger. Both developments took place in the context of a rather constant but lately slightly falling economic output and, since the mid-1980s, a declining and stabilizing economic misery index. Thus, while the economic productivity does not vary much since decades, the six Western European countries have become much more open and also substantially tertiarized.

Not only in Western Europe, but obviously on a global scale, economic activities have not become completely footloose, but the mobility of people, goods, services, capital, and information has become significantly larger ([Held and McGrew, 2000](#); [Brady et al., 2007](#)). Since the 1970s, most national markets for manufactured goods and financial transactions have been integrated into global ones, as tariffs among advanced economies were reduced to negligible levels ([Brühlhart, 2009](#)). In a similar vein, the advanced economies have seen an upsurge in the extent

⁴ Data retrieved from globalization.kof.ethz.ch [08/03/2011].

⁵ Data retrieved from stats.oecd.org [08/03/2011].




Figure 2.1 Economic Long-Term Developments in Western Europe

Notes: Sources: KOF (Dreher et al., 2008) and OECD (2010). All indices were standardized to a scale ranging from 0 to 100 across the six Western European countries of the study.

of international lending and the displacement of conventional loan businesses by security markets (Hirst and Thompson, 1999). The reduction of transport and communication costs further enabled large corporations to become global players, i.e., to integrate their value chain on a worldwide level and split their production according to comparative advantage (Berger, 2005).

An important part of international economic flows take effect in the financial markets. Accordingly, capital flows have enormously increased in both amount and speed on a worldwide scale, and multinational banks play an ever more critical role as managers of financial flows and credit lenders (Kalinkowski and Cho, 2009). The downside of positive effects like the more efficient allocation of financial resources is increasing financial market volatility. Consequentially, financial crises have become more frequent and severe, which is not only visible in the recent global financial crisis, but also the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 (Stiglitz, 2003; Bhagwati, 2004; Quaglia et al., 2009). Rapidly industrializing countries,

most notably China, Brazil, and India, but also Eastern European states, which radically opened their markets since the collapse of the Comecon system, induce further major transformations within the world economy. The share of these emerging markets in world trade has tripled since the 1970s, and competition has increased (Perraton et al., 1997). In sum, what Katzenstein (1985) wrote with respect to small Western European countries has therefore become significant for all countries under study: vulnerability in relation to the world economy is an inescapable fact of nowadays' economic policy making.

In addition to globalization, post-industrialization processes also have profoundly transformed Western European economies. This process approximately summarizes the domestic structural changes that shape the context of economic policy making in the six countries under study. A first major process restructuring the workforce was the massive entry of women into the labor markets (Häusermann, 2010b). A second aspect of post-industrialization constitutes tertiarization, that is the movement of labor and production from the agricultural and manufacturing sectors to the service industries (Iversen and Cusack, 2000, p. 313f.). While the tertiary sector, especially the financial and communication services, experienced a high productivity growth in the last decades, most basic labor-intensive industries declined in relative terms (see Figure 2.1).

Technological change, changing consumption patterns, saturated markets, and the competition from emerging markets has increasingly impaired the opportunities for the traditional industries in Western Europe, while the service sectors grew. The composition of the workforce accordingly changed with the entry of the majority of the young people into the service industries, while early retirement continues to happen prevalingly in the traditional sectors.

2.2 The Changing Nature of the State

One important aspect of the macroeconomic developments outlined so far is their interaction with a fundamental transformation of the state. Partly as a cause and partly in consequence, but surely in lockstep with globalization and post-industrialization, states increasingly drift towards more workfare (Jessop, 2002), competition enhancing (Cerny, 2000) and regulatory elements (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003). First, glob-

alization and post-industrialization induced a significant erosion of the effectiveness of decommodification measures⁶ in the traditionally generous welfare regimes of Western Europe – although there certainly is no radical race to the bottom (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000; Grande and Kriesi, *forthcoming*; Häusermann, 2010b). Welfare states are increasingly rebuilt from providing free-standing social services to incorporate more market conforming employment policies, e.g., employment subsidies, training schemes, and conditional entitlement programs (Clayton and Pontusson, 1998; Vail, 2008). This transformation was negotiated in the context of increasingly flexible and competitive industrial relations, which led to social pacts that contain more market-conforming policies (Rhodes, 2001). Especially since the beginning of the 1990s, labor market liberalization has thus become more prominent in shaping labor relationships in Western European economies. As a consequence, however, economic inequality and job insecurity have increased (Rueda, 2005; Anderson and Pontusson, 2007).

Second, governments are increasingly concerned with promoting the competitive advantage of their economies. Hence, to be successful in a globally integrated economy, a reorientation from public production to the provision of support for particular production and service sectors has taken place (Sapir, 2006). Of course, states have not completely refrained from direct market participation, but the last decades have seen a high number of privatizations as well as the relative decline of public investment (Heinemann, 2006; Zohlnhoefer et al., 2008). Thus, the general focus of economic policies has changed from production to redistribution and supporting business in the international markets (Vogel, 1996; Rhodes, 2001). Western European states partly retreated from lucrative businesses like telecommunications or the energy industry (Schneider et al., 2005). In turn, public authorities have extensively established independent regulatory agencies in a bid to keeping credibility regarding the provision of public goods as well as the enhancing of their economic competitiveness (Gilardi, 2005).

Finally, public authorities have continuously shifted their routines towards regulatory activities as their interactions with both the economy and transnational governance networks have become more differentiated (Majone, 1996; Vogel, 1996). First, the cooperation between adminis-

⁶ Policies to disconnect income streams from market outcomes such as employment protection or minimum wages.

trations and the economic sphere has become more intense, most of all in the form of public private partnerships. Second, advanced economies have integrated into a complex multi-level governance system (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000, p. 1f.). Most notably with the extension of the EU's regulatory scope, previously nationally oriented actors have increasingly become involved in transnational decision-making and are now constitutive parts of a multi-level governance process (Kohler-Koch, 2003). Nation states thus have significantly transferred authority to supra- and international bodies which, in turn, were heavily responsible for the diffusion of liberalization policies (Simmons et al., 2006). Crucial steps in this respect in the 1990s were the Treaty of Maastricht, which created the Single European Market, the termination of the WTO Uruguay round and the introduction of the Euro. Furthermore, the competition for capital has led to a proliferation of bilateral investment treaties which secure the rights of foreign investors (Elkins et al., 2006). Even in policy domains that have remained predominantly national affairs, such as labor market regulations, welfare regimes or collective bargaining systems, the influence of international and European regulatory networks is therefore nonetheless influential (Schmidt, 2009, p. 518).

Complementing the argumentation with respect to the changing role of the state, Figure 2.2. provides an empirical overview of three indices corresponding to the processes related to the changing role of the state in the economy as described so far. All indices are arranged so that they show increasing liberalization trends on a scale from 0 to 100.⁷ First, the graph indicates the KOF index for the lowering of national boundaries which covers the dissolution of various policy instruments to shelter the national economy, i.e., measures for formal and hidden import barriers, tariff rates, taxes on international trade, and capital account restrictions (Dreher et al., 2008)⁸.

Further, the degree of labor market deregulation is shown that subsumes several variables reflecting employment security. The data, which come from the OECD structural analysis database⁹, entail the share of active labour market programs in public expenditures, the strictness of

⁷ All indicators are standardized by setting the highest value to 100 and the lowest to 0. The remaining values are then recalculated correspondingly to fit into the range from 0 to 100

⁸ Data retrieved from globalization.kof.ethz.ch [08/03/2011].

⁹ Retrieved from stats.oecd.org [08/03/2011].

regulation on dismissals and the use of temporary contracts. Finally, an index of state retrenchment – measured by the number of privatizations and the share of governmental investing in total public expenditures¹⁰ – is presented.




Figure 2.2 The Evolution of the Role of the State in the Economy in Western Europe

Notes: Sources: KOF (Dreher et al., 2008) and OECD (2010). All indices were standardized to a scale ranging from 0 to 100 across the six Western European countries.

While the reduction of national barriers shows a quite uniform upward trend in all decades, public sector retrenchment begins to stabilize in the early 1990s. The flexibility of labor markets is rather constant except a substantial rise in the mid-1990s, where they stabilize or are even reversed in the case of the lowering of national boundaries. The trends thus points to growing liberalization with respect to the whole time period, but mainly in terms of internationalization.

¹⁰ Taken from the privatization barometer (retrieved from privatizationbarometer.net [08/03/2011]) as well as the OECD structural analysis database.

2.3 The Emergence of a Pro-Liberalization Mainstream

Globalization, post-industrialization, and state transformation constitute the main exogenous pressures that led to major shifts in the actor constellations of the debate. The starting point inducing these shifts was the embedded liberalism regime of the post-war decades which can mainly be characterized by a prevalence of Keynesian macroeconomic policies and economies organized on the national level which were not heavily interdependent (Ruggie, 2008). This regime was incrementally removed in favor of a multi-level governance system and a network of bilateral treaties leading to a complex interdependence among advanced economies (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Elkins et al., 2006). This increasing political-economic integration also provided the backbone for the global diffusion of economic liberalism, which found new terrain after the collapse of state socialism at the end of the Cold War. Hence, the spread of pro-market ideas was decisively driven by the failure of socialism and the appendant advocacy of the United States and the Bretton Woods institutions (Simmons et al., 2006).

One of the main consequences of the growing political-economic interdependence and the spread of economic liberalism is mainstream party convergence. Center-right and center-left parties, who usually dominate government coalitions in Western Europe, have programmatically converged on economic issues (Kitschelt, 1999; Boix, 2000; Mair, 2001; Milner and Judkins, 2004; Kriesi et al., 2008). In the 1970s, the class cleavage was the prevailing structuring element of debates on economic policies, dividing the political opponents along the left-right dimension (Bartolini and Mair, 1990). This historically very contentious division between labor and capital, however, has lost much of its importance in structuring political conflicts in advanced economies (Dalton et al., 1984; Hardin, 2000).

While the value change in favor of a more radical economic liberalism first captured parties on the right in advanced economies, but both the left in advanced economies and the political elites in many developing countries followed suit after the end of the Cold War (Vandenbroucke, 1998). Thus, the majority of public authorities shifted to monetarist and supply-side economic management. These changes are obviously related to a fundamental reshaping of political conflicts on economic liberaliza-

tion. More specifically, the long-term changes eroded the plausibility of the left's traditional economic recipes. Keynesian economic policies lost much of their viability in the stagflation crisis during the 1970s (Hall, 1993). Therefore, established left parties needed to turn from sharp criticism of capitalism to a more pragmatic approach on economic liberalism in order to keep aspiring for office (Giddens, 2000; Müller-Rommel and Poguntke, 2002). In sum, the most important consequence is the convergence of the left and right mainstream parties.

Table 2.1 shows the decade averages of policy positions, issue salience, and going public by mainstream and challenger parties in electoral campaigns of the 1970s, 1990s, and 2000s.¹¹ Policy positions show the averages of the directions made by the four camps regarding economic liberalization. The issue saliencies indicate how important economic liberalization is relative to all other issues debated during the electoral campaign. Going public, finally, shows the relative frequency of the four camps. The data stem from a content analysis of newspapers in a two-month selection period up to each election day (see Dolezal et al., 2012). Radical left parties such as communists and left populists are coded as left challengers.¹² Mainstream left parties include mainly green parties and social democrats,¹³ while the right mainstream consists of liberals, Christian democrats, and conservatives.¹⁴ Right challenging parties summarize right-wing populists and other radical parties.¹⁵

The policy positions show three key developments. First, the party systems as a whole moved to pro-market positions, since three party camps moved to the right and only challengers slightly strengthened their op-

¹¹ The following national elections are covered by the data: Austria=1975, 1994, 1999, 2002, 2006; France=1978, 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007; Germany=1976, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005; the Netherlands=1973, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006; U.K.=1974, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005; Switzerland=1975, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007.

¹² Austria=KP; France=Parti Communiste, Force Ouvrière and smaller radical left splinter groups; Germany=Die Linke and its predecessors; Switzerland=Alternative Liste, PdA, Solidarit and smaller radical left splinter groups; the Netherlands=Socialistische Partij, Groenlinks

¹³ Austria=Grüne, SP; U.K.=Labour, Scottish National Party; France=PS, Radicaux des Gauches, Verts; Switzerland=SPS, Grüne, LdU; Germany=SPD; Netherlands=PvdA.

¹⁴ Austria=VP, Liberales Forum; Switzerland=CVP, FDP; France=UMP/RPR, UDF; Germany=CDU/CSU, FDP; the Netherlands=CDA, D66, VVD, SGP; the U.K.=Conservatives, Liberal Democrats.

¹⁵ Austria=FP, BZ; Switzerland=SVP and radical right splinter groups; the Netherlands=Lijst Pim Fortuyn; France=Front National.

Table 2.1 *Policy Positions, Issue Salience, and Going Public on Economic Liberalization in the Electoral Arena*

	Left chall- enger parties	Mainstream left parties	Mainstream right parties	Right chall- enger parties
Position				
1970	-0.57	-0.32	0.12	-0.09
1990	-0.58	-0.23	0.58	0.42
2000	-0.66	0.25	0.36	0.34
Δ 1970/2000	-0.09	+0.57	+0.24	+0.42
Issue salience				
1970	22.1	19.9	20.4	10.8
1990	18.7	11.9	11.6	7.5
2000	17.1	10.3	9.5	6.5
Δ 1970/2000	-5.0	-9.6	-10.9	-4.3
Going public				
1970	5.3	32.4	58.7	3.6
1990	5.2	37.3	51.8	5.8
2000	8.5	44.6	39.1	7.9
Δ 1970/2000	+3.2	+12.1	-19.6	+4.3

Notes: All numbers are decade averages. Positions range from -1=opposition to +1=support of economic liberalization. Source: Own data established in collaboration with Kriesi et al. (2012).

position to economic liberalization. Second, the electoral politics fo economic liberalization has become more polarized, especially from the 1970s until the 1990s. Positive and negative positions are further away from each other. Third and most importantly in the context of this study, the mainstream left and right converged on a moderately pro-market position (0.25 for the mainstream left and 0.36 for the mainstream right parties). Since these two party camps are still by far more important in terms of going public than the other two camps, this adds to neoliberal dominance in the politics on economic liberalization. Furthermore, we see that the salience of economic liberalization has decreased for all parties, but especially so for the mainstream parties. It is thus likely that the parties with potential governmental policies try to avoid talking about economic liberalization reforms which usually are quite unpopular (Kriesi et al., 2012).

Besides the reconfiguration among traditionally government-dominating parties, new actors are forcefully entering the debate on the pro-liberalization

side as well. Most notably, the long-term changes have been accompanied by a transnationalization of politics, i.e., the transformation of the territorial scope of conflicts beyond the nation state. To a large extent, new layers of economic policy making have been established beyond the nation state (Held et al., 1999, p. 80f.; Hooghe and Marks, 2001). First, vertical mechanisms of transnationalization are responsible for the increasing involvement of supra- and international actors in national debates (Lehmkuhl, 2006, p. 149). These actors mostly try to push for the opening of markets. A telling example is the EU, which, at least until the recent financial crisis, continuously pressured its member states to deepen the Single European Market (Howarth, 2006, p. 85f.; Thatcher, 2007).

Second, horizontal transnationalization is a further substantive process that brings along the increasing influence of foreign actors like foreign governments or multinational corporations in the countries' debate (Koopmans and Erbe, 2004). Most of all, the upsurge in international financial flows has made globally operating banks politically independent from the systems of patient capital that are essential for the functioning of the coordinated economies in continental Western Europe (Höpner and Krempel, 2003). Moreover, the process of horizontal transnationalization points to the efforts by the global players among the employers to dismantle collective bargaining, what substantially eroded the capacity of coordination and social solidarity in the interest intermediation regimes in many Western European countries (Hassel, 1999). The biggest financial institutes and other global players thus grew out of the national political networks they relied upon for decades.

To bring it all together, the main expectation on the debate analysis accordingly is that the mainstream party convergence and transnationalization have led to an pro-market mainstream in the debate on economic liberalization (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000, p. 476f.; Grande and Pauly, 2005). The effect of this mainstream can be described as a continuing push towards classical liberal policy recipes (Rodrik, 2006; Cerny, 2009). Its program, namely the favoring of trade liberalization, floating exchange rates, integration of financial markets, and expansion of transnational production, are backed by core beliefs about economic freedom and the spread of material wealth.

To really understand the coalition's political program, it is worth referring to one of its main origins. In "What Washington Means by Policy Reform", John Williamson (1990) summarized the shared policy stances of the Bretton Woods institutions, Wall Street actors and the US Treasury with respect to the conditions for international loans to developing countries (Wade and Veneroso, 1998). While some of the points raised in the document were irrelevant for Western Europe, many policy proposals of this 'Washington consensus' have been adopted by international and European organizations, e.g., the OECD, the European Commission, and a large number of Western European governments (Alesina and Giavazzi, 2006). In the latter case, the corresponding liberal policies were implemented via the traditional corporatist policy making networks (Regini, 2003; Streeck, 2006; Baccaro and Simoni, 2008).

2.4 Challenges of Neoliberal Dominance

As forcefully as the neoliberal dominance emerged from the public debate on economic liberalization in the last decades, there are not only adherents in the debate. More precisely, since globalization, post-industrialization, and the transformation of the state also have created new forms of opposition, there is a transition from the technocratic phase of economic liberalization to its repoliticization in the early 2000s. The traditional and newly emerging challengers are heterogeneous and thus less easy to conceptualize for researchers than the all-encompassing class conflict between labor and capital that firmly structured politics for much of the twentieth century (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Hironaka, 2005). What seems clear is that the movement of the established left parties to the center of economic conflicts opens up a niche on interventionist and protectionist issues. This gives several actors a promising opportunity to mobilize the economic losers' potential (De Vries and Edwards, 2009).

Following Kriesi et al. (2008, p.4-5), economic losers are best conceptualized as having insufficient exit options in terms of their employment situation. The pivotal determinant is the level of marketable skills, since a low educational attainment hampers economic mobility in today's highly flexible and internationalized labor markets (Oesch, 2006; Häusermann and Schwander, 2009). The decisive political dilemma for the politics of economic liberalization lies between claims for more deregulation to sustain the winners benefits and the increase of social and

national protective policy solutions to shelter the losers.

In this context, the labor in decline argumentation and welfare chauvinism thesis can be relied upon to formulate expectations for the left and right challengers. According to the latter, right-wing populists are increasingly discussed contenders in the debate on economic liberalization. According to the former, the traditional political left, i.e., radical left parties and trade unions are perceived as oppositional forces which struggle to sustain a decisive role (Wallerstein and Western, 2000; March and Mudde, 2005; Ruggie, 2007). First, the radical left parties traditionally seem very well suited to articulate the economic losers' potential in Western Europe since they mainly try to mobilize on the grievances against an excessive capitalism. Yet, there (at best) moderate success in the last years shows that this only happens to a marginal degree. In fact, radical socialist, communist, maoist, and trotzkiyst parties face serious constraints for a successful revival. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet union was detrimental to the electoral prospects of the classical radical left parties, because it undermined their ideological coherence and the credibility of their societal project. Thus, most radical left parties lost much of their importance in the decade after the fall of the Iron Curtain (March and Mudde, 2005). As the results from their election campaigning show (see table 2.1), they mobilized slightly more radical against economic liberalization and also had a stronger going public in the 2000s than in the decades before. But these shifts are rather marginal and they were also unable to reverse the general trend of declining salience of economic liberalization in election campaigns.

Trade unions seem to be in a rather difficult situation, too. From the postwar period until the late 1970s, labor markets became increasingly organized in advanced economies (Wallerstein and Western, 2000). Since the 1980s, however, trade union density and absolute membership numbers tend to fall in most countries, and many centralized systems of wage setting have been breaking apart – except in countries with a Ghent system¹⁶ (Regini, 2003; Häusermann, 2010a). Therefore, they have a hard time maintaining social protection at a fairly high level and are facing continuous pressure to make concessions in light of high unemployment numbers and increasing welfare costs (Baccaro and Simoni, 2008). More-

¹⁶ Systems where the main administrative responsibility over welfare payments, particularly in the field of unemployment benefits, is held by the trade unions, not by public authorities.

over, the relationship between social democratic parties and unions in Western Europe, until the 1970s a solid political coalition, has significantly weakened in the last decades (Upchurch et al., 2009). The shift of social democrats towards economic liberalism and their experience that strong ties to unions are an electoral liability have made them reluctant to strongly cooperate with the trade unions.

Against this background of the increasing difficulties of the labor movement, social movements are often brought forward as actors that take over the mobilization of discontent with globalization and post-industrialization. Indeed, the political-economic changes gave rise to the emergence of a variety of movements, commonly summarized under the label global justice movements. These movements can be seen as counter-movement against the multilateral economic institutions and their economic liberalism, which they perceive has detrimental socio-economic effects (Ruggie, 2007, p. 27). It might therefore be anticipated that social movements have obtained a significant standing in the debate, yet two reasons speak against this. First, since the 1960s, most social movements have focussed on multi-cultural, pacifist, emancipatory, and cosmopolitan demands, leaving economic issues aside. Second, since the peak of the movements mobilizing against economic liberalization in the late 1990s, the global justice movements lost much of their dynamic, even during the recent global financial crisis (Hutter, forthcoming; Wueest, 2011). Only in 2011, there is some significant mobilization observable with the ‘indignados’ (i.e., the outraged) movement in Spain and the occupy protests that started in New York. However, striking and demonstrating unions clearly seem to be more active with respect to the left opposition against global capital.

Figure 2.3 shows the salience of economic liberalization in the protest arena and the strike activity over all six countries for the last four decades. The salience of protests is measured as the share of participants in protests against economic liberalization. This protest data stem from the same research project as the debate and electoral campaign data (see Dolezal et al., 2012). The data contains a systematic account of the issues and positions related to less institutionalized events of political participation from 1970 to 2007. Since strikes are not covered in the protest event data set used in this analysis, they are reported separately. The index of strike activity stems from the Comparative Political Data Set and is calculated by counting the number of working days lost

per 1000 workers (see [Armingeon et al., 2010](#)). Since the indices have a different data base – share in number of participants and number of workdays lost –, they are not directly comparable with each other and only their development over time should be interpreted.




Figure 2.3 Protest Against Economic Liberalization

Notes: Sources: Kriesi et al. (2011) and Armingeon et al. (2010). All indices were standardized to a scale ranging from 0 to 100 across the six Western European countries.

Strike activity peaked during the economic crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since then, however, strike activity markedly cooled down, with the exception of the early 2000s, when German and French unions were up in arms against sweeping labor market reforms of their governments and the Austrian unions against drastic pension reforms of the right wing government. Protest activity is much more volatile, yet as already outlined, since the strong mobilization at the end of the 1990s, social movements tend to loose ground in terms of the opposition towards economic liberalization,

Despite the historically rooted dominance of the left in the opposition against liberal capitalism, it is also probable that another group of challengers emerges out of the conservative right to oppose the internationalization of the economies, albeit for different reason than the left.

This right challenger expectation pits populist right parties and protectionist business actors against the pro-market mainstream.

Most notably, populist right-wing parties have been successful in exploiting the existing potentials for more economic regulation (De Vries and Edwards, 2009). Previous studies have already shown that the winning formula of the populist right, a combination of cultural demarcation and economic liberalism, which was the preferred strategy of populist right parties during the 1990s, has lost much of its appeal in the 2000s (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Kitschelt, 2007). Nowadays, the right-wing populist parties increasingly approach the losers of recent transformations, also in economic terms and the working class has en masse turned to the right-wing populists in Western Europe (Oesch, 2008).

Right-wing populists increasingly succeed in linking economic competition to the endangered standard of living of the indigenous populations, as the electoral success of the *True Finns* this year shows (see Grande and Kriesi, forthcoming). Their opposition to the opening of markets is culturally motivated, since they perceive national sovereignty and the well-being of the national workforce to be in danger (Mudde, 2007; Berezin, 2009). This welfare chauvinism expectation therefore suggests that the populist right-wing parties step up as major oppositional forces in the debate on economic liberalization. In doing so, they likely side with protectionist business and employer associations. The results in table 2.1., however, contrast this expectation. Right challenger parties actually have become more pro-market oriented over the last four decades. But from the 1990s to the 2000s, we observe a slight decrease of their pro-liberalization stance, which possibly indicates a growing skepticism of at least some populist right parties.

In other words, opposition on the right can be expected from internationally less successful economic sectors. As Katzenstein (1985) as well as David and Mach (2006) have shown for small Western European economies, a conservative and protectionist faction always existed among business actors, mainly among farmers and small businesses which a focus on domestic markets. With increasing economic integration during the last decades, however, the frictions within business likely have become more pronounced in all of Europe (Schneider and Grote, 2006). Accordingly, some business actors may be inclined to opt for oligopolis-

tic strategies since this allows them to keep profits within the national economy (Roach, 2005, p. 19).

2.5 New Conflict Dimensions on Economic Liberalization

The transformation of the fundamental conflict constellation in the debate on economic liberalization is accompanied by a change in the underlying conflict dimensions. This change, however, poses a complex challenge to conceptualize in terms of the dimensionality of the debate, since the long-term transformations have eroded the once overwhelming class cleavage (Dalton et al., 1984; Kriesi, 1998; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). More precisely, the political conflicts on intervention in the economy and redistribution have become heterogeneous, since the political actor's preferences do not align on a single dimension any more (Häusermann and Kriesi, 2011).

Nevertheless, debates in specific policy domain are never an unstructured amalgam of communicative acts. A small number of underlying dimensions usually accurately describes the conflict lines of a debate: "While the detailed local substance of political competition varies in idiosyncratic ways from setting to setting, key features of its structure are fairly constant" (Laver and Sergenti, 2011, p. 17). Accordingly, economic liberalization still gives rise to new political divides.

From the globalization literature, we have learnt that the simple mutually exclusive separation into national and international markets no longer exists (Tarrow and Caporaso, 2009, p. 594). National markets have become more and more intertwined and international institutions increasingly intervene into arenas once perceived as strongholds of domestic politics. As Zürn and Walter (2005, p. 273f.) highlight, the consequence is that there is a growing divide between those who profit from internationalized markets and those who profit from the sheltering of national industries. One important factor responsible for this divide is exposure to international competition, i.e., between the tradables and nontradables sectors in a country (Frieden, 1991; Hays, 2009). The second crucial variable is skill (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006). The internationalization of markets increases the demand for the abundantly available factors of a country, which in advanced economies typically is

high-skilled labor (Midford, 1993). Consequently, the well-educated are beneficiaries of globalization, while low-skilled workers lose out. From the perspective of the internationalization of the economies, the decisive political dilemma lies thus between claims for more deregulation and liberalization of the national economy to sustain the winners benefits and the increase of social and national protective policy solutions to shelter the losers.

Even if internationalization has become a crucial aspect of economic policy making in Western Europe, many important steps towards liberalization such as privatizations and labor market reforms are still carried out at the domestic level (Schwartz, 2001, p. 31). Moreover, the welfare literature forcefully points to the legacy of class politics in Western Europe (Häusermann, 2010a). Although cultural liberalism and cosmopolitan values related to the new left have become more salient for the political left and mainstream left parties experiment with ‘flexicurity’ approaches to restructure welfare states, it is evident that the ideological antagonism between labor and capital still divides today’s politics at least to some extent (Kriesi et al., 2012; Pontusson and Rueda, 2010). Apart from the opposition between state and market this divide concerns also social policies. It thus splits labor, i.e. unions, left parties and public interest groups (social movements and charity organizations), favoring highly redistributive policies, and capital, i.e. right parties, employers organizations and international firms, which prefer means tested benefit structures (Esping-Andersen, 1999).

In sum, conflicts on economic liberalization can thus take place with regard to domestic politics or they can be concerned with the changing relationship between the national economy and global markets, i.e., whether business activity should be free to move across borders or not (Hellwig, 2008; Hall and Gingerich, 2009, p. 37). We therefore assume two dimensions of the debate on economic liberalization, since state intervention to ensure social security and state intervention to protect national sovereignty are two strictly different aspects of economic liberalization. Or, as Kitschelt (2007, p. 1183) puts it, “trade always cut across, or was antithetical to distributive class politics.” Chapter 6 will empirically assess the structure of the debate on economic liberalization. For this purpose, the issue categories as listed in table 2.2 will be used as a starting point. The categories are a first aggregation of the issues coded during the content analyses. This preparatory work is needed since

the hundreds of inductively collected issues were too unstructured to be included as such into the analyses. Chapter 5 contains more information on the data collection. Furthermore, a precise listing of the content of the categories can be found in Table A.5 in the appendix.

In the following, the concepts underlying the classification will be described. After the separation of the domestic from the international aspects of economic liberalization, a second distinction is introduced, along which economic liberalization is further disaggregated. As Vogel (1996, p. 3) emphasizes, economic liberalization can entail regulatory aspects or the retreat of the public sector which activates free market mechanisms. Moreover, since there is no zero-sum relationship between government intervention and market processes, freer markets often imply tighter and more widespread controls by public authorities. Each distinction is further disaggregated as far as the numbers of coded observations for each issue allow. All issue labels are formulated in a way that the dimensions and issues have a clear direction in favor of economic liberalization. This is important for the consistency of the analyses, since the meaning of positive and negative with regard to policy statements is always the same.

Table 2.2 *Issues of the Debate on Economic Liberalization*

Dimension		Issue
Domestic	Regulatory aspects	Retrenchment of restrictions
		Labor market deregulation
	Activating aspects	Privatization
		Economic promotion
International	Regulatory aspects	International market deregulation
	Activating aspects	Internationalization
	aspects	Locational competition

Thus, for both distinction, two issues are defined, except for international market regulation. This issue contained too few statements collected in the content analysis to further decompose. To begin with, general regulatory retrenchment and labor market deregulation policies, both related to the domestic dimension and regulatory aspects, are discerned. The issue *retrenchment of restrictions* entails all statements regarding the loosening of competition constraints, more business friendly corporate

governance, and the weakening of social partnership. For example, regulations concerning unfair competition, too high manager salaries, or social-compensation plans fall in this category. *Labor market deregulation* consists of statements related to more flexible employment regulation, e.g., measures related to dismissal protection or shop opening hours. Further, *privatization*, i.e., the cut-back or sale of state production, is separated from general *economic promotion* policies, which, for example, entail tax benefits for businesses or bailout programs of nearly collapsing corporations.

As with the issues of the domestic dimension, regulatory aspects (*international market deregulation*) are separated from policies aiming at expanding the scope of market mechanisms in the economic sphere. International market deregulation policies include restrictions to interventions in financial markets, trade, and international labor markets as well as the introduction of more flexible tax regimes. And finally, with respect to activating aspects of international liberalization, *internationalization* is discerned from *locational competition*. The former comprises the promotion of trade and free movement of labor, while the latter covers tax competition and the active promotion of foreign direct investment.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter outlined the big picture of how the macroeconomic environment and accordingly the politics on economic liberalization in Western Europe have changed during the last decades. While the basic situation in terms of productivity and economic misery remained fairly constant over time, the importance of the service sectors and especially economic exposure have steadily increased. Western Europe is far more exposed to the global economy and also more de-industrialized than decades ago. This has not only changed the nature of the state, but lies most likely also at the origin of a fundamental transformation of public debates on economic liberalization policy making in Western Europe.

The first fundamental expectation regarding the debate analysis is the change of the public debate towards a two-dimensional structure instead of a simple unidimensional left-right bifurcation. Furthermore, public political competition is expected to relate to one or both of two specific dimensionality: Either the growing importance of internation-

alization for public conflicts or conflicts on state involvement into the markets are structuring public debates on economic liberalization. By testing the two-dimensionality expectation, this analysis thus sets out to revisit the left-right paradigm often assumed in popular and scientific accounts of conflicts on economic policy making.

This chapter also provided the historical background for the debate analysis, from which the expectations regarding a pro-market mainstream and its challengers from the political left and right were derived. The transnationalization of economic policy making and mainstream party convergence led to a pro-liberalization mainstream which should generally entail the following actors: established parties and the corresponding governments and public administrations they control, EU and international bodies, multinational corporations and the business associations representing them.

With regards to the key players of groups challenging the pro-liberalization mainstream, trade unions are still expected to play an important role in mobilizing grievances against the consequences of free markets, although the intensity of their opposition has decreased over the decades. The radical left parties and social movements, in contrast, are hypothesized to be only marginal actors in the debates. The populist radical right, in contrast, who mobilizes oppositional potentials for cultural reasons, is a new important contender in the debate. They are expected to side with traditionally protectionist business actors.

Table 2.3 offers an overview over the expectations with regard to the dimensionality, mainstream formation, and challengers in the public debate on economic liberalization. During the analyses, the neoliberal dominance, labor in decline and protectionism theses are tested in a longitudinal analysis of election campaigns and protest events from the 1970s until 2007. Moreover, all expectations are explored by comparing the debates across the six countries under study.

Table 2.3 *Expectations on the Overall Transformation of Conflict*

<i>Mainstream formation</i>	Mainstream party convergence and transnationalization led to a pro-liberalization mainstream on economic reform.
<i>Challengers</i>	Although in decline, the labor movement remains the most important opponent of economic liberalization, but right-wing populists, small business actors, and public welfare organizations are also increasingly fighting economic liberalization reforms.
<i>Two-dimensionality of the debate</i>	Not the left-right dimension, but the separation between struggles for the internationalization of the economies and the liberalization of domestic markets structures the debate.

3

How Institutional Contexts Relate to Public Debates

Until now, the broad picture was outlined of how the economic environment and conflicts on economic liberalization have evolved. Yet, even if they diagnose a strong convergence among Western European countries towards a free market model in the early 1990s, Crouch and Streeck (1997, p. 7) note that “differentiated typologies of market mechanisms” still lead to varying trajectories among countries. Institutions, broadly understood as sets of rules or practices with rule-like qualities, constrain the room to maneuver for political competitors and thus affect how much influence different interests have in policy making processes (North, 1990; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; O’Reilly, 2005). National peculiarities in debates are thus assumed to persist even under the influence of strong adaptive pressures like globalization and post-industrialization (see Pontusson, 2005). More precisely, the institutional contexts “can be systematically linked to the distribution of power and the type of interaction” among actors in a specific debate (Adam and Kriesi, 2007, p. 138).

In general, the relationship between institutions and actors engaged in debates runs both ways. Institutions structure the articulation of political demands, while the actors, in turn, provide the motives for engaging in the public debate and, ultimately, institutional change (Lieberman, 2002). Actors thus interpret the institutional context in different ways, which gives rise to contention over the meaning of these institutions and, ultimately, to their incremental modification (Clemens and Cook, 1999). By combining approaches from the comparative political economy with insights a political communication perspective, this chapter elaborates the theoretical underpinnings of the influence of institutions, i.e., how the neoliberal dominance on economic liberalization and its challengers differ by countries and arenas.

However, institutions do more than constrain actors' material predispositions, they also shape their discursive capabilities. This means that actors may behave strategically, but their preferences are historically rooted and rely on contingent interpretations of institutionalized values, norms, and power configurations (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Herrigel and Wittke, 2005). On the basis of these institutionally shaped preferences, actors seek to transform institutional settings through their engagement in political conflicts. Although there are for sure radical shifts in the institutional settings of countries and arenas as the traditional institutional accounts show, important processes of fundamental institutional change are incrementally driven by continuous political conflict.

Given that, with respect to economic liberalization, domestic and transnational veto players are a crucial transmitting point for the diffusion of liberalization reforms, the impact of long-term developments depends on the strategies of political actors which, in turn, are preconditioned by *path dependency*, i.e., the actors' strategies are embedded in historically grown national political-economic arrangements (Risse et al., 2001; Brinegar et al., 2004, p. 63f.). Moreover, debates are even more exposed to the influence of institutions than policy decisions, since public discourse is especially strongly shaped by ideologies and entrenched historical legacies (Ferree et al., 2002; Medrano, 2003).

In sum, the institutionalization of economic liberalization is understood as a dynamic process involving mutual interdependence of political conflict and institutions (Jackson, 2010, p. 65). In the following, the interaction of a specific sphere of political conflict, namely public debates, and the countries' and arenas' inherent institutions are discussed.

3.1 Countries: Diverging Institutional Constellations

We begin the discussion on diverging public debates with an overview of key economic developments in the six countries. More specifically, economic flows across borders, tertiarization, and the economic misery index are analyzed to assess how strongly the countries were affected by globalization, post-industrialization and general economic difficulties, respectively. The findings on the trends of the countries' economic performance in the last four decades will help to contextualize the expectations on the debate analysis later on.

Cross-border economic flows is an index consisting of indicators measuring trade and international financial activities. Tertiarization is a composite number indicating service sector growth in terms of economic output and employment. The economic misery index, finally, shows how the countries were affected by unemployment rates and inflation. All figures in the table represent the decade averages of the standardized indices, which take values from 0 to 100. This allows to compare the six countries directly, but does not allow absolute comparisons with other economies.

Table 3.1 *Globalization, Tertiarization and Economic Misery*

	A	FR	DE	NL	CH	UK
<i>Cross-border economic flows</i>						
1970	16.1	2.2	2.1	63.8	47.9	38.4
1980	31.7	19.7	11.8	78.7	63.7	51.7
1990	50.6	38.0	29.2	88.4	77.6	57.6
2000	81.3	54.9	54.5	97.0	91.2	64.7
Δ 1970/2000	+65.2	+52.7	+52.4	+33.2	+43.3	+26.3
<i>Tertiarization</i>						
1970	29.9	39.2	21.8	68.5	n.a.	n.a.
1980	45.5	64.8	49.9	89.2	n.a.	84.6
1990	59.6	80.0	65.0	92.5	72.9	88.0
2000	74.4	86.6	83.0	95.7	79.0	88.5
Δ 1970/2000	+44.5	+47.4	+61.2	+27.2	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Economic misery</i>						
1970	24.1	42.0	22.8	35.9	14.7	56.9
1980	22.1	54.9	29.5	43.9	9.7	59.3
1990	18.7	40.5	34.6	27.8	15.3	38.4
2000	19.2	33.9	36.5	16.4	11.9	20.1
Δ 1970/2000	-4.9	-8.1	+13.7	-19.5	-2.8	-36.8

Notes: All numbers are decade averages of indices which range from 0 to 100 (for the 2000s, however, only the years up to 2007 were considered); Sources: KOF ([Dreher et al., 2008](#)) and [OECD \(2010\)](#).

The overall trend with respect to cross-border economic flows is very clear. A strong and continuous increase in transnational trade and financial activity in every country can be observed. The growth is strongest in Austria, whose integration into the global markets was quite low in the 1970s (16.1 index points) but sharply rose by 65.2 index points to 81.3. In fact, after regaining access to the Eastern European markets during the 1990s, Austria has rapidly caught up with Switzerland's and

the Netherlands' level of trade, although these other two small, continental countries remain by far the most open economies with an average of over 90 index points in the 2000s.

Switzerland does not only have an exceptionally high and long-standing export dependency of 80 percent or more with regard to its most important industrial sectors, above all the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, mechanical engineering, and horology. Its financial sector is also widely outreaching its own economy. The chemical and pharmaceutical industries as well as the financial sector with its center in Amsterdam are also important drivers of economic openness in the Netherlands, which is additionally the key transport hub to continental Europe with its large overseas ports.

The U.K. shows the weakest increase in international economic flows over time (26.3 index points), which means that France and Germany have reached similar degrees of economic openness. However, the U.K. still is the most open country of the three biggest Western European economies in the 2000s, but its margin is reduced to about ten index points, while it was clearly ahead with approximately 38 points in the 1970s, compared to 2 in France and Germany. The U.K. thus still profits from its reputation as a strong center for the financial markets as well as its pioneering role for the internationalization of industrial production. Interestingly, Germany and France have developed almost in lockstep, which hints at their dense economic interdependence that emerged out of their common role as core economies of the European single market (Trouille, 2007).

To conclude, integration into the European and global markets remains more important for small Western European countries, although its impact nowadays is also substantive for big economies. Note that the timing and speed are highly correlated. The early integrated countries, i.e., the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.K., are affected by much slower increases of economic cross-border flows than the late ones. Germany, Austria, and France had – in comparison to the other countries – quite low levels of economic integration but a subsequent period of internationalization at a high pace. This should have considerably activated the conflict potentials of the international liberalization dimension in the public debate.

The development of tertiarization shows a similar general trend like the development of cross-border economic flows. The steepest growth of tertiarization, however, took place between the 1970s and the 1980s but not in the 1990s as for economic cross-border activity. The pattern that all six countries belong to the the group of early deindustrializing countries corresponds to Iversen and Cusack's (2000: 342) much more detailed analysis. In addition, the picture for the single countries also slightly differs.

As with economic openness, the Netherlands are the most tertiarized country (95.7 index points), followed by the U.K., France and Germany. Moreover, Germany exhibits the most impressive growth of the tertiary sector (+61.2), followed by France (+47.4) and Austria (+44.5). In the U.K., as far as there are data available, the level of tertiarization remains fairly constant compared to the other countries. It only grows by 3.9 index points. Yet the U.K. already started from a very high level in the 1980s. The Netherlands and the U.K. have a slightly bigger share of the tertiary sector than the other countries in the 2000s, yet the differences are not so substantial as with regard to international economic flows. Further, contrasting their high economic openness, Austria and Switzerland are the least tertiarized countries.

With respect to economic misery, i.e., to the basic economic difficulties in the six countries, the trends are less uniform. The index of inflation combined with the unemployment rate shows neither a constant development over time nor a simultaneous course among countries. To begin with Switzerland, it performs best over the four decades by far, displaying the lowest degree of economic misery throughout the period studied and ending up with 11.9 index points.¹ Similarly constant, Austria was stable at a level of about 20 index points. In these two countries, the general economic environment did not change substantially in comparison with the other four countries. Here, the economic context thus seems to exert about the same pressure for liberalization reforms in all decades, although it has to be noted that Switzerland and Austria – like other advanced economies – for sure have lost to emerging markets in terms of their economic competitiveness. The pressure for reforms in Germany, by contrast, rose considerably over time as the sharp increase in economic misery by 13.7 index points indicates. This development, of course, was

¹ Contrary to the other indices, a negative direction of the trend of economic misery of course indicates a positive statement about the state of the economy.

heavily influenced by the economic burden of the reunification and became mainly evident in the combination of low growth, radically rising welfare costs, and high unemployment rates (Vail, 2008). In the 2000s, the misery index for Germany was highest among the countries under study.

In the Netherlands, the *Dutch miracle*, a series of incremental social policy reforms which led to the virtuous cooccurrence of strong growth and low unemployment from the mid-1990s on, resulted in a cut of the economic misery index by almost one half from the 1990s to the 2000s (Visser and Hemerjick, 1997). In a similar vein, the U.K. displays a continuous and drastic improvement of its general economic situation after being far behind at the bottom end of the six countries in the 1970s (−36.8 index points). Especially the Conservative government of John Major and the following third way Labour governments were able to considerably lower the economic misery from the 1990s onwards. In France, finally, economic misery could be reduced as well, but not as substantially as in the U.K. The general economic situation in France remained almost as dire as in Germany (Vail, 2008).

In sum, except the difference between small and big economies with regard to economic openness and the high economic misery in France and Germany, there are no substantial variations among the among the six countries. But why should the debate on economic liberalization then run differently across national contexts? Building on the work of Shonfield (1965) and Zysman (1983), accounts of different institutional trajectories of political-economic development have sprung up in the last two decades (e.g., Albert, 1993; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Schmidt, 2009; McCartney, 2009). The basic assumption of this literature is that capitalist economies differ in terms of how interests are intermediated, although each system in itself is efficiently organized and leads to a high performance. This contribution will stick to existing institutionalist typologies in full awareness of the flaws associated with them. Yet to reinvent the wheel with every other analysis blurs the understanding of the essential meaning of specific institutional constellations. A better solution seems to use renowned typologies but to define the implications and explanatory claims of these typologies in the context of the own specific research framework. It is thus neither the aim of this

contribution to present a comprehensive overview of all typologies nor to review the vast literature that is concerned with one or more typology.

The most influential recent attempt to conceptualize capitalist democratic regimes probably is the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The VoC approach is organized around the employers' coordination capacities – however defined – as the key distinguishing feature (Hall and Gingerich, 2009). More precisely, it identifies two diverging patterns of adaptation to economic changes (Hancké et al., 2007). Liberal Market Economies (LME), on the one hand, can be characterized by non-cooperative relations between unions and employers, a market-driven financial system, and arm's length relations among firms. With respect to the country sample of this study, the U.K. most closely matches the premises of this LME category.

In Coordinated Market Economies (CME), on the other hand, union-employer relationships are generally perceived as cooperative, industries traditionally have close ties to banks, and employers are organized in associations. This means that business in CME is more intensely involved in processes of interest intermediation between trade unions, public authorities, professional organizations and employer associations. In LME, instead, less formal interactions are usually assumed to take place among the different economic interest groups, leading to a more confrontational nature of employment relations. From the six countries under study, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland can be classified as CME.

The different composition of such institutional arrangements has straightforward consequences on how countries react to abrupt economic upheavals. As Hall and Soskice (2001) argue, firms in LME are quicker to hire and fire in response to a changing economic environment than employer in CME. Exogenously induced shocks are thus more directly passed on to workers. In coordinated economies, labor markets are designed to at least partly withstand the volatility of markets (Hays, 2009, p. 13). The main strategy are cooperative agreements between employers, trade unions and the public authorities. Trade unions are more willing to agree to necessary conditions to endure a crisis like wage moderation or temporary part-time work. These concessions by the unions, on the one hand, depend on state guaranties to shore up employment protection and to supplement income losses. On the other hand, business has

to make binding commitments to maintain pre-crisis employment and wage levels.

The parsimony of the VoC dichotomy comes with one major disadvantage. It is necessary to define at least one residual category (the Mixed-Market Economies) for countries that do not consistently fit into the ideal-type pattern. Unfortunately, very important countries for the political economy research like Japan or France fall in this category. In relying on Shonfield's (1965) differentiation between arm's length, interventionist and organized capitalist systems, Schmidt (2009) convincingly argues that this misconception is due to the neglect of the state as the central mediating and intervening actor in the economic sphere and extends the two Varieties of Capitalism to three – Liberal, Coordinated and State-influenced (SME) Market Economies.

While in LME like the U.K. the influence of the state is limited to rule setting and conflict settlement, it actively tries to facilitate economic activities in CME and SME. However, in CME the state acts as a co-equal to employers and unions to negotiate employment protection, to participate in wage bargaining, or to set other economic regulations (Schmidt, 2009, p. 521). In SME, by contrast, the state often appears as an entrepreneurial state which actively decides over business activities (Thibergien, 2007). Such countries traditionally rely on a large public sector and long-term state-led development strategies. In the context of this study, France can clearly be defined as a SME.

A second very important conceptualization of institutional patterns in different countries is the neocorporatist distinction of different types of labor and employment relations (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979). In contrast to the employer-centered view of the VoC tradition, neocorporatists preferably focus on trade unions. Corporatist regimes rely on bargaining mechanisms among quite centralized interest groups, while economic interest groups in general are fragmented in pluralist regimes. Despite their different exploratory aims, however, the VoC typology and neocorporatist classification quite nicely coincide. There is congruence between corporatist regimes and CME, whereas SME and LME are characterized by pluralist interest intermediation, leaving trade unions with a comparatively weak position in labor relations (Sapir, 2006).

Among the four corporatist/CME countries of the study, the Netherlands and Switzerland can be further separated (Visser and Afonso, 2010). Similar to other continental European economies, the Netherlands and Switzerland face high wages and fixed labor costs but – as outliers – did not experience sharply rising unemployment (Iversen and Cusack, 2000). Both countries have relied on a comparatively flexible labor market to compensate for economic difficulties by extending part-time and temporary employment (Visser and Hemerjick, 1997; Bonoli and Mach, 2000). Moreover, in contrast to other CME like Austria, labor movements traditionally play a subordinate role and business interests are dominated by the large export-oriented companies (Katzenstein, 1985). It is therefore expected that Switzerland and the Netherlands can be characterized by liberal-leaning institutional arrangements.

To begin with the more intuitive expectation, institutional settings shape the degree of national *distinctiveness* of public conflicts, i.e., how closed national debates still are for international, European, and foreign actors in the different countries. The territorial scope of economic policy making has considerably extended beyond the nation-state, but these trends are not assumed to uniformly affect all countries in the same ways. In France, the influential state is expected to keep the debate as national as possible, since it should be reluctant to give away control over the economy.

In the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, national networks between social partners and administrations should also be an important barrier to transnationalization. In these cases, however, there is also a clear trend to Europeanize labor relations (Lehmkuhl, 2006), which is why the distinctiveness should be lower relative to France but still moderate. With respect to Switzerland, however, non-EU membership should additionally keep the debate more distinctive. In the U.K., finally, labor relations and the influence of national public authorities are kept at a comparatively low level, which should lead to a less nationally distinct debate. In sum, I assume that among the six countries studied, the debate is the largely inhabited by national actors in France and Switzerland, followed by Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands, whereas in the U.K. international, European and foreign actors will play a more significant role.

The second set of hypotheses regarding the influence of the institutional arrangements is related to the *overall climate* of the debate in the six countries, i.e., how the policy conflicts are turning out in terms of overall positions and polarization on the aggregated levels of the national debates. Quite straightforwardly, the debate should overall be more supportive of economic liberalization in the U.K. The U.K. has a deep-rooted legacy as a promoter of free markets due to its role as former hegemon in and main profiteer of the world trade system (Gifford, 2007, p. 465).

In France, in contrast, the debate is expected to be relatively more skeptic against economic liberalization. The reason is that economic modernization strategies have traditionally relied on major industrial projects with far-reaching state intervention (Maclean, 2002). Additionally, due to their liberal-leaning corporatism and most notably more flexible labor market regulations, the overall climate in Switzerland and the Netherlands should be more market-friendly than in Austria and Germany. Yet the CME are generally expected to have moderate stances. On the one hand, the power resource approach holds that social partners in coordinated economies are expected to have more moderate stances in decision-making processes in contexts of increasing international competition (Lange, 1984; Korpi, 2006). On the other hand, the VoC approach similarly maintains that employers in coordinated market economies are more in favor of social protection since their comparative advantage lies in industries where asset-specific skills prevail (Emmenegger and Marx, 2011).

As Hallin and Mancini (2004, p. 66) forcefully argue, the specific features of the capitalist democratic systems as discussed are related to particular media system characteristics, since the political-economic and media systems developed coherently in lockstep. In the context of this study, media system features are crucial to identify the intensity of conflict in public debates. More precisely, Hallin and Mancini distinguish between three ideal-typical models of media and politics whose labels already suggest a close relationship between media and political systems: liberal, democratic corporatist, and polarized pluralist systems. Liberal media systems lack extensive press subsidies and put emphasis on private ownership in media policy. As far as the countries of this study are concerned, the U.K. comes closest to this model, although the strong public broadcaster BBC sets it clearly apart from more liberal me-

dia systems like the U.S.A. Polarized pluralist countries such as France have a strongly contrasting development. The history of sharp ideological conflict has led to a more confrontational political style, not only with respect to electoral campaigns, political protests, and labor market disputes, but also in the mass mediated public arena (Kriesi et al., 1995, 2012). Thus, we expect a rather conflictive debate in France, while the debate is anticipated to be less polarized in the U.K. In Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, public debates should thus be relatively moderate compared to France but more conflictive than in the U.K.

Finally, the different types of political-economic arrangements should also create different opportunities for actors participating in political contention (Hancké et al., 2007). This, in turn, leads to distinct debates regarding who participates how in the six countries under concern. In terms of the *accessibility* of debates, pluralist countries like France and the U.K. can thus be described as systems where reform agendas are usually decided by a small elite (Lijphart, 1999; Schmidt, 2010, p. 16). Corporatist countries like Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Austria tend to have a more inclusive debate to reach a broader support for reforms. It can thus be anticipated that a broader range of actors engage in public debates in these countries. Additionally, the comprehensive direct-democratic institutions in Switzerland should lead to the most inclusive debate.

3.2 Arenas: Structuring Sites of the Policy Process

Not only the national institutional contexts are interdependent with the opportunities and constraints of actors, but also the specific arena in which the debate takes place (Helbling et al., 2012). Arenas can be defined as sites of political contention separated by specific rules and norms of an either formal or informal nature (see Ferree et al., 2002; Bartolini, 2005, p. 27f.; Kriesi et al., 2011). In this sense, arenas can be perceived as “structured fields of action” with their own sets of constraints and opportunities for the actors participating in debates (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977) or as “*rule systems* which affect how individual and collective actors perceive, define and pursue their interests in complex surroundings” (Schneider and Grote, 2006, p. 2, own emphasis).

The analyses of the public debate are centered on the public arena as the forum to which all political communication is directed in established democracies (Ferree et al., 2002). Yet, by paying particular attention to the arenas from where the actors make their statements, this study will explore the relationship between these arenas and the public discourse. As table 4.2 summarizes, we can organize the different arenas according to their function in the political process (Aberbach et al., 1981, p. 1; Poggi, 1990; Scharpf, 1999, p. 7-21). In most general terms, the analysis takes place in the public arena, which is defined by the discursive strategies of the elites, the journalistic work flow, and the citizens' patterns of media consumption. Yet, actors enter the public debate from different phases of the political process. These phases roughly can be separated into input (governing by the people) and output (governing for the people) arenas of the political system: First, the input side is the realm where political potentials are mobilized, political innovations are brought up and policy options are debated. This refers to the parliamentary, electoral, protest, and direct-democratic arenas – provided the corresponding institutional procedures exist in a given country. The parliamentary arena is marked by the strict rules of debating and decision-making. Further, the electoral arena is constituted by the rules of party competition and the casting of votes. Protest politics, on the contrary, is not characterized by such formal rules, though protests nowadays are professionalized, ritualized performances to gain public attention (Tarrow, 1994, 94).

Table 3.2 *The Arena Structure of the Debate*

Policy process	Arenas
Input	Parliamentary, electoral, protest, and direct-democratic arenas
Janus-faced	European and international governmental arenas, domestic executive and judicial arena
Output	Arena of interest intermediation, administrative, political advisory, and business arena

The output arenas are the sites where policies are implemented and evaluated. This includes the following arenas: the arena of interest intermediation with its entrenched regimes of how labor unions, employers, and professional associations interact with the public authorities; the

political advisory arena, where policies are criticized and evaluated by more or less independent experts; and the business arena, where profit-oriented and entrepreneurial behavior is the distinct characteristic.

In between input and output arenas are governmental and judicial arenas, which have a *janus-faced* position (Kriesi, 2007, p. 263). On the one hand, public authorities heavily interact with the input arenas: they intervene into the decision-making processes in the parliamentary arena by providing expertise for new regulations and influence the electoral and direct-democratic arenas by political campaigning. On the other hand, they head the administration and moderate negotiations between social partners in interest intermediation processes. They thus influence both sides of the policy process. These janus-faced arenas include the international and supranational state arena as well as the domestic executive and judicial arena. These arenas are defined by the rules and norms of international relations and the EU's own institutional procedures, by the rules of executive decision-making and law enforcement, and by specific legal procedures, respectively.

Due to their inherent institutional patterns, arenas have an impact on the course of public debates. Overall, debates in the input arenas are hypothesized to be accessible for the largest number of actors. This is due to the many channels for participation of the input arenas, most notably in the protest arena. Since janus-faced arenas are the sites of decision making, public authorities are crowding out most other actors. These arenas are thus anticipated to be relatively closed. The output arenas, finally, are hypothesized to be less inclusive than the input arenas, but not as exclusive than janus-faced arenas since at least experts and economic interest groups are expected to have regular access to the debate here.

Moreover, it is also anticipated that arenas substantially differ with respect to their overall climate, i.e., the aggregated policy positions and polarization. In general, the input arenas are hypothesized to be more conflictive than the other arenas. First, arenas decisively co-determine who gets access to the debate and who has how many communicative resources available. An evident example is the electoral arena, which is defined by the norms and rules of party competition and vote aggregation: Party manifestos would not be established and no televised debate would bring together candidates if there were no election. Moreover, po-

litical parties are clearly the key actors in the electoral arena, whereas the field of potential participants is much larger in, for instance, direct-democratic campaigns (Kriesi et al., 2009).

Intermediary actors like parties and protest movements are struggling here to mobilize political potentials. Thus, the challengers of the pro-market mainstream loom highest in input arenas. In the janus-faced arenas, actors care about the reformulation and implementation of the policies debated and decided in the input arenas. I therefore suggest this to be the most cooperative arenas, i.e., polarization should be lowest here. Furthermore, the mainstream parties in government dominate these arenas and, therefore, these arenas should be tightly connected with the mainstream on economic liberalization. In terms of the overall policy positions, janus-faced arenas are thus anticipated to be the most liberal arenas.

The output arenas, finally, are expected to occupy a middle ground. While some actors, such as interest groups, are hypothesized to fiercely fight about the consequences of policies implemented by the authorities, other actors are expected to be distinctly mainstream-oriented. Namely business actors and experts in general are expected to be firm supporters of neo-liberal dominance, while unions are expected to be prominent opponents. This should lead to a moderately polarized debate, which is more conflictive than in the janus-faced arenas but less than in the input arenas.

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter has been concerned with the expected impact of the institutional constellations in countries and arenas on the general course of the public debates. To conclude, table 3.3 summarizes the hypotheses established in this chapter. First, depending on the strength of the state in economic policy making, the distinctiveness of the debates, i.e., the degree with which the debate runs national, is anticipated to vary across countries. This makes the debate in France the most closed one and the debate in the U.K. the most open. Switzerland, as a special case, is hypothesized to resemble France with its comparatively distinct debate.

Table 3.3 *Expectations on the Impact of the Institutional Context*

<i>Distinctiveness in countries</i>	The debate in France and Switzerland should be more nationally driven than the debates in the other countries, while it is expected to be least centered on domestic actors in the U.K.
<i>Accessibility in countries</i>	The debate in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and especially in Switzerland is inhabited by a broader variety of actors than in France and the U.K.
<i>Accessibility in arenas</i>	Input arenas are anticipated to be the most accessible sites of the policy process, while the janus-faced arenas are expected to be most exclusive. Output arenas are hypothesized to take the middle ground.
<i>Overall climate in countries</i>	The U.K. leans towards a liberal position; France is expected to be more interventionist and protectionist; the other countries are expected to be in-between, with the Netherlands and Switzerland closer to the U.K. and Germany and Austria closer to France.
<i>Conflict intensity in countries</i>	Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are hypothesized to be more polarized than the U.K., but less than France.
<i>Overall climate in arenas</i>	With regard to the positions, input arenas are the least liberal ones, whereas the janus-faced arenas are anticipated to be firmly connected with the pro-market mainstream. The output arenas should occupy a middle ground with respect to the position and conflict intensity.
<i>Conflict intensity in arenas</i>	The highly conflictive input arenas are separated from the more consensus-oriented janus-faced arenas.

Second, the range of actors which are able to access the debate is assumed to be a function of the specific country contexts, too. In comparison with the U.K. and France, more actors should be able to engage in the public debate on economic liberalization in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and especially Switzerland because of its comprehensive direct democratic institutions. Finally, the capitalist regime type that characterizes the six countries is assumed to influence the overall climate of the debate. The U.K. – and to a lesser extent – the Netherlands and Switzerland should lean towards a liberal position, while France is expected to be more skeptical regarding economic liberalization. The remaining two countries, Germany and Austria, are in between these two extremes. And finally, it is assumed that the debates in corporatist countries are accessible to a broader range of actors than in the two pluralist countries France and U.K.

With regard to arenas, the highly conflictive input arenas were separated from the more consensus-oriented janus-faced arenas, with the output arenas taking a middle position. In addition, the positions are hypothesized to vary in lockstep with the conflict intensity: Whereas input arenas are the least liberal ones, the janus-faced arenas are firmly connected with the pro-market mainstream.

So far, the overarching argumentation was stepped through with respect to the overall transformation of conflicts on economic liberalization in the last chapter and in terms of influence the institutional contexts in this one. The next chapter will conclude the theoretical outline by adding the the expectations derived from specific actor characteristics to the set of hypotheses.

Debate Coalition Formation: The Actors' Strategic Repertoire in Public Debates

As outlined in the previous chapters, debates are shaped to a considerable extent by long-term transformations and the institutional contexts. Economic liberalization reforms, in turn, largely depend on the outcome of dynamic processes in the public debate, which are driven by political agency. The actors' crafting of the messages which are mediated to the public is thus crucial for the prospects of getting their interests respected in the policy making process, i.e., to get "the audience involved in the fight" (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 4). The success of actors in debates can consequentially be conceptualized by discursive strategies by which actors strive to mobilize supporters or persuade critics (Enyedi, 2005).

In political communication research, discursive strategies have been traditionally understood as who gets access to the media fora (*going public*) and who manages to deliver his own evaluation of policies to the public better than other contenders (*policy position taking*) (Downs, 1957; Budge and Farlie, 1983; Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989; Wolfsfeld, 1997). However, the patterns of interpretation and justification actors adopt to influence how people perceive specific policy positions, i.e., the *framing* of policy positions, are crucial too (e.g., Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 70; Enyedi, 2005). In addition, actors need to be able to engage in *valence campaigning*, i.e., direct references to other actors in order to signal who is a fellow campaigner and who is an opponent in the debate (Laver and Sergenti, 2011; Zakharov, 2009). These four strategic concepts, as Figure 5.1 illustrates, provide actors with the tools to "actively construct the meaning of the reality in question" (Kriesi et al., 2009).




Figure 4.1 The Formation of Debate Coalitions

By means of this strategic repertoire, actors engage in public competition – or how Schmidt (2010) defines it, in a coordinative discourse – about the importance of policies, their specific evaluation, and interpretation. This competition “encompasses the wide range of policy actors engaged in the construction of policy ideas” (Schmidt, 2010, p. 3). Moreover, most of the time, politically engaged actors cluster together to pursue their interests (see Cerny, 2009). Hence, explicitly or implicitly, actors share specific policy positions and general beliefs as well as refer directly to one another. In the long run, these discursive processes lead to a constellation of specific coalitions among the actors in the debate.

The processes structuring public debates can thus be perceived as the formation of debate coalitions. If actors share specific policy positions as well as values in a specific policy domain and do refer to other actors in a positive way, they can be regarded as participants of the same debate coalition. Actors belonging to the same coalition do not necessarily cooperate with each other in terms of actual policy decisions or explicitly stated intentions to work together. Hence, they form objective rather than subjective coalitions, which are traceable to scholars and the audience but not necessarily intendedly established by the actors themselves (Kriesi et al., 2012).

Similar to the premises of the renowned advocacy coalition framework, this debate coalition argument thus assumes that policy making is structured by networks of important policy participants (Weible, 2005). But debate coalitions are exclusively defined by discursive interactions while the advocacy coalition framework, in contrast, requires empirical evidence of “a nontrivial degree of coordination” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007a, p. 196), for example explicit coordination of political campaign

efforts.

However, before the expectations regarding the strategies of single actors and the process of coalition formation are elaborated in greater detail, some attention has to be paid to the clarification of the actor typology used in this study. This is a crucial step of the debate conceptualization, since the classification of the multitude of individuals and organizations into actor types heavily determines the interpretation of empirical findings. Table 4.1 lists the actor types and how they will be used in the analyses. In addition, the tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in the appendix show how the actors found in the content analyses were aggregated into the corresponding categories.

The classification starts with the very broad distinction between public authority actors, intermediary actors, and actors that are – strictly speaking – external to the political system. This is not to say that the latter have no role in discursive processes in public debates, but their involvement in policy making is rather unconventional from a theoretical point of view, since they mainly operate in the economic (corporations) or societal realms (experts and public welfare organizations). The public authority actors include international governmental organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO), European Union actors, foreign and domestic executive actors, administrative agencies, judiciary actors, as well as legislative bodies. All these actors somehow have a legitimate responsibility to provide public goods or regulate. Intermediary actors, on the other hand, include parties and interest groups, i.e., all organization that aggregate societal problems and demands, and translate them into political claims.

Some of the categories are not mutually exclusive in practice. All members of parliament in the six countries, for instance, also have a party affiliation. This overlap is avoided by attaching all statements of persons with a party membership and a legislative function to the respective party, since party affiliation is assumed to be more important for the individual preference. The category legislative actors thus entails only statements where the legislative body as such was mentioned (e.g., the German “Bundestag” or the “Lower House” in the U.K.). A similar intersection holds for governmental actors: party and executive functions do overlap in practice. In this case, however, the statements were subsumed under the executive category. Party actor statements thus contain

all observations of their members unless the actor is in government.

Table 4.1 *Actor Classification as Used in the Analyses*

Basic Categories	Main types (14 categories)	Further refinement (30 categories)
Public authorities	IGO actors	–
	EU actors	–
	Foreign executives	Executives from advanced (OECD) economies Executives from emerging markets
	National executive	–
	Public Administrations	Economic administrations General administrations
	Judiciary	–
	Legislative	–
Inter-medial actors	Business associations	Chambers of commerce Peak, big industry and moneyed interest assoc. Small and medium-sized business associations
		Private sector union Public sector union
		Farmer organizations White collar organizations
	Party Families	Communists and radical socialists Greens Social democrats Liberals Christian democrats and conservatives Radical and populist right
		Global players Niche businesses Public enterprises
		Economic research institutes and think tanks Public advisors and cultural experts
		Aid organizations and churches Global justice movements
External actors	Corporations	
	Experts	
	Public welfare actors	

Notes: Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the appendix provide a detailed documentation of the actor classification.

Furthermore, the actor categorization should be sensitive to the issue of the debate, since every policy domain entails its own range of potentially relevant actors. That implies that economically defined categories will be paid special attention during the analyses. First, foreign executives are split into executives from advanced economies (defined by the membership in the OECD) and executives from emerging markets. As, for example, the negotiations during the WTO Doha round have shown, governments from emerging market economies often do substantially disagree on specific issues of economic liberalization. With respect to the public administrations, the category economic administrations – summarizing administrations responsible for economic, tax, fiscal, and social policies – is separated from other, general administrative actors.

As for the business associations, they are divided into chambers of commerce, peak associations, and small business associations. Further, trade unions from the public and private sector as well as farmer and white collar professional organizations are disaggregated. With regard to companies, global players (defined by membership in the list of 2000 biggest companies)¹ are distinguished from niche businesses and public enterprises. Above all, often stated claims that global players have become powerful actor in today's public conflicts are coming under further scrutiny with this differentiation. And, finally, public welfare actors are disaggregated into organizations (e.g., charity organizations or churches) and the global justice movements, which mainly are built by social movement groups like Attac.

4.1 Going Public: Who Inhabits the Debate on Economic Liberalization?

To have a voice in public debates is not always easy to achieve, given that both the media's and public's attention is a scarce good (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002; Burstein and Linton, 2002; Kriesi et al., 2009). But actors have to reach a certain level of attention by the media because only then they are enabled to apply further strategies to gain influence on the course of the debate. In this context, the concept of *going public* (see Kernell, 2006), although originally developed in the context of PR strategies by U.S. presidents, can be used to describe the ability of po-

¹ See Tables A.3 and B.1 in the appendix as well as Forbes (2010)

litical actors to search public attention in general. In contrast to similar concepts like standing (Ferree et al., 2002), however, going public emphasizes the active nature of the competition among actors for public visibility.

In order to understand the importance of the going public strategies, it is key to separate two distinct arguments. According to the *resource argument*, the visibility of already influential actors, who benefit from their specific position in the political-economic structure, is enhanced. Following the *mobilization argument*, by contrast, challengers may strive for a stronger media presence because they are otherwise excluded from the decision making arenas (Kriesi, 2004). The resource argument leads to the hypothesis that institutionally privileged actors manage to prevail in the debates, since they dispose of large means and capabilities in public relations and receive continuous attention by specialized journalists (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p. 24).

Yet while resourceful actors already have news value, challengers have to strive for it. A contrasting point can thus be deduced from the mobilization argument regarding potential challengers in the debate. They can be expected to extensively turn to going public campaigns precisely because they are institutionally disadvantaged in the policy making arenas. In the case of exclusion from the policy making process, intermediary actors may use outside lobbying, i.e., the attempt to mobilize public support for their cause (Kollman, 1998). For challengers of the pro-market mainstream, going public is thus a survival strategy to influence decision making by mobilizing public support (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). Mobilization can thus be understood as the other side of the resource argument.

The resource argument points to the success of the most powerful actors in terms of access to a debate. Executives and public administrations can be anticipated to loom high in every country, since they enjoy a long-standing and extensive relationship with the media. Moreover, public authorities should play an especially strong role in France. Most civil society actors and interest groups are only selectively given access to the centers of power in France, which arguably makes it hard for anyone except the strong state to develop a substantive standing in public debates (Kriesi et al., 1995). In Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland, the resource argument points to a strong presence of both

public authority actors and social partners, since the interest intermediation arena has traditionally been the main realm of most economic policy decisions (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979).

Horizontal transnationalization, i.e., the increasing influence of foreign national actors in a country's debate, probably has increased the chances of forces pushing for liberal policies to engage in public debates (Koopmans and Erbe, 2004). On the one hand, economic interdependence in terms of mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, cooperative agreements and capital participation has grown to a level which suggests a strong participation of foreign firms in the debates (Trouille, 2007). On the other hand, the rise of the multi-level polity in Europe had decisive implications for the distribution of political power, "reinforcing some actors to the detriment of others" (Kriesi et al., 2007). Based on previous work with respect to European integration (e.g., Koopmans, 2007), it is thus hypothesized that foreign public authority actors do dispose of large resources to substantially enter national economic debates.

However, economic resources and institutionalized media channels are not the only factors facilitating access to public debates. As far as parties are concerned, an additional issue ownership argument needs to be considered (Petrocik, 1996; Walgrave and De Swert, 2007). Issue ownership gives a party an advantage on a specific issue if this party has established a credible record of competence on this issue. With respect to economic liberalization, Social democrats and liberals should more forcefully be able to enter the debate since they have a long-standing reputation in economic policy debates in general. Economic liberalization can be regarded as a key issue for these parties, which should therefore be eager to have their voices heard.

Turning to the mobilization argument, the debate on economic liberalization first of all is an opportunity for radical left actors to mobilize the economic potential in resistance to the perceived neoliberal character of economic liberalization reforms (De Vries and Edwards, 2009). The most obvious potential challengers from the radical left are communist and left socialist parties. Yet their target constituency, the disadvantaged in economic terms, are not easy to mobilize (Dolezal et al., 2012). On the one hand, since the political interest and knowledge generally low, economically disadvantaged show a disproportionately low inclination for political participation (Verba et al., 1995). On the other hand,

the relative losers of the transformation processes in Western Europe seem to be even more attracted by populist right parties which interpret redistributive conflicts in terms of increasing immigration and a loss of national sovereignty (Rydgren, 2007; Kriesi et al., 2008; Oesch, 2008). Hence, especially in countries where the populist right-wing parties are deeply integrated into the political system like in Switzerland (Swiss People's Party) and Austria (Freedom Party and Alliance for the Future), radical left parties should have difficulties to articulate the demands of the economically disadvantaged. In sum, although the debate on economic liberalization basically constitutes a formidable opportunity for radical left parties, they are not expected to be able to seize this opportunity.

A second left challenger are the trade unions which are anticipated to take his chances to mobilize against economic liberalization. As a reaction to the long-term trends discussed in chapter 2, trade unions have increasingly begun to reintroduce more militant strategies in the last decades (Baccaro et al., 2003; Frege and Kelly, 2003). They more extensively engage in grass-roots politics and public campaigns, which makes them much more visible. But there are important differences between countries with respect to the success of this change in the mobilization strategy. In Anglo-Saxon countries, unionization was exceptionally vulnerable in periods of high unemployment and inflation and suffered a significant decline (Hirsch and Addison, 1986). Thus, trade unions are unlikely to be major players in economic debates in the U.K. In France, by contrast, they are expected to be the radical challengers who try to influence decision making on economic policies from outside the negotiation process. Most notably, their very high readiness for strikes or demonstrations already points to the validity of the mobilization argument in France.

The final potential challenger on the radical left are global justice movements (della Porta, 2007). The turn of the new millennium can be considered the peak period of the global justice movement. After the Battle of Seattle in 1999, activists were repeatedly able to galvanize the global elites with violent protests. In the same year, activists protested at the IMF and World Bank talks in Washington. Later on, in 2001, massive protests surrounded the 3rd Summit of the Americas in Quebec (talks among leaders from both South and North America held by the Organization of American States), the European Union summit in

Gothenburg, and the G8 summit in Genoa. These events led to an upswing of research by scholars of social movements that easily gives the impression that social movements are decisively in advance and would soon be able to create an overarching global civil society (e.g. [Boli and Thomas, 1999](#); [O'Brien et al., 2000](#); [della Porta, 2007](#)).

Yet although social movements are hypothesized to be important challengers in the debate, such perceptions can be misleading. As Tarrow (2001) rightly notes, these conclusions are built on the assumption of a coherent and rather consistent phenomenon of protest movements which does not get confirmed in systematically comparative empirical studies ([Hutter, forthcoming](#)). It is thus expected that the global justice movements are only moderately influential for the public debate on economic liberalization. With respect to country differences, social movement actors can be expected to more strongly enter the debate in France, since its tradition of militant trade unionism and radical alter-globalization movements (e.g., Attac or the Confédération Paysanne led by José Bové) has made France a center of civil society opposition to the global economy ([Uggla, 2006](#)).

Finally, the other actors from Table 4.1, that is the judiciary, legislatures, mainstream parties, experts and public welfare actors, are not expected to be affected by either the mobilization or the resource argument and should thus not especially strongly standing out in the debate.

4.2 Policy Position Taking

After having succeeded to gain access to the debate by means of their going public strategy, actors, among others, need to present their evaluation of the policies at stake, i.e., they need to make their policy position visible to the public and the other actors. Furthermore, policy position taking is a crucial determinant for the actors' membership in a specific debate coalition since congruent policy stances mean shared goals with respect to policy making on economic liberalization.

In line with the dimensionality hypothesis which posits that an international and a domestic dimension is structuring the debate, we have to anticipate a more complex positioning of actors than the simple left-right dichotomy. More specifically, on both the political right and left,

important actors have shifted their position on economic liberalization. Moreover, actors who are insufficiently considered by the previous literature have to be placed into the political space constituted by the two dimensions of the public debate on economic liberalization. Figure 2 summarizes the expectations regarding the actors' positions which will be subsequently discussed in detail.




Figure 4.2 Debate Coalitions in the Policy Space of Economic liberalization

The general constellation that emerges from the the actors' positions on economic liberalization relies on the assumption that both the traditional right and left have effectively split into two camps. On the left, *third way* actors have shifted towards more liberal positions. On the right, neomercantilists have distanced themselves from liberal positions on international liberalization. These differences within the left and right are based on the transformation of the structural potentials in consequence of globalization, post-industrialization, and state transformation.²

With regard to the traditional left-right divide, all of the left actors were usually expected to have one voice on the left's core issues like redistribution and economic risk hedging. And most notably the workers are the historically undivided structural potential of this *traditional left* position. Yet, the traditional left debate coalition is expected to have shrunk to the actors indicated in the lower left quadrant of Figure

² I.e., the long-term trends discussed in chapter 2.

4.2. Although the workers location still mainly corresponds to the traditional left on economic issues, many have switched to the right-wing populist's constituency during the last decade, weakening the support for the traditional left. This movement is due to their attitudes on cultural issues like immigration which became increasingly important for electoral contests (Kriesi et al., 2008).

Trade unions are anticipated to be the main pillar of the traditional left coalition. Despite the fact that unions have to represent increasingly heterogeneous interests of their members and are facing continuous pressure to make concessions in light of high unemployment numbers and increasing welfare costs (Regini, 2003), they have proven astonishingly resilient to maintain social protection at a fairly high level in most advanced economies. As far as the differences among the trade unions are concerned, public sector unions are anticipated to be more radical than their private sector counterparts since their supporter base was – until the recent economic crisis – safer from the recent vagaries of market turmoil and restructuring programs by governments.

The trade unions are assumed to receive support from public welfare actors such as public interest groups (e.g., charity organizations) and social movements in the traditional left coalition. The latter mostly oppose specific aspects of economic liberalization such as delocalization or structural adjustment programs but should also generally be very skeptic of economic liberalization (Mertes, 2010). The most important of these alter-globalization movements have their roots in the reaction to the rising neoliberalism since the 1970s. Their take-off period, however, is usually seen in the early 1990s as the Bretton Woods Institutions began to extend their developmental programs for poor countries (Kaldor et al., 2003).

Decisive for the transformation of the left, however, is the development that the societal group of socio-cultural specialists, i.e., high-skilled workers in interpersonal and mostly sheltered service occupations, has considerably expanded over time and has become the core constituency of the *third way* (Kriesi, 1998; Oesch, 2006; Häusermann, 2010a). In contrast to most workers, few socio-cultural specialists work in internationally competitive or for-profit sectors (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2006). This class is thus likely taking more liberal positions, since it generally has a comparatively protected occupational status and usually includes

high-skilled high-earners, hence people who, in principle, are in favor of liberalization as long as it does not impinge their conception of solidarity (Kriesi et al., 2012). Although they do not depend much on the welfare state, socio-cultural specialists prefer what usually is denoted as flexicurity: they want more flexible labor markets and activating employment policies, but only if a considerable level of social security is assured. In sum, the socio-cultural specialists are the typical structural potential of the third way.

The third way position first of all applies to left mainstream parties with aspirations for governmental responsibility. Established left parties thus turned from sharp critics of capitalism into actors pursuing similar or even more vigorous economic reforms than their right counterparts (Giddens, 2000; Müller-Rommel and Poguntke, 2002). Examples are the fundamental restructuring of public services by the Blair government in the UK in the late 1990s, and Schröder's labor market reforms (the Agenda 2010) in Germany at the beginning of the 2000s (Ross, 2000). To win elections, social democrats and greens largely have abandoned their traditional positions since they had to adapt their political program to the austerity constraints induced by growing welfare costs and slowing economic growth (Kriesi et al., 2008). Further, similar to the third way parties, state enterprises are also expected to be slightly in favor of economic liberalization, since they basically are striving for market opportunities to increase their performance. Too much liberalization, however, would introduce unwanted competition into the markets they dominate or even have monopolized.

The political right, in contrast, is already historically divided into neomercantilists and internationalists. Domestically oriented small- and medium-sized industries and low-productive businesses traditionally ask for state intervention to protect their privileges (see Katzenstein, 1985; David and Mach, 2006). These actors have an incentive to opt for oligopolistic strategies, keeping profits within the national economy (Roach, 2005, p. 19). The protectionist faction among business actors is likely to raise its voice ever more with the ongoing economic integration during the last decades. Tellingly, in conflicts at the European level, there has been a significant neomercantilist wing among business actors which opted for a protected European single market (van Apeldoorn, 2002).

With the emergence of the populist right in Western European poli-

tics, this position is likely to be reinforced. Although right-wing populists mainly mobilize on cultural issues like immigration and European integration, they are expected to widen the division between neoliberals and protectionists on the political right (Kriesi, 2011).

The positions of the neomercantilist coalition is based on the preferences of the petty bourgeoisie, i.e., the self-employed and the domestic market oriented employers. This constituency in general is in favor of a liberal market design of the economy but prefers strong barriers to the movement of capital, goods, services, and people across borders. It is assumed that the small business associations and professional organizations from sheltered sectors (most of all farmers) and the populist right represent these neomercantilist interests in the debate.³

As already noted, small business associations and domestically oriented businesses are likely receiving support from the right-wing populists, who try to mobilize both the petty bourgeoisie and blue-collar workers (Oesch, 2006). The central political program of the new populist right can be understood as an ethno-pluralist doctrine: different ethnicities are not necessarily superior or inferior, but simply different and thus incompatible. First adopted by the French National Front, ethno-pluralism has been embedded into the political programs and rhetorical profiles of most European right-wing populists (Rydgren, 2007). In line with this ideology, most immigrants are singled out as threatening to the values of the national community. However, many right-wing populists also identify other dangers for the national community, among which economic globalization and its agents (supranational institutions and multinational corporations) (Betz and Johnson, 2004).

While most populist right parties supported economic liberalization during the early 1990s – often manifest in campaigns for radical tax cuts –, most turned to what may also be labeled as neomercantilist (Zaslove, 2004; Kitschelt, 2007). Accordingly, the most common position of right-wing populists nowadays is to be supportive of the capitalist system at the national level, but fiercely protectionist with regard to the access to the welfare system (Andersen and Bjorklund, 1990; Evans, 2005). The rationale behind this corresponds to the notion that economic globalization and the creation of supranational legal institutions jeopardize the

³ Neomercantilism refers to the idea of a strong state and national competition as foundations of economic success (see Held and McGrew, 2000)

nation-state as the main reference of collective identification and well-being (Mudde, 2007; Kriesi et al., 2008; Berezin, 2009). The defense of the welfare system thus extends to the protection from all kinds of cross-border economic activities. One of the most visible moments of this type of opposition was the 2005 defeat of the French referendum on the constitution of the European Union. Although radical left forces rallied for a rejection of the constitution too, the mobilization of the Front National was decisive for the result of the vote. Moreover, the substantive electoral gains of the True Finns this year points to the ongoing success of this neomercantilism.

High-skilled workers with a leadership role in their organizations and employers from the private industries are assumed to take a liberal stance on both dimensions, since they are independent from the welfare state and work in businesses which benefit from international competition (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2006). Accordingly, they should most clearly lend support to the bigger group of mainstream actors in the upper right corner, that is the neoliberal coalition which includes all public authority actors, chambers of commerce, peak employer associations, liberal parties, christian democrats and conservatives, experts, and global players.

One of the basic assumptions of this study is the fundamental transformation of politics on economic liberalization as a consequence of globalization and post-industrialization in general, and, among others, transnationalization in specific. Transnationalization has not only implications for the overall structure of the public debate but also leads to the need to consider a new set of actors. To begin with, transnationalization of course leads to the growing importance of supra- and international public authority actors, most notably the EU. The EU as the most important international and increasingly supranational institution derives its power not from taxation as the traditional Westphalian nation-states but from the implementation of regulations (Majone, 1996).

As Van Appeldoorn (2002) emphasizes, the EU is dominated by a compromise between transnational industrial and financial capital. This neoliberal globalist fraction rivaled with a neomercantilist wing during the 1980s and 1990s but has prevailed later on. Moreover, international bodies like the WTO or the IMF complement the EU as driving forces of the internationalization of economic policy networks (Coleman, 2006, p. 199). As main actors catalyzing the diffusion of the neoliberal dom-

inance, EU and IGO actors can – together with national and foreign executives, administrations, and experts – be expected to be located in the upper right corner in Figure 3.2 (Simmons et al., 2006; Tarrow and Caporaso, 2009).

Such processes of vertical transnationalization, however, are not confined to political actors in the narrower sense. Economic integration and post-industrialization have also profoundly changed the role of multinational corporations for political conflicts (Lehmkuhl, 2006, p. 149). Concentration processes have led to the prevalence of multinational companies in most European industries. The growing internationalization of their production has reduced their willingness to engage in traditional national concertation and they increasingly dedicate their resources to directly influence the public debate (Coen, 1997; Herrigel and Wittke, 2005; Schneider and Grote, 2006, p. 12). Moreover, political integration has strengthened the access of large firms and the employer associations representing them to interest intermediation arenas (Eising, 2007). Global players, along with the usually closely linked chambers of commerce and peak employer organizations, are thus hypothesized to join the neoliberal coalition. Moreover, also liberals, white collar organizations, and, to a less extent, Christian democrats and conservatives should represent the interests of big business.

To sum it up, it is expected that a pro-market mainstream consisting of a third way and a neoliberal coalition dominates the debate. This mainstream faces two challenging coalitions, the traditional left and the neomercantilists.

4.3 Valence Campaigning

It is crucially important to explore how actors compete with each other by advancing rival policy positions, but non-policy related factors clearly also have an impact on public debates. Such factors include, but are not confined to the charisma of leaders, the reputation of actors regarding their competence and trustworthiness, and their media performance (Schofield, 2006; Norris, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002). Quite surprisingly, these non-policy characteristics of public competition have not been comprehensively conceptualized in the literature on political communication, which lingers between scandalization, political marketing, negative campaigning, or personalization (Schnur, 2007; Kriesi, 2011,

p. 184). Following Laver and Segrenti (2011, p. 164), we will use valence as catch-all term summarizing these aspects, which actors try to manipulate by means of positive or negative campaigning.

The importance of valence in political competition is highlighted by the literature on the individualization of citizens' political preference formation, coming to the forefront in dealignment processes in electoral contests Dalton et al. (2000)⁴ as well as declining membership numbers of interest groups (Wallerstein and Western, 2000). Actors thus increasingly have to present themselves in a good light in order to convince the public opinion of their good intentions and the validity of their policy propositions.

Moreover, the importance of valence gets reinforced by the media logic of producing news in political campaigns (Kriesi, 2011; Mancini and Swanson, 1996). Personal characteristics have an important news value for the mass media in their competition for the audience. They are thus keen to exploit the actors' struggle for a better evaluation of their valence. This makes valence a crucial device in the strategic repertoire of actors who want to make their voices heard by the public. Besides going public and policy position taking, the analyses will accordingly focus on the valence campaigning strategies of the actors.

This study focuses on a particular aspect of the competition on valence. Instead of being passive subjects with specific valence attributes, actors are perceived as active subject trying to influence their own image as well as the non-policy related perception of other actors by the audience (see Zakharov, 2009). On the one hand, actors try to highlight personal weaknesses and the professional incompetence of their competitors. In electoral contests, this strategy is usually denoted as negative campaigning (Plasser and Plasser, 2002). Following the media malaise argument (Robinson, 1976; Norris, 2000; Shehata, 2010), negative campaigning has become ever more important since non-policy related news on politics increasingly focusses on scandals and sensational events. The general expectation on the direction of valence campaigning is thus that negative statements clearly prevail, i.e., that actors mainly try to attack

⁴ Although there is very mixed evidence regarding the increasing influence of valence in electoral contests, it nevertheless is of constant importance (see Kriesi, 2011; Adam and Maier, 2010).

each others reputation in the public debate.

On the other hand, individuals and organizations of the same actor type should refer to each other affirmatively in order to foster a positive evaluation by the public. This has also implications for the conceptualization of debate coalitions: in addition to shared policy positions, actors can also signal with a positive valence attribution who belongs to the same coalition. Debate coalitions can thus also be perceived as networks in which cooperative interactions prevail ([Adam and Kriesi, 2007](#)). The underlying assumption is that actors in a coalition depend on each other because they rely on each other's communicative resources to gain influence on the course of the debate. In sum, the own evaluation and that of coalition members should overall be more positive in the debate, while all other actors should be referred to with a more negative connotation.

4.4 Framing

The last element by which the debate and its constituting coalitions are characterized is framing which in general has become a crucial tool in social science research to understand public debates ([Scheff, 2005](#)). The term frames refers to the causal interpretations and problem definitions actors provide to link different policies to shared beliefs (Entman, 1993, p. 52; Helbling et al., 2011). Conceptually, frames can thus be understood as “central organizing ideas that provide coherence to a designated set of idea elements” ([Ferree et al., 2002](#), p. 105). Since much meaning related to specific policy positions in public debates is “taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole” ([Hall, 1993](#), p. 279)⁵, frames are serving as the cognitive cues indicating agreement on basic principles ([Surel, 2000](#)). Applied to the debate on economic liberalization frames thus reveal how interests are articulated with respect to specific collective beliefs and values (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, p. 213-220; Enyedi, 2005, p. 699).

Every issue allows for a variety of frames used by the different political actors, which means that the public is not exposed to just one frame as it traditionally is assumed in the literature. Rather, individuals are ex-

⁵ What Hall ([1993](#)) calls social paradigms can be perceived as frames, since he similarly defines social paradigms as interpretative frameworks within which policy making evolves.

posed to competing frames and choose the alternative which is congruent with their own values and norms (Chong and Druckman, 2007, p. 112). Actors accordingly are trying to influence which frames are used for the evaluation of specific issues (Kriesi et al., 2009, p. 354). This mechanism of how the importance of specific interpretations of reality can be manipulated to influence the individuals' decision making processes is denoted here as framing but is conceptualized in manifold ways in the literature, e.g., also as second-order or second-level agenda setting (see Iyengar and Kinder, 1987, p. 63; Kioussis et al., 2006; Chong and Druckman, 2007, p. 115). With regard to the success of frames, their resonance with central societal themes is decisive. As Entman (2004, p. 14) specifies, the most successful frames are those "fully congruent with schemas habitually used by most members of society". Thus, frames that appeal to widespread stereotypes and the received wisdom in a given society are very effective means of political competition (Kriesi et al., 2009, p. 357).

To categorize frames for the analyses in this study, a two-stage approach is applied. First, Habermas' (1993) three-fold classification to broadly organize arguments in public discourses is used to make first distinctions among the many justifications used by the actors in the debate (see table A.4 in the appendix to get a comprehensive overview over all frames). The classification has proved to be useful for the analysis of political communication processes in different domains (Trenz, 2005; Lerch and Schwellnus, 2006; Helbling et al., 2010). As table 4.2 shows, on the most abstract level, the classification differentiates between utilitarian, identitarian and moral-universal arguments.⁶

Utilitarian arguments are used to justify an issue position by its potential to meet particular aims (Helbling et al., 2012). This kind of problem definition is thus instrumental and underlines the practical benefits of a policy. Identity related arguments, on the contrary, justify positions by referring to ideas and values inherent to particular communities. They are brought forward if a specific policy position is beneficial for the actor's own or any other culturally defined entity. Moral-universalist arguments, finally, refer to general principles and rights that are valid for

⁶ Habermas' conceptualization of public arguments has a lot in common with March and Olson's (1984) two logics of arguments. The pragmatic argument corresponds to the logic of consequence, while ethical arguments relate to the logic of appropriateness, since actors seek to promote the justifications encapsulated in an identity, a membership in a political community or group (March and Olsen, 2006).

everyone regardless of particular interests or cultural identities. Such arguments therefore put policy positions in the context of universal goals like human rights or abstract values like individual freedom.

Table 4.2 *Frame Conceptualization*

General Characterization	School of thought	Debate specific frames	Description
Utilitarian	Mercantilism	Intervention	Need for regulation
	Social Democracy	Social protection	Redistribution, full employment and social security
	Liberalism	Prosperity	Innovation, economic performance and growth
Identitarian	Mercantilism	Protection	Traditional production, national wealth
Moral-universal	Liberalism	Economic Freedom	Self-fulfillment, individual freedom
	Social Democracy	Social justice	Respect of basic rights, social justice

Notes: A detailed list containing the classification of the annotated justifications into the six categories can be found in Table A.4 in the appendix.

The Habermasian three-fold distinction only establishes the general framework for the development of debate specific frames. With respect to economic liberalization in Western Europe, these fine-grained frame categories are most likely in line with the pivotal ideologies that shaped the political economy since the beginnings of the modern economies (Surel, 2000, p. 169f.; Gartzke, 2007), or, as Thelen (2010, p. 50) puts it: “the landscapes of contemporary political economies are littered with what Barrington Moore once called ‘suppressed historical alternatives’ that [...] remain available to actors as they cope with new problems and challengers.” More specifically, the frame classification used in this analysis is derived from the three historically dominant schools of economic thought: social democracy, liberalism, and mercantilism. While social democratic and liberal frames have already been defined by other studies of the framing of economic issues (see Chong and Druckman, 2007), this analysis innovates with the introduction of mercantilist arguments to cover identitarian and statist justifications, i.e., intervention and protection frames (see table 4.2).

Systematic accounts of political-economic thought sprung with the early elaborations by liberal philosophers in the seventeenth and eigh-

teenth century U.K. (Skousen, 2001). As Tarrow and Caporaso (2009, p. 595f.) put it, “the growth of a market society in the early nineteenth century was driven by the ideology of liberalism that found expression in [...] market discourse as the ‘common sense’ of the emerging capitalist system.” Two central ideas stand out on classical economic liberalism. On the one hand, the notion of liberty justifies both the emphasis on property rights and on individual freedom as a basic human need (Kitschelt, 1994). The category *freedom* subsumes these aspects of economic liberalism. On the other hand, the accumulation of wealth plays a crucial role in this school of thought. Assumedly, if individuals strive for their personal success, the whole society profits through the efficient allocation of resources by market mechanisms. This argument is expressed in Adam Smith’s famous metaphor of an invisible hand and matches the *prosperity* frame category in table 4.2.

The corresponding regulatory program of economic liberalism allowed for the release of European economies from the formerly prevailing mercantilist structures (Pressman, 2006). In turn, this common sense that free markets are the natural way of organizing an economy was challenged by social democratic thoughts. And after the disastrous experiences of the Great Depression in the 1930s, the global economy was transformed into an embedded liberalism, i.e., the great compromise between free market ideologies and the social democratic demand for social security in national welfare systems (Ruggie, 1982).

Liberalism was progressive with respect to the mercantilist paradigm in pre-industrial Europe (Magnusson, 2003). Mercantilist doctrines started from the view that trade among nations is a zero-sum game and that states have to protect the own economy at the expense of others’ (Ekelund and Tollison, 1982). In the nineteenth century, however, mercantilist theories were modified into comprehensive approaches regarding the role of the state in the economy. Mercantilism became the theory of state dirigism according to which states achieve political power by economic wealth (Immerwahr, 2009). Mercantilist thinking, for example, is still influential in regionalist efforts in international politics, such as the common trade policy for the European Union (Hurrell, 1995; van Apeldoorn, 2002). In sum, the two core beliefs of mercantilism are the national interest (*protection*) and the need for state *intervention* (see table 4.2).

While classical liberalism overcame the mercantilist paradigm, it itself was challenged by several influential intellectual movements, ranging from revolutionary anarchists to moderate socialists (Lichtheim, 1969; Pressman, 2006). In Western Europe, socialist thinking over time became embedded into democratic capitalist systems (see Polanyi, 1944). This became manifest in the postwar compromise between labor and capital and the development of rigorous econometric models of imperfect competition – most pronouncedly formulated in Keynes’ (1936) “The General Theory”. The core beliefs of this social democratic compromise can be defined as ideas of “social protections created to guard against the depredations that markets might cause” (Tarrow and Caporaso, 2009, p. 598). Accordingly, social democratic ideas in Western Europe aim at correcting the main weaknesses of liberal capitalism, i.e., *social protection* to prevent the most acute hardships of economic deprivation and the respect of basic human rights regardless of economic imperatives (*social justice* in table 4.2) (King, 2003).

The basic expectation regarding the distribution of the frame categories in the debates is that liberal ideas dominate the debate since they are preferred by the mainstream. Beyond that, the four debate coalitions are hypothesized to emphasize specific frames in accordance with their deviating core values and norms. Because of their historical legacy, the two left coalitions (traditional left and third way) should be more frequently using social democratic frames, although in combination with different additional frames. Intervention frames are feasible extensions to the traditional left’s ideological mind-set. In line with its inclination to preserve the status quo on social protection they are expected to fuse social democratic with interventionist frames.

The framing strategy of the third way coalition, by contrast, should lean more towards liberal frames, since this left coalition has a reformist agenda that tries to reconcile social democracy with economic liberalism. Further, the neoliberal coalition is anticipated to pursue the most clear-cut framing strategy, which is mainly based on liberal frames. Finally, not surprisingly, the neomercantilist coalition should use mercantilist frames more often. Especially protectionist arguments should be brought forward by the neomercantilists, since they lie at the heart of this coalition’s ideology.

Besides the policy position related expectations in terms of the influence of coalition memberships, it is anticipated that the function actors hold in the policy process also influences their framing patterns. Actors with actual governmental responsibility should also put more weight on the frames related to the role of the state in the economy. Especially interventionist frames can be understood as part of the pro-market mainstreams' strategy, since the dominant forces probably emphasize their regulative responsibility to govern the liberalization reforms. In sum, it is thus hypothesized that all executive actors and the mainstream parties usually forming governments use more mercantilist frames.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter outlined the actor hypotheses. More precisely, the theoretical underpinnings of the formation of debate coalitions were established using four distinctive discursive strategies actors can apply in public debates: going public, policy position taking, valence campaigning and framing. All expectations derived in the previous sections are presented in a condensed way in table 4.3.

First, with respect to going public, the resource and mobilization arguments as well as issue ownership were used to establish specific hypotheses on the importance of different actors. Second, four patterns of policy position taking on the two anticipated dimensions of the economic liberalization debate were identified on the basis of a split on both the political left and right. Third, the theories of valence campaigning and media malaise enabled the formulation of expectations how the actors refer to themselves and other actors with respect to non-policy related aspects. Finally, following Habermas (1993) and the schools of thought that shaped economic policy making in Western Europe, coalition specific framing strategies were identified.

Table 4.3 *Expectations on the Influence of Discursive strategies*

<i>Going public</i>	The resource argument points to the strong standing of institutionally advantaged actors (most of all national executives and corporations), while the mobilization argument expects challengers (radical left actors and the populist right) to be strong in the debate. Moreover, social democrats and liberal parties should have a significant standing, since economic liberalization belongs to their core issues.
<i>Policy position taking</i>	The actors cluster into four debate coalitions, namely the third way, traditional left, neoliberals and neomercantilists. The neoliberals are expected to be firmly and the third way slightly supporting economic liberalization, while the traditional left is hypothesized to be fully in opposition. The neomercantilists, finally, are expected to form a protectionist coalition.
<i>Valence campaigning</i>	Actors are in general expected to pursue a more negative campaigning strategy against actors from other policy coalitions. At the same time, they try to present themselves and fellow campaigners in a relatively more positive light.
<i>Framing</i>	Liberal frames should be predominantly used in the debates. Traditional left actors are emphasizing social democratic frames, while the third way adherents should prefer a combination of social democratic with liberal frames. The neoliberals should constrain themselves to liberal and the mercantilist to protectionist frames. In addition, the actors with governmental responsibility (most of all national executives and mainstream parties)

With this chapter, the theoretical elaboration of the debate analysis is accomplished. The next chapter will thus discuss the methodological issues to enable the examination of the hypotheses in the second empirical part of the study.

5

Designing the Content Analysis

The basic methodological choice is to explore the debate on economic liberalization by means of an analysis of mass media reports. This requires justification, since there are various other strategies to analyze political contestation. For instance, one could rely on other written documents (e.g., party manifestos), or on expert surveys (see [Keman, 2007](#), p. 77). However, while these alternative approaches have their merits, they fail to grasp the whole universe of actors' preferences. It is nearly impossible to find a comparative data set which encompasses all relevant actors. Party manifesto data, for example, are restricted to political parties and ignore interest associations or actors from the protest arena. The same usually goes for expert surveys.

A further advantage in our relying on data derived from print media is that it captures the competition among and confrontation between actors better than other data ([Helbling and Tresch, 2011](#)). The salience of an issue for a party in an electoral contest, for example, heavily depends on the agenda-setting strategies of other parties, and the actual salience of this issue can therefore strongly deviate from the one in the party's manifesto.

This chapter sets out to outline the content analysis which provides the data for the analysis of the economic liberalization debate in the following chapters. It first describes the selection of countries and time periods and sampling of newspapers, before the identification of the relevant concepts and their aggregation to the units of analysis is discussed. According to the open access policy of this research, detailed information on the data sets, aggregation, and analyses can be found in the appendices as well as on <http://www.bruno-wueest.ch/phd.html>.

5.1 Selection of Countries and Time Periods

The debate on economic liberalization is analyzed in six West European countries: Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.K. The political change that took place as a consequence of globalization, post-industrialization, and state transformation depends on a multitude of contextual factor which differ among these countries, but all are stable liberal democracies with consolidated political institutions and an advanced economy.

Other European countries were not considered since the broader societal context has created different latent potentials for economic conflicts and, therefore, the influence of country-specific political-economic institutions cannot easily be compared. Consequently, East European countries were excluded since their democratization began just when contemporary globalization and post-industrialization were accelerating (Dolezal, 2008, p.54). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, East European political systems were still in transition, which makes comparison with established democracies difficult. South European countries, except Italy, democratized during the 1970s, again making comparisons over time problematic. Italy was not included into the sample because the breakdown of the First Republic during the early 1990s was attributable more to national idiosyncrasies which again would have made comparisons very difficult (Newell, 2000, p.177f.). Scandinavian countries, finally, were not included into the sample because of the lack of necessary language skills of the researchers involved to gather data from print media outlets.¹

The main aim of this analysis is to get a comprehensive picture of the debate on economic liberalization in the six countries. The window of observation is 2004 to 2006, for which the debate data was collected. While the big liberalization reforms in the 20th century took place in less contested economic sectors, the debate has turned to very sensitive issues for Western European countries such as agriculture in the beginning of the 21st century. Accordingly, the conflict between the forces pushing for liberalization and the challengers of this forces has become more fierce. This makes an investigation of the debate structure in the mid-2000s

¹ The content analysis data set was established by the author and his collaborators in the research project “National Political Change in a Globalizing World” (see Kriesi et al., 2008).

especially interesting. In order to keep the work load of the content analysis manageable, the observation period has been limited to the three years 2004 to 2006 (Dolezal et al., 2012).

5.2 Sampling of Newspapers

The first step of the content analysis is the selection of newspapers. As a starting point, the largest quality newspaper was chosen for each country (see Table 5.2). This is *Le Monde* in France, *Die Presse* in Austria, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in Germany, *NRC Handelsblad* in the Netherlands, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* in Switzerland, and *The Times* in the U.K. This was a pragmatic decision, due the big effort needed for the content analyses of the debate. Given the fact that only one media title could be considered, quality newspapers were chosen since they are particularly suitable to study debates. They remain the leading medium of political news coverage, because they report in the most detailed manner about debates and influence the editorial decisions of a wide range of other news organizations (Reinemann, 2003; Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2008).

The sampling of the relevant news articles was done in three steps: First, the relevant events of the debate in each country were identified, using various yearbooks (Keesing's World Record of Events, Facts on File World News Digest Yearbook etc.) as well as the annual reviews of the newspapers in our sample. Examples for such events are parliamentary debates on liberalization reforms, protest events against globalization, or regular meetings like the World Economic Forum. These lists formed the basis for an extensive keyword list for each country, helping us to find the articles of interest in electronic newspaper databases. The advantage of creating such lists is that we knew about the content of the relevant discussions in each country before we engaged in a keyword search. We could therefore avoid many false negative selections, i.e., articles which should have been found but were not found by our keyword search. Second, in order to filter the news reporting out of all newspaper articles, op-eds and letters to the editor were sorted out. Finally, a chronological sample of 1'200 articles per country was drawn. This allows to account for the dynamic of the debate. Time-invariant selection procedures, such as taking all articles about a political issue published on a certain weekday, fail to capture differences in the intensity of a debate. A chronological sampling, by contrast, tracks the frequency distribution

of relevant articles and therefore captures the peaks and troughs in the debate.

Given the still time-consuming coding procedure, we did not only have to rely on a sample of the relevant articles but did also code only specific sections. For national election articles, we annotated the headline, the ‘lead’, if available, and the first paragraph of an article. Again, as tabloid articles are shorter and fewer in numbers, we decided to code the entire articles. For the debates, we annotated the first twenty core sentences. This was because the format of the articles (such as the paragraph structure) is sometimes lost in the electronic articles we relied on.

5.3 Core Sentence Annotation

The actor positions in the newspaper articles were identified using Core Sentence Analysis (CSA). This approach is inspired by Wittgenstein (1921), whose theoretical elaboration of the extraction of the basic message of written documents was first translated into practical coding instructions by Osgood (1959) and Axelrod (1976). Subsequently, it has been adapted to analyze party competition and political conflict in general (Kriesi et al., 2008; Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings, 2001; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 1997). The principal aim is to systematically quantify political statements in written documents. According to the CSA method, if a relevant actor is found in a text segment, this segment is – if possible – reduced to its most basic structure (a *core sentence*), which contains only the subject (actor), the object (issue) and the polarity of the relationship between the two.² This relationship between actor and issue is always quantified as a polarity using a scale ranging from -1 to +1, where -1 means opposition and +1 means support, with three intermediary positions indicating a vague or an ambivalent relation. If, for example, an actor is only potentially or vaguely in favor of or against a certain issue or actor, a value of +0.5 or -0.5, respectively, was assigned. Whenever there was an ambiguous relation, a 0 was coded. The example in Table 6.3 illustrates the coding procedure.

² The relationship between grammatical and core sentences is not straightforward. One sentence can include no, one or several core sentences. Additionally, a core sentence can span over more than one sentence.

Table 5.1 *CSA Coding example*

“Mr. Blair has made economic reform the top priority of his presidency, hoping to make labour markets more flexible in order to tackle record unemployment and sluggish growth across the continent. However, he is now likely to face challenges from President Chirac [...]” <i>(The Times, May 31 2005, Battle for the heart of Europe)</i>				
Subject	Polarity	Object	Frames	Arena
Blair	+1	labor market reform	social protection/ wealth	Europ./int. governmental
Chirac	−1	Blair	n.a.	“

The first core sentence refers to Blair’s support of labor market reforms (*actor-issue statement*), which is complemented by a social protection frame (“in order to tackle record unemployment”) as well as a frame related to wealth (“in order to tackle [...] sluggish growth”). The second core sentence consists of Chirac’s likely opposition to Blair (*actor-actor statement*). For the analysis of debates, two additional attributes are examined: frames and political arenas (the theoretical basis, analytical categories, and concepts of arenas and framing are discussed in detail in Chapter 3). By frames, the problem definition or justification an actor gives when he takes a position is meant. Since sometimes actors back their policy positions in public debates with multiple frames (Lerch and Schwellnus, 2006, p. 307), the coding of up to five frames per core sentence was allowed. The political arena is the general context to which an issue position refers and in which it is articulated. More specifically, the arena is defined as the site where the policy process is debated at the moment the statement leading to a core sentence was made, e.g., an election campaign in the electoral arena or a demonstration in the protest arena.

Summarized over all six countries, the number of core sentences amounts to 9841 for the debate data. Further, there are a total of 7636 frame and 3697 actor-actor statements in the debate data set. Table 5.3 shows the key figures of the content analysis data used throughout this study. Since there are ‘genuine’ differences in the number of statements for the different countries that stem from the way newspapers are reporting on political competition, probability weights are applied during the analyses.

Table 5.2 *Number of Observations Coded in the Different Content Analysis Data Sets*

Country	Debate (issues)	Debate (frames)	Debate (actors)
France	1847	1521	292
Austria	1927	847	1146
Germany	1621	907	788
Netherlands	896	732	305
Switzerland	2140	2634	452
U.K.	1410	995	714
Overall	9841	7636	3697

5.3.1 Positions, Saliencies and Polarization

A first step in the analyses is to calculate the actors' issue position as well as the salience measures with respect to issues, frames, and actors (see figure 5.1). The average issue *position* of an actor is calculated by taking the mean of all the coded polarity values over all core sentences that contain a relationship between this actor and a given issue (or another actor if actor-actor statements are involved). The range of these positions spans from -1 to +1. The *salience* of an issue or frame for a given actor is the relative frequency with which the actor takes a position on this issue or frame compared to all statements attributed to this actor. Additionally actor *saliencies*, defined as the relative frequency with which an actor is cited in the debate compared to all actors, are calculated.

As Figure 5.1 illustrates, by aggregating the actors, issues, frames and arenas coded from the statements to substantially meaningful categories, the positions, saliencies, and polarizations within a debate or electoral campaign can be analyzed. The corresponding actor and issue categories used in this analysis can be found in Chapter 3 (Tables 3.3, 3.2, and 3.4, respectively) and the frame categories are listed in Table 4.2. Further, the aggregation procedures are documented in appendix A.




Figure 5.1 Annotated Variables and Aggregation into Indicators

It is important to note that positions and saliencies are always calculated using article weights. This accounts for imbalances caused by the selection of articles. In fact, the CSA data, i.e., core sentence statements derived from newspaper articles, statistically behave like survey data sampled at two levels, e.g., the country and individual level. In such data sets, the basic assumption of equal chances for individuals or statements, respectively, to get into the sample is violated because the countries have different population sizes and the articles contain different numbers of core sentences. To illustrate what consequences this might have, let us assume an actor with ten statements which all stem from the same article. This is a likely scenario if an article reports in a little bit more detail about this actor's position. Let us further assume a second actor with ten statements, but this time from ten different articles. These ten statements should be given more weight since the actor was covered in very different instances. Thus, the data needs to be aggregated using probability weights on the level of articles, i.e., every statement is weighted relative to the total number of statements in the same article.

To assess polarization, a measure based on Taylor and Hermann's (1971) index is used. This index was originally designed to measure the degree of left-right polarization in a party system, but it can also be applied to examine how strongly actor positions differ on any set of issues or dimensions (see Dolezal, 2008). It is calculated by taking the sum of variances of the actors' positions, again weighted by their saliencies (see definition in Table B.1 in the appendix). As with the original index, the range of values taken depends on the scale of the issue categories and range between 0 and 1. The higher the value, the more polarized an issue, dimension, or debate.

5.3.2 Advantages of the CSA Approach

CSA is a versatile instrument to capture the full complexity of political contestation without imposing too strong theoretical expectations in advance of the coding (e.g. a priori definitions of classifications). Moreover, Kriesi et al. (2008), Franzosi (2004), and van Atteveldt (2008) have recently provided theoretical and empirical evidence that such relational content analysis is a useful device for the social sciences in general. Neither party manifestos nor expert surveys yield such comprehensive data on both actors' positions as used in spatial models (e.g., Downs, 1957; Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989) and issue salience as employed by theories of selective emphasis and issue ownership (Budge and Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996).

A severe drawback of manual content analyses – especially of large-scale applications of the CSA approach like the one described here – is the large effort it requires (Hillard et al., 2007; Schrodtt, 2009). The dominant approach to overcome this cost problem is the estimation of semantic information in documents by means of statistical procedures (e.g. Slapin and Proksch, 2008; Hopkins and King, 2010; Laver et al., 2003). Their common basic procedure is to scale text along one specific variable, be it the left-right dimension, issue categories or ordinal variables. The statistical procedures either depend on the comparison of relative word frequencies in texts (Laver et al., 2003; Zuell and Landmann, 2005; Hillard et al., 2007), the co-occurrence of specific keywords (Ruigrok and van Atteveldt, 2007), or on dichotomous variables assessing the presence of word stems (Hopkins and King, 2010). All these approaches need is a sufficient amount of manually coded reference texts, usually not more than 100 documents, and they basically handle all kinds of unstructured texts (Hopkins and King, 2010, p. 4f.). However, this does not hold without restrictions. Changes of vocabulary over time and between different authors as well as large differences in the length of the documents can lead to imprecise coding assessments (Hug and Schulz, 2007).

The decisive disadvantage of these methods for the collection of data on debates from newspaper articles is that these methods lack the recognition of relational data, i.e., relationships between at least two different concepts like actors and issues. First, they have mainly been used to code issue positions in party manifestos where the actors are already pre-defined. Second, some approaches are explicitly not aiming at link-

ing issues to specific actors since they are designed to classify texts into thematic categories (Hillard et al., 2007). By contrast, the simultaneous coding of actors and issues is precisely the core task of the CSA approach. Fully automated procedures to recognize such complex relational data, however, are still in the early stages of development (see Wueest et al., 2011; van Atteveldt, 2008).

Hence, since the application of statistical techniques was not feasible in order to collect relational data, the workload was reduced by the sampling strategies as described above and by the application of a software framework for manual data collection. This coding software consists of a web-based application which is equipped with an administrative panel to organize large-scale data collections and allows for the simultaneous annotation for up to 10 coders. Furthermore, the software includes a database that is specifically designed to store newspaper articles, the meta data of the coding process such as the date of publication and rubric as well as the coded variables. Finally, it comes with an intelligent annotation front end to make the core sentence coding process as ergonomic as possible.³

A second major challenge of manual content analyses is the difficulty to assess the quality of the data gathered. Such difficulties are created by genuine variation in the way newspapers cover political competition. Comparisons of data generated by the CSA approach with data from expert judgments, party manifesto codings, and mass surveys, however, suggest that the external validity is given. As Helbling and Tresch (2011) show, the indicators for actor positions are highly correlated in all countries under study. Low inter-coder reliability is also potentially hampering the data quality. In a pretest, six coders obtained a coefficient of reliability of 0.77 for coder agreement on the identification of core sentences. Inter-coder agreement for the correct annotation of actors and issues was 0.88 and 0.85, respectively. Given that the typical level of acceptance is 0.80 (Lombard et al., 2002), the agreement was within acceptable limits already before the actual data collection started. Additional coder training and improved coding instructions were provided in the following in order to address remaining uncertainties.

³ Most of the programming was done by Stefanie Gerber.

Some coding instructions were also specifically designed to minimize unintended influence of the journalistic processing of the actor statements. Only editorial articles, but not paid media content, op-eds and letters to the editor were considered as data source. Furthermore, no explicit expressions of opinion by journalists in the editorial articles were included as core sentences. Moreover, if one uses aggregate measures like the average position or relative frequencies, as will be done in this book, the journalistic bias among newspapers carries even less weight.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter completes the conceptualization of the study by outlining the distinguishing features of the data collection and aggregation. The data sets used in the following are based on an extensive content analysis of newspapers in France, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.K. from 2004 until 2006. Positions are useful to examine the policy stances as well as valence campaigning. Further, the actor saliences allow to study the hypotheses on going public, while the frame saliences will be used to explore the framing of economic liberalization.

In the following chapters, the debate on economic liberalization will be analyzed. The empirical assessment starts with the structure of the debate in terms of regulatory levels and dimensions. The focus then turns to the four discursive strategies that define the public debate. For the most part, the empirical chapters follow the same research strategy. Each discursive strategy is explored by countries, arenas, actor characteristics and debate coalitions.

Part Two

How the Debate on Economic Liberalization
Relates to the Institutional Contexts and the
Actors' Discursive Strategies

6

Mapping the Terrain: The Structure and Actor Distribution of the Debate on Economic Liberalization

The empirical analysis starts with the exploration the structure of the public debate on economic liberalization in the six countries from 2004 to 2006. This entails an analysis of the regulatory levels at which the debate takes place as well as an assessment of the structure with regards content, i.e., the issues and dimensions of the debate. First, we study how international the economic liberalization debate runs in the six countries. Given the significant shifts of regulatory responsibility to European and international levels ([Hooghe and Marks, 2001](#)), it is an open question how much public discourse remains bound to the national level.

Second, the expectations with respect to the dimensionality of the public debate on economic liberalization will be tested. Globalization, post-industrialization as well as the changing role of the state in the economy are assumed to have broken up the left-right structure in the politics on economic liberalization. New divides on both the political left and right which are connected to the emergence of the third way on the left and the strengthening of protectionists on the political right transformed the structure of public debates, which is now anticipated to be characterized by a two dimensions based on the distinction between domestic and international liberalization. This expectation will be empirically tested by a factor analysis and shows that the issues of the debate load on two factors capturing an international and a domestic dimension.

The focus then turns to the actor going public, the fundamental discursive strategy that paves the way for their policy position taking, valence campaigning, and framing. Chapter 4 has established the mo-

bilization and resource propositions. The resource argument posits that participants with institutionalized channels and/or large public relation capacities loom high in debates (Wolfsfeld, 1997; Ferree et al., 2002). The mobilization argument, by contrast, expects that actors with less resources and little influence on the policy process in the decision-making arenas try to compensate their relative disadvantage by striving for a high public visibility. The results will largely confirm the resource argument, although some indications for the mobilization argument can be found as well.

6.1 The Structure of the Debate

6.1.1 The Transnationalization of Political Conflict

The distinctiveness of the debates in the different countries will be assessed with regard to the distribution of the actors' origins. The key question is how often actors from the foreign, international and European levels are intervening in the national debates. Differences with respect to the salience of such non-national actors reveal how closed public debates are. Table 7.1, accordingly, shows the importance of different regulatory levels for the debate, measured by the share of actors' level of origin. To calculate these shares, the relative frequency of the statements related to the different levels is used. Additionally, probability weights accounting for the uneven distribution of statements are applied across articles and – for the overall numbers only – across countries.

Overall, foreign, European, and international actors are responsible for about one third of all statements. The chi-square at the bottom of the table shows that there is no significant variation between the countries, although there are still differences visible. In France and Switzerland, national actors make up for over 70 percent of all statements. As far as France is concerned, this corresponds to the expectations. Being a state-led economy, the French debate was assumed to be more nationally oriented. Further, it seems that Switzerland with its non-EU member status is less affected by transnational intervention.

Table 6.1 *Salience of Actor Origins*

Level of origin	Overall	FR	A	DE	NL	CH	UK
International	16.2	11.3	20.2	18.6	15.6	11.8	20.5
European	11.3	9.2	14.8	7.6	14.3	9.2	12.9
Foreign	8.5	6.4	12.7	6.9	8.8	7.8	8.7
National	64.0	73.2	52.3	67.0	61.3	71.2	57.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	9480	1754	1931	1605	857	2022	1427
Pearson's χ^2	18.0 <i>n.s.</i> (15 DF)						

Notes: All shares in %; Actor and issue statements used; Article weights applied for all calculations; Country weights applied for overall numbers. Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.001 .

Actors intervening from the international level, mainly IGO actors and global players (multinational corporations), are more important than European and foreign actors for the debate in every country. Moreover, while the salience in Switzerland and France is only 11.8 and 11.3 percent, respectively, international actors account for more than 20 percent of statements in Austria and the U.K. Similarly, European actors have a low salience in Switzerland and France, but also in Germany, where they are least important with a share of 7.6 percent in all statements. The influence of foreign actors, i.e., actors from other countries that are neither affiliated with the international or supranational level, does not vary much among the countries, except for their comparatively high salience in Austria (12.7 percent).

Austria is the country where transnational actors have the largest influence (47.7 percent), but also in the Netherlands and the U.K. they make up for about 40 percent of all statements. However, since the relationship between the two variables is not significant, the debates in the different countries are not highly distinct in terms of the involvement of the different regulatory levels. This means that transnationalization and the corresponding involvement of European and international public authority actors, foreign executives and multinational corporations affects all countries similarly.

6.1.2 The Microstructure of the Economic Liberalization Debate

The next analyses will focus on the distribution of issues across the six countries. Besides the actors and frames, the issues of economic liberalization are an essential element of the debate structure. In chapter 2, we have introduced the separation between issues concerning two criteria. On the one hand, the issues are separated according to the relationship between the national and the global economy. On the other hand, regulatory aspects and activating economic policies are separated. This led to seven distinct issues: retrenchment of restrictions, labor market deregulation, privatization, economic promotion, international market deregulation, internationalization, and locational promotion (see table 6.2). As the chi square in table 6.2 indicates, there is a strong relationship between the issue distribution and the countries, which means that there are significant differences between the countries in terms of which issues dominate the public debate. Thus, it is worth to first take a closer look at the importance of the different issues for the debates in the single countries.

Table 6.2 *Issue Salience by Countries*

	Overall	FR	A	DE	NL	CH	UK
Retrenchment of restrictions	17.5	17.4	6.4	15.4	25.5	14.2	26.0
Labor market deregulation	8.6	11.1	11.1	12.5	6.6	6.5	3.3
Privatization	18.1	22.5	26.7	12.6	15.9	17.9	14.2
Economic promotion	10.7	10.6	10.1	16.4	8.5	9.2	8.7
International market deregulation	13.3	6.7	9.6	13.1	18.4	12.7	19.1
Internationalization	20.8	19.2	24.6	21.1	16.8	23.8	19.1
Locational competition	11.1	12.5	11.6	8.8	8.2	15.7	9.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	9839	1845	1927	1621	896	1410	2140
Pearson's χ^2	50.5 * (30 DF)						

Notes: All shares in %; Only issue statements used; Article weights applied for all calculations; Country weights applied for overall numbers. Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.001 .

In general, three issues seem to be especially important for the economic liberalization debate: privatization; retrenchment, i.e., the general deregulation of domestic markets; as well as internationalization, i.e., the promotion of cross-border economic activities. Retrenchment is dominant

in all countries but Austria. Moreover, it is the most important issue for the debate in the U.K. and the Netherlands with 26.0 and 25.5 percent, respectively. In both countries, although labor market deregulation is not salient, policies concerned with the withdrawal of regulations are at the center of the debate, since they also exhibit a high share of international market deregulation (19.1 and 18.4 percent).

Further, labor market deregulation received considerably more attention in Germany, France, and Austria. This seems to be a result that partly depends on the selected time period, at least as far as France and Germany are concerned. Both countries had fierce debates on far-reaching labor market reforms (the *Agenda 2010* in Germany and the *Contrat Première Embauche* in France) during these years. For the three more liberal countries, by contrast, labor market reforms are less important. At least for the U.K. and Switzerland, this has to do with the fact that labor markets already are comparatively flexible.

The issue privatization is especially salient in Austria and France, the countries which long had the biggest public sector among continental Western European economies. These two countries thus struggle most about the direct involvement of the state in the economy. The consequence of the high salience of privatization in France and Austria is a relatively low importance of international deregulation.

Confirming the long-standing evidence by Katzenstein's (1985) analyses, the debate on internationalization is affecting two small countries, namely Switzerland and Austria, exceptionally strongly. These countries traditionally have to deal with the benefits and risks of a strong interdependence with global markets. Furthermore, reflecting the importance of tax competition which is included in locational promotion, this issue is especially important in Switzerland.

6.1.3 Conflict Dimensions of Economic Liberalization

The debate on economic liberalization is assumed to be structured by more than one dimension, since different coalitions within both the political left and right have increasingly drifted apart as a consequence of globalization and post-industrialization. Especially the growing importance of protectionist positions on the political right as a reaction of increasing market volatility should lead to a configuration of the issues

in the debate that pits international and domestic issues against each other. In the following, the dimensionality of the public debate in general will come under further scrutiny. More precisely, we expect the public debate to be structured along the two dimensions international and domestic liberalization. The factor analysis reported in table 6.4 uses the weighted policy positions of actors to empirically test this expectation. Potentially, there are 180 possible actors entering the debates (30 actor types \times 6 countries), but since not all actors appear in every country, the number of observations is 147.

Table 6.3 *Structure of the Debate Space: Factor Analysis*

	Dom. lib.	Int. lib.	Uniqueness
Retrenchment of restrictions	0.046	0.587	0.653
Labor market deregulation	0.531	0.214	0.672
Privatization	0.770	-0.148	0.385
Economic promotion	0.689	0.247	0.464
International market deregulation	-0.004	0.455	0.793
Internationalization	0.002	0.608	0.630
Locational promotion	0.150	0.542	0.684
Eigenvalue	1.64	1.08	
Proportion in %	19.6	19.1	
N	147		
Likelihood ^a	35.23* DF=21		

Notes: Principal-component factor analysis on the level of actor categories (orthogonal varimax rotated solution) based on issue positions weighted by their salience. Additionally, article weights are applied for the calculations. Labels: Dom. lib.=Domestic liberalization, Int. lib.=International liberalization. ^a independent vs. saturated model. Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.001 .

Only two factors reach an eigenvalue above 1 and all issue categories clearly load only onto one of the two factors. This adds further evidence to support the dimensionality hypothesis. The issue of the public debate on economic liberalization do not align to one dimension and thus the left-right paradigm is not accurate to describe it. The findings on the dimensions thus show that a simple left-right model of political contention is not accurate to capture the debate on economic liberalization, as much of the literature on international political economy assumes (see [Milner and Judkins, 2004](#); [Dutt and Mitra, 2005](#)).

In the following analyses, debates on economic liberalization will thus often be studied at the disaggregate level of two dimensions which are constructed in the following way. On the one hand, the loadings of privatization, labor market deregulation and domestic liberalization load almost exclusively on the first factor. On the other hand, international liberalization and deregulation clearly belong to the second factor. Hence, while the first factor measures the national dimension, the second latent concept represents the international dimension.

Locational promotion, by contrast, loads higher on the second than on the first factor to which all the domestic issues belong. This result nevertheless leads to the conclusion that locational promotion is an international issue. Thus, actors mentioning this issue focus more explicitly on enhancing national competitiveness vis-à-vis other economies rather than being interested in creating a good environment for economic activity, e.g., the establishment and maintenance of infrastructure or supportive regulation for business, which would have been the interpretation related to the domestic dimension. A similar finding can be observed with respect to the issue “retrenchment of restrictions”. The results clearly indicate that this issue has more to do with conflicts on the internationalization of economies.

For the further analyses, “locational promotion” and “retrenchment of restrictions” are therefore collapsed with the two issues “international market deregulation” and “internationalization” to the international dimension. The three remaining issues, “privatization”, “labor market deregulation” and “economic promotion” are combined to the domestic dimension of the public debate on economic liberalization. More specifically, the issue statements are not simply summed up by these dimensions. We will add the factor loadings as additional probability weights to the calculations whenever indicators are aggregated by dimension.

6.2 Going Public: Who Inhabits the Economic Liberalization Debate?

Long-term transformations have brought about a pro-market mainstream and challengers struggling on economic liberalization in a debate which is divided into an international and a domestic dimension. In this structure, actors adopt specific discursive strategies to make their positions

heard. The first one of these strategies that will be considered here is *going public*. Going public is the most basic discursive strategy, since position taking, valence campaigning, and framing obviously depend on the actors' ability to enter a public debate at all.

In the following, going public will be explored at the actor level as well as in interaction with the country and arena context of the debate on economic liberalization. Moreover, the variation in actor salencies also decisively influences the diversity of the six countries and three arena types. The more different actors have a voice in the countries and arenas, the more heterogeneous the picture gets with respect to policy positions, valence campaigning, and frames.

This section thus serves the purpose to analyze the distribution of actor salencies. On the one hand, the accessibility of the debate across the countries and arenas will be explored. On the other hand, the conflicting expectations derived from the resource and the mobilization arguments are examined in the second part. As for accessibility, it is hypothesized that the coordinated market economies (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) are inhabited by a broader range of different actors (see chapter 3).

In terms of the resource argument, actors like national executives and corporations are seen in the advantage since they dispose of large attention from the mass media, institutionalized channels to get their message to the public, and significant abilities to produce and distribute their messages. Furthermore, social democratic and liberal parties are anticipated to loom high in the debate since they profit from their issue ownership on economic liberalization. Second, according to the mobilization argument, disadvantaged actors are considered to choose the public debate as a strategy to gain otherwise denied influence on policy decision making processes.

To test these expectations, table 7.3 presents the going public with respect to the basic actor groups (14 categories) by country and arena. Again, the numbers are calculated using article and country weights.

Table 6.4 *Going Public in the Debate on Economic Liberalization*

	Overall	Countries						Arenas		
		FR	A	DE	NL	CH	UK	input	janus-f.	output
Public authorities	IGO actors	2.5	2.4	1.4	0.9	3	4.5	2.1	0.1	3.6
	EU actors	9	5.7	11.8	6.2	12.3	7.7	10.6	1.5	18.4
	Foreign executives	7	5.4	9.3	5.7	8.2	6.2	7	1.7	16.1
	National executives	14.9	19.7	8.5	8.9	17.9	16.5	17.1	13.4	22
	Administrations	5.3	2.2	6.3	2.4	3.9	4.5	12.8	0.5	5.2
	Judiciary	1.1	1.2	1.4	1	0.7	1.2	0.8	0	3.6
	Legislatives	1.9	0.5	0.4	1.5	1.5	6.1	1.3	9.9	0.8
Intermediary actors	Business associations	6.3	4.8	7.2	7.9	5.6	5.9	6.5	3.5	3.1
	Trade unions	8.6	13.3	5.9	8.5	8.3	6.5	8.5	13.2	3.7
	Professional organizations	1.7	3.3	0.9	2	1.3	1.2	1.1	2.7	0.8
	Parties	14.5	16.1	13.6	26.6	9.4	15.4	6.5	39	8.8
External actors	Corporations	18.6	15.1	24.4	21	16.3	13	23.2	7.6	8.6
	Experts	7.1	9.5	6.9	5.4	10.4	8.6	1.5	4.5	4.2
	Public welfare actors	1.6	0.6	2	2	1.2	2.8	0.9	2.4	1.1
Total percentages		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Pearson's χ^2		90.7 * (65 DF)						157.4 *** (26 DF)		
N		9480	1754	1931	1605	857	2022	1427	1446	2787

Notes: All figures are in %; Article and country weights applied. Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.001 .

Overall, resourceful actors clearly are most visible. As expected by this line of argument, the two actors with the highest standing are the national executives (14.9 percent) and corporations (18.6 percent). Transnational actors also play an important role, as can be seen in the solid salience of EU actors (9.0 percent) and foreign executives (7.0 percent). However, the exceptionally high salience of corporations is surprising. Not only are they the most important actor in the debate, they have about three times as many statements as the business associations, usually seen as their representatives with regard to political processes and thus the more intuitive voice of business interests in the debate. Yet it seems that corporations heavily seek to exert direct influence on the debates and to circumvent the protracted processes of interest intermediation. Other important actors are parties (14.5), trade unions (8.6 percent), and also experts (7.1 percent). The importance of the latter points to the validity of repeated calls to rigorously include them into policy process analyses ([Sabatier and Weible, 2007b](#)).

As good as the resource argument matches the overall picture, as partial it is able to explain the comparative actor salencies. The national executives are most important in France (19.7 percent), which makes sense given their dominant position here. Business associations perform best in Austria and Germany, two historically corporatist economies where interest associations were expected to have a stronger standing. And trade unions are quite important in two other corporatist countries, namely Germany (8.5 percent) and the Netherlands (8.3 percent). Additionally, parties do exceptionally well in Germany (26.6 percent), where they traditionally are very crucial pillars of the political system and get fawned over by the media ([Ferree et al., 2002](#)). Furthermore, the national executives are more important in the liberal-leaning countries than their counterparts in Austria and Germany (17.1 percent in the U.K., 16.5 percent in Switzerland, and 17.9 percent in the Netherlands). The debate in the U.K. with its majoritarian political system is correspondingly dominated by the executives ([Lijphart, 1999](#)). This becomes even more evident if the exceptionally high salience of the public administrations in the U.K. is considered. With 12.8 percent of all statements they have more than double the importance than in all other countries. Similarly, the centralized style of corporatist policy making in the Netherlands (the ‘Polder model’) and the weak role of parties and the legislature in Switzerland gives public authorities an edge in these countries (see [Woldendorp and Keman, 2007](#); [Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008](#)).

In the liberal-leaning countries, going public is thus a more important tool for public authorities to influence the policy process.

However, many actors show a relatively higher salience where they are institutionally disadvantaged, which lends support to the mobilization thesis. The results for the trade unions in France (13.3 percent) and the U.K. (8.5 percent) can be interpreted in this way. In both countries, unions traditionally have difficulties to access the crucial sites of political decision making. Their strong standing in the debate can be interpreted as an attempt to influence the political decisions indirectly by getting the public involved. Finally, corporations are very strong in Austria (24.4 percent) and Germany (21.0 percent). In these two countries, the interests of corporations are usually expected to be integrated into the political realms via business associations. However, it appears that corporations use their resources much more heavily in these countries to get their voice heard in the public debate, thus bypassing interest intermediation in the back rooms of policy making more strongly than in other countries.

The country context does not only shape the opportunities of specific actors to access the public debate, also general properties in terms of the overall actor distribution varies across the national debates. The accessibility of the Swiss political system is visible in the highest share of otherwise almost ignored actors. Legislative bodies, experts, public welfare organizations, and IGO actors all perform best in Switzerland. This points to the openness of public debates in this country. Political outsiders are enhanced by the direct democratic institutions and the many informal channels of policy making (Höglinger, 2008).

The U.K. and France (as expected), but also Austria, instead, have a relatively closed structure of the debate. Public welfare organizations fare especially badly in France and the U.K., while legislatures are largely overlooked in the debates in France and Austria. Moreover, judiciary actors have an exceptionally low standing in the U.K. Yet, the comparatively higher openness of the public debate in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland confirm the accessibility hypothesis with regard to countries.

With respect to the actors' going public in the arenas, it is not clear that input arenas are better accessible than the janus-faced and output

arenas. The public authorities have – with the exception of the legislatures – the highest salience in the janus-faced arenas. IGO and EU actors, foreign and national executives, administrations, and judiciary actors use their established channels to communicate here. However, only the national executives are main players also in both input (13.4 percent) and the output (8.4 percent) arenas. Thus, they crucially engage in every stage of public contention of the policy processes. The other actor categories with a similar overall importance are parties, which mainly engage in the input arenas (39.0 percent), and corporations, which have about 40 percent of all statements made in the output arenas. And only these three actors are also able to markedly influence the course of the debate in every arena.

Legislative bodies and public welfare actors are by far most visible in the input arenas (9.9 and 2.4 percent, respectively), while business associations are important in the output arena. This could very much have been expected, since the former are specialized to bring up new policy demands and the latter focus more on the negotiations during the implementation phase of policies (Kriesi, 2007). Experts, instead, have distributed their statements evenly across the arenas. And trade unions as well as professional organizations have most of the statements in both the in- and output arenas. This is in line with the theoretical expectations, too, since they do usually not take part in the policy decisions within the realms of public authorities.

Further important variations with respect to the going public of actors can only be found by disaggregating the rough actor categories. Most notably, the expectations regarding the issue ownership of parties can only be tested with the fine-grained classifications that distinguish between party families. Accordingly, figure 7.1 shows the success of the going public strategies for the fine-grained categorization that consists of 30 actors. The bars indicate the mean predicted numbers of statements made by the actors for both dimensions of the public debate on economic liberalization. These mean predicted numbers are the results of count regressions as reported in tables C.1 and C.2 in the appendix.

In contrast to simple frequency tables, a count regression allows to estimate the going public of actors in a multivariate model that includes controls for country and arena effects. Furthermore, the frequency of statements by actors on the two dimensions of conflict is

a heavily skewed and overdispersed dependent variable (see figure C.1 and table C.1). Thus, the count models were estimated by negative binominal regressions (see Long and Freese, 2006). Before the estimation, the data were first aggregated to the 30 actor categories, 6 countries, and 3 arenas using article and issue weights – calculated from the factor loadings to account for the different contribution of the issues to the dimensions.

On this disaggregated level, it becomes clear that the national executives are the dominant actor of the debate on both dimensions of economic liberalization. With an average number of about 23 statements on domestic aspects, national executives have clearly a stronger going public than private sector unions and niche firms who come second and third, respectively. National executives thus seem to be at the forefront of neoliberal dominance, since among the seven actors who reach more than ten statements on one of the dimensions, only the private sector unions are assumed to be challengers. Although only the next chapter provide a precise picture on the policy positions of the actors, it seems neoliberal dominance more forcefully plays out on the international dimension. EU actors, foreign executives from advanced economies, national executives, and global players loom high in the debate related to this dimension and are also expected to pursue a liberal policy positioning strategy. Moreover, the results confirm the resource argument: media clearly favor actors which have advantages in terms of institutionalized channels or economic resources, because these advantages give them a higher status and news value.

The private sector unions are the only hypothesized challenger with an important stance in the debate with an average of about 11 statements on international and 14 on domestic liberalization. Notably, they are the second most important actors with regard to domestic conflicts. All other challengers, including the right-wing populist parties, are rather insignificant players in the debate. However, we will see later during the analysis of policy position taking that there is a considerable protectionist wing that challenges the neoliberal dominance, but the right-wing populists are not its main advocates.




Figure 6.1 Overall Going Public and with Respect to the Two Dimensions: Results of Count Regressions

Notes: Averages of the number of predicted frames from count regression models on the usage of frames by actors, controlling for countries and arenas. Country, issue, and article weights applied. For the list of coefficients, standard errors, z statistics and wald tests of the regression analysis, see table C.2 in the appendix.

Reflecting the overall higher importance of international liberalization, most actors speak out more often on this dimension. Yet, many actors from the political left go more frequently public on the domestic dimension, namely private and public sector unions, communist and left socialists, as well as the greens. These left challengers thus engage in the debate in the context of the policies that mainly remained attached to the national realm of policy making, while international and European aspects are mainly left to the challengers of the political right and the liberal mainstream. For obvious reasons, public welfare organizations and global justice movements are an exception within the camp of the left challengers. They are mainly focused on international aspects, which confirms globalization-related issues as their core business. Yet also public advisory actors refer more strongly to domestic issues. This seems intuitive for the public advisory actors, since they are especially tied to the domestic realm with respect to their supportive role for national executives and public administrations.

The two party families which traditionally alternate in government or in a leading role in governmental coalitions in Western Europe, the social democrats as well as the Christian democrats and conservatives, also dominate the other parties regarding the going public in the debate on economic liberalization. Further, the stronger stance of the social democrats in comparison to the Christian democrats and conservatives points to the validity of the issue ownership thesis for these parties. They show a stronger going public in the debate on both dimensions, whereas they won on average only 34.9 percent in the electoral contests which took place closest to the time period of this debate analysis.¹ This is considerably less than the Christian democrats and conservatives which gained about 37.2 percent of votes. Also the communists and left socialists have much more weight in the debate than in the elections, while the importance of liberals and right wing populists does not substantively vary. The radical left is clearly the smallest party family in electoral contests (3.2 percent), but are responsible for more statements than the greens in the debate. Since they also mainly mobilize on economic issues in electoral contests, issue ownership seems to play a substantive role for the strength of parties in the debate (Kriesi et al., 2008). In sum,

¹ The following national parliamentary elections were considered for this calculation: France=2002, Austria=2002, Germany=2005, the Netherlands=2003, Switzerland=2003, the U.K.=2005.

economic liberalization seems to foster the going public of parties from the political left.

With regard to business interests, big business clearly prevails. Peak employer associations outperform small business associations and professional organizations (farmer and white collar organizations). Additionally, with respect to corporations, global players are the most important actor. But it has to be noted that the categories for corporations do not include genuinely small companies, since the niche firms mostly are multinational companies as well. The difference to global players is that niche firms are not among the biggest 2000 companies worldwide (see table A.3 and B.1 in the appendix). Thus, small businesses do not have a direct voice in the mass media at all. Combined with the also low standing of their interest groups, this is a clear result in favor of the resourceful and well organized actors in the business realm. Small businesses, often praised as the pillar of Western European economies, have almost no voice at all.

6.3 Conclusion

In the beginning, this chapter has shown that one simple left-right dimension is not enough to characterize the conflict structure of the public debate on economic liberalization. As expected, two dimensions were found which can be ascribed to international and domestic aspects. These dimensions will be an important aspect of many subsequent analyses, but a first consequence was already evident. The actors responsible for the neoliberal dominance in the debate firmly hold their ground on the international aspects of the debate. The issues of the relatively less important domestic realm of economic liberalization, in contrast, provide an opportunity for the political left to have a voice.

The remainder of this chapter centered on the analysis of the going public strategy and its manifold implications for the actor level. First, the hypothesis on the distinctiveness of the national debates was assessed. It was confirmed that France and Switzerland deviate from the other countries with a public debate that is more constrained to national participants. However, the national differences in terms of the going public of actors differentiated by their level of origin were not statistically significant. The assumption regarding the accessibility of the debates

was also largely confirmed for the countries. The debate in three of the four coordinated market economies, namely Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, is also accessible for comparatively peripheral actors. As far as the arenas are concerned, however, the expected differences did not materialize.

With respect to the actor hypotheses, the resource argument is confirmed for the aggregate going public over all countries. Public authorities, corporate interests and the established parties clearly have the biggest weight in the debate. However, when the country context is additionally considered, many actors show a comparatively higher salience where they are institutionally disadvantaged. This also lends some support to the mobilization thesis. The most notable finding, however, perhaps is the strong stance of big business actors and their representatives. This dominance is most problematic for the standing of the small businesses and not for the trade unions, which also have a considerably strong voice. Because small businesses play a crucial role for the economic performance in Western Europe, they could also have been expected to enter more forcefully into the public debates on economic liberalization.

In the following chapters, the expectations regarding the relationship of country and arena contexts with debates as well as the actor characteristics will be empirically tested for the three remaining discursive strategies.

7

Policy Conflicts in the Economic Liberalization Debate

Policy position taking is a key element of the actors' discursive strategic repertoire after having gained access to the public debate. In the last chapter, we have seen that the structuring of the debate into an international and domestic dimension has led to a specific 'division of labor': actors responsible for the dominance of neoliberal positions densely populate the international dimension, while many actors from the political left prefer the domestic aspects of the debate on economic liberalization.

This chapter aims to provide more insights on the policy positions and conflict intensity of the overall debate and the two dimensions at the levels of countries, arenas, actors, and debate coalitions. With regard to countries, the discussion so far repeatedly made suggestions about the overall climate of countries. Most of all, some countries were perceived as more liberal-leaning than others. In the first part of this chapter, these and other expectations concerning the country context of public debates will be empirically assessed. The results will show that we indeed have two liberal-leaning countries in terms of the overall political climate, Switzerland and the U.K. The other countries, especially France, are more skeptic of economic liberalization. In a similar vein, hypotheses about the overall climate in the arenas will be tested, i.e., whether there indeed are systematic variations between the arenas in terms of their aggregated policy position and their polarization. We will find that neoliberal dominance is most heavily challenged in the input arenas.

The second part of the analyses is dedicated to the actors' policy positions and the debate coalition formation as a function of the actors' going public and policy positions. One set of expectations established in chapter 4 suggested four debate coalitions with distinct policy positions:

the traditional left and neomercantilist challengers and the third way and neoliberal coalitions as camps that reinforce neoliberal dominance. While this coalitional setting is confirmed, we will see that many third way actors are actually embracing neomercantilist positions.

7.1 The Countries' Overall Debate Climate

The debate in the six countries is assumed to be characterized by a different overall climate in terms of the willingness to support the various aspects of economic liberalization. With respect to the aggregated policy positions, the expectation refers to the capitalist regime types which are expected to influence the debate in four distinct directions. First, France – a state-led market economy (SME) – is expected to be least in favor of economic liberalization. On the other extreme, the U.K. is perceived to come closest to a liberal market economy (LME) and most clearly leans to support of economic liberalization. The four coordinated market economies (CME) are anticipated to split into the rather liberal-leaning countries, the Netherlands and Switzerland, as well as Austria and Germany, which should have a more skeptical debate.

Figure 8.1 shows the positions of countries with regard to economic liberalization and its two dimensions. The symbols indicate the position, while the corresponding lines show the 95 percent confidence interval of these positions. Most importantly, these confidence intervals allow to discern whether positions are substantially different from each other and whether they are ambivalent, i.e., if they do not significantly deviate from zero. Positive scores indicate positions supporting economic liberalization, whereas values below zero mean opposition.

The three positions over all countries (overall and on the two dimensions) are very consistent, and they only range from +0.14 to +0.19. Moreover, the confidence intervals are quite narrow, which means that the values for the two dimensions do not significantly vary from each other. Hence, the overall position towards economic liberalization is predominantly positive, regardless of which realm of the economy is concerned. This might be taken as evidence for the influence of neoliberal dominance on the public disputes regarding economic liberalization in Western Europe.

Moreover, the general distribution of supportive and oppositional statements (results not shown here) lends support to the pro-market mainstream thesis. Support of economic liberalization sum up to around 60 percent of all statements on both dimensions. Nevertheless, since there is also considerable opposition on every dimension neither an overwhelming neoliberal dominance nor a balanced debate characterizes this aggregated picture of the debate. In all countries there is such a substantial amount of oppositional statements that arguments regarding a hegemonic pro-liberalization discourse in Western Europe seem overstretched (van Apeldoorn, 2002).




Figure 7.1 Average Policy Positions on International and Domestic Liberalization by Country

Notes: Average positions and their 95 % confidence intervals. Article weights applied for all, country weights applied for overall, and issue weights applied for dimensional calculations.

With respect to the positions by country, there is more variation, which points to the fact that national institutional settings do indeed matter for policy positions. Most notably, France stands out as the only country opposing economic liberalization in general. This negative overall stance is primarily caused by the opposition towards domestic liberalization which is not very strong but nevertheless significant (-0.11 in the maximum range from 1 to -1).

On the international dimension, France has an ambivalent stance, since the confidence interval overlaps with zero. However, in line with

the theoretical expectations, it is still the most negative of all countries. Only the position of Austria is also ambivalent towards international liberalization. Similar to France, Austria is a countries where the state intervenes relatively strongly into the economic affairs. Its public sector long was the largest of Western European countries. In addition, this rather skeptical stance corresponds to the fact that the electoral campaign in Austria also became increasingly anti-liberalization over time.

Two countries perceived as rather liberal (the U.K. and Switzerland) are indeed at the forefront of support of economic liberalization. Switzerland shows the most pronounced support with a position of +0.28, but the U.K. does not significantly differ with +0.25. Moreover, Germany with +0.22 does not sharply deviate from Switzerland as the confidence interval shows, but Austria (+0.19) and the Netherlands (+0.17) do so. According to its political-economic regime type, the latter was expected to be quite liberal as well. Yet also in terms of the electoral arena, the Netherlands stood out as being the most skeptical of these three countries.

However, what all supposedly liberal-leaning countries, i.e., the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.K., share is the pattern of positions on domestic and international liberalization. These three countries are the most liberal ones on the international aspects but are much more reluctant to embrace domestic liberalization. Austria and – to a lower degree – Germany show exactly the opposite pattern. They are more protective against the global economy but comparatively liberal when it comes to domestic issues. The positions in France, finally, do not differ much between the dimensions.

Not only the aggregate positions, but also the conflict intensity is related to the political-economic context in the six countries. Table 7.1 shows the polarization index by country and overall. In simple terms, this index summarizes how strongly actors vary with respect to their positions on the different issues. To this aim, the quadratic sum of the deviations of positions from the average position over all actors is calculated, using weights to account for the actors' relative frequencies (see table B.2 in the appendix). Higher values indicate higher polarization.

First, France and Germany, the two countries countries with the most pressing economic difficulties have the highest conflict intensity in their

Table 7.1 *Polarization by Country and Dimensions*

	Overall	FR	A	DE	NL	CH	UK
Domestic liberalization	0.19	0.38	0.15	0.32	0.16	0.28	0.13
International liberalization	0.07	0.13	0.16	0.21	0.13	0.14	0.06
Economic liberalization	0.12	0.24	0.16	0.27	0.16	0.20	0.08

Notes: Labels: A=Austria, FR=France, CH=Switzerland, NL=Netherlands, UK=United Kingdom, DE=Germany. Article weights applied for all, country weights applied for overall, and issue weights applied for dimensional calculations. See table B.2 in the appendix for the definition and calculation of the polarization index.

public debates on economic liberalization. Both have the highest level of economic misery (see section 3.1). Second, comparing the dimensions, domestic liberalization is far more conflictive. Only in Austria both dimensions show about the same level of polarization. Thus, not the issues of internationalization like the WTO Doha Round negotiations are fiercely disputed, but the nationally regulated policies like labor market reforms are at the center of struggles. Even though it is clear that this conclusion can only tentatively be made, globalization seems to have a the smaller impact on public conflicts on economic liberalization than domestic long-term transformations. Furthermore, two of the three countries with a very rapid increase in economic flows during the last decades – as observed in the analysis of the countries’ economic development in section 3.1 – have the highest polarization of international liberalization (France and, although only marginal, Austria).

As expected, the U.K. is the country with the least conflictive debate on economic liberalization and France has the most polarized debate. Yet, the latter result could also be explained by time-specific reasons. The debate in France was dominated by a major labor market reform which ignited fierce disputes. Furthermore, as already mentioned, France is the only country where international liberalization clearly is more heavily disputed. The Netherlands and Austria are quite consensual countries when it comes to the debate, but total polarization still doubles in comparison to the U.K. Germany and Switzerland, finally, are similar in terms of their very high polarization on domestic liberalization. Most notably in Germany, the debate on domestically oriented policies seems to be far away from the often noted consensual character of its system of economic interest intermediation (e.g., [Emmenegger and Marx, 2011](#)).

In sum, the results are mainly confirm the expectations. Yet, as we will see, some more differences with respect to the countries can be carved out by including the institutional context of arenas and the actor characteristics into the analyses of actor positions.

7.2 Positions and Polarization by Arenas

Besides countries, arenas are part of the institutional context of public debates. Arenas are the sites where the policy process on specific aspects of economic liberalization passes through. The specific institutional constellations of arenas influence the course of public debates as the policy positions on economic liberalization presented in figure 8.2 and polarization indices as indicated in table 8.2 show. In chapter 3 it was hypothesized that the input arenas are both the most skeptic and conflictual of the three arenas.

In general, the range of positions has increased compared to the overall positions by country. Most notably, there are more clearly negative positions, although some confidence intervals are considerably larger. Nevertheless, this points to the fact that arenas add explanatory power to the country contexts, a so far too rarely considered aspect in analyses of public debates ([Helbling et al., 2012](#)).

As far as the overall positions are concerned, they are again very consistent, i.e., they are located within a small range and have narrow confidence intervals. The difference between these overall positions and the ones over all countries in figure 8.1 is caused by the lower number of statements used. Since it was not possible to attach all statements to an arena, a smaller number of observations could be used for the positions in Figure 8.2 than in Figure 8.1. Nevertheless, they are intriguing: while the aggregate climate in Western Europe is favorable to economic liberalization, this analysis reveals that it does not apply to the input arenas. The position in the arenas where the different interests feed into the political system, i.e., the realms of electoral competition, parliamentary debates, political protests, and direct democratic votes, shows that economic liberalization is not an unchallenged issue.

In contrast to the countries, where the picture was more complex than anticipated, the main expectations are largely confirmed with regard to the arenas. With the exception of the Netherlands, the positions in input




Figure 7.2 Average Policy Positions in Arenas by Country

Notes: Average positions and their 95 % confidence intervals. Article weights applied for all and country weights applied for overall calculations.

arenas are the most disputed ones with regard to economic liberalization. And even in the Netherlands, the position of the input arena is ambivalent (+0.01) and is not substantially more positive than the output arenas (−0.03). Further, in all countries except the U.K., the position is at least ambivalent in the input arenas. If economic liberalization is challenged, it seems to happen mostly in arenas where the articulation of interests wishing to be included into the political system takes place.

The discrepancy between the opposition-dominated input arena and the other arenas is especially large in Germany, whose janus-faced and output arenas are overall the most liberal ones. Moreover, as will be shown below, the strong articulation of opposition in the input arenas (positions of −0.31 and −0.25, respectively) is responsible for the high conflict intensity of the debates in France and Germany. In both countries but also in Austria, the public debate in the input arena is so detached from the janus-faced arenas that the demands mobilized by intermediary actors in the input arenas are largely ignored during the actual decision making processes. In addition, this pattern shows that Austria, France and Germany are not overall skeptic towards economic liberalization, as hypothesized, but only with regard to their input arenas.

Switzerland and the U.K., finally, share the pattern that the aggregate positions essentially do not differ between the three arenas. Here, every arena seems to be the terrain of neoliberal dominance, although a high variation in the Swiss input arena is stretching the confidence interval below zero. As the country analyses already have shown, only these two countries but not the Netherlands can therefore be labelled as liberal-leaning political-economic systems in terms of the debate. Moreover, with respect to the confidence intervals, no arena significantly deviates from the others in the Netherlands, the U.K. and Switzerland, i.e., the three countries perceived as liberal-leaning. This means that there is no sharp distance between the different stages of policy making in these countries.

The results for the polarization indices by arenas as shown in Table 7.2 nicely match the findings with respect to the policy positions. The struggles in the input arenas are most pronounced for both dimensions, followed by the output arenas. As for the latter, the one on domestic liberalization is especially high polarized. These findings completely confirm the expectations. And like for the country-specific analyses, the domestic dimension is clearly more contested, which points to the fact that the public debate has turned to very conflictual issues like labor market flexibility with respect to this dimension.

Table 7.2 *Polarization by Arena*

Dimension	Overall	Input	Janus-faced	Output
Economic lib.	0.12	0.24	0.11	0.16
Domestic lib.	0.19	0.31	0.14	0.25
International lib.	0.07	0.16	0.10	0.11

Notes: Article weights applied for all, country weights applied for overall, and issue weights applied for dimensional calculations. See table B.2 in the appendix for the definition and calculation of the polarization index.

7.3 Explaining the Actors' Policy Position Taking

Having explored the impact of the institutional context on the policy positions and polarization in the public debate on economic liberalization, the focus in this section turns to the question how the actors' characteristics shape their policy position taking. The expectations on how the actors shape the course of the debate are related to two basic arguments.

First, the mainstream and challenger hypotheses suggest that the majority of actors is endorsing pro-liberalization positions, facing opposition by a few left and right-wing protectionist challengers only, namely trade unions, social movements, small business actors, and right-wing populists. Second, a basic conflict constellation of four debate coalitions located in the two-dimensional debate space is expected. These include the traditional left, third way, neoliberals and neomercantilists.

Figure 8.3 approaches these hypotheses by presenting the actors' positions at the most aggregated level. The dots show the overall policy positions over all countries for a first general classification of fourteen actor categories, along with the confidence intervals of these positions.

Eight out of fourteen actors are significantly embracing liberalization reforms. IGO and EU actors (+0.53 and +0.38, respectively), national executives (+0.32), business associations (+0.42), and corporations (+0.32) decisively so, while experts (+0.22), foreign executives (+0.19), and legislatures (+0.18) are a bit unassertive but nevertheless clearly in favor of economic liberalization.

As anticipated, there is thus a clear pro-liberalization majority which further confirms the pro-market mainstream expectation. For most of these actors, however, this unanimous position only holds for this highly aggregated categories. If the actor classification is broken down into more fine-grained actor categories and countries, the picture looks quite differently since some categories are substantially heterogeneous (see table 8.3).

There are three actors with ambivalent positions. First, the ambiguity of political parties (+0.07)¹ highlights that the aggregation may cover a lot of important variation, since there surely is a broad range of positions among the parties from the various political camps which cancel each other out. Second, the ambivalence of judiciary actors can also be interpreted in a straightforward way. Courts mainly have to deal with economic liberalization when legal conflicts arise, e.g., in the context of cartel law violations or labor regulation disputes. As arbiters, judiciary actors need to be ideologically neutral but intervene dependent on the

¹ The confidence interval for the parties actually indicates a significant deviation from zero, i.e., an overall favorable position. Yet the position is so slightly positive that it is still interpreted as ambiguous.




Figure 7.3 Policy Positions of Actors on Economic Liberalization

Notes: The points indicate the position, the corresponding lines the 95 % confidence interval of these positions. Article weights applied.

interpretation of existing law. Public administrations, finally, are also ambivalent, which may reflect their function as the authorities which have to balance the different interests of employers and workers during the implementation of liberalization reforms.

Overall, the majority of actors favoring economic liberalization is challenged by only three actors on this level of analysis. Two of them, the trade unions and public welfare groups, can be attached to the political left and are fiercely fighting economic liberalization (-0.56 and -0.60 , respectively). Yet, there is also evidence for the right challenger hypothesis. The clear opposition from the professional organizations, which are dominated by the farmer organizations but also include the white collar associations, provides a first hint to the existence of a conservative, protectionist camp in the debate.

As already outlined, the overall positions of actors on a highly aggregated level might well cover much crucial variation among the actors. More specifically, it is still unclear how the positions of the various actors differ on the two dimensions and whether the variation across countries and arenas as found above is still relevant when actor differences are

taken into account. Table 7.3 reports the results of OLS regressions predicting the actors' average positions on the international and domestic dimension to answer these questions. The fine-grained actor classification distinguishing 30 categories, the six countries, and the arenas are included as independent variables.

One of the main arguments is that actors do not engage in public debates in an isolated way. In general, they are assumed to be aware of the shape of the debate in a specific policy subsystem, be it because they are regularly in interaction with other actors or because they follow the news coverage of the issues debated in the policy subsystem. This, in turn, makes it possible for scientific research to identify debate coalitions, i.e., actor camps with shared policy positions, in order to better understand the constellational settings shaping the debate on economic liberalization.

The dependent variable is defined as the average positions on the two dimensions by actor types ($N=30$), countries ($N=6$) and arenas ($N=3$). This amounts to $30 \times 6 \times 3 = 540$ potential observations. However, since not all combinations exist, the real number of observations is obviously lower. The coefficients for the actors shows by how much their position differs from the position of the IGO actors. Since IGO actors are the most liberal actors in the debate (see Figure 7.3), significant coefficients signal a deviation from the pro-market mainstream. In a similar vein, the overall most supportive category was chosen with respect to the countries (Switzerland) and arenas (janus-faced). Significant parameters thus point to less liberal positions here, too.

Table 7.3 *Determinants of Policy Positions on Domestic and International Liberalization*

	International liberalization			Domestic liberalization		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>t	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>t
<i>Actors (ref=IGO actors)</i>						
EU actors	-0.233	0.254	n.s.	0.287	0.403	n.s.
For. exec. adv. economies	-0.770	0.253	**	-0.279	0.417	n.s.
For. exec. emerging markets	-0.343	0.292	n.s.	-0.144	0.441	n.s.
National executives	-0.449	0.251	n.s.	-0.104	0.392	n.s.
Economic administrations	-0.854	0.277	**	0.133	0.432	n.s.
General administrations	-1.156	0.285	***	-0.180	0.425	n.s.
Judiciary	-0.737	0.329	*	-0.306	0.471	n.s.
Legislatures	-0.823	0.279	**	0.070	0.435	n.s.
Chambers of commerce	-0.602	0.314	n.s.	-0.107	0.543	n.s.
Peak employer assoc.	-0.480	0.256	n.s.	0.003	0.402	n.s.
Small business assoc.	-0.816	0.273	**	-0.018	0.420	n.s.
Private sector unions	-1.138	0.254	***	-1.088	0.392	**
Public sector unions	-1.463	0.303	***	-1.158	0.404	**
Farmer organization	-0.718	0.314	*	-0.634	0.545	n.s.
White collar organizations	-1.005	0.302	***	-1.272	0.429	**
Communists/Left socialists	-1.404	0.315	***	-1.046	0.448	*
Greens	-1.365	0.350	***	-0.509	0.426	n.s.
Social democrats	-1.074	0.254	***	-0.364	0.396	n.s.
Liberals	-0.482	0.273	n.s.	0.002	0.420	n.s.
Christ. dem./conservatives	-0.147	0.260	n.s.	-0.306	0.402	n.s.
Right-wing populists	-1.491	0.303	***	-0.465	0.457	n.s.
Global players	-0.440	0.253	n.s.	-0.052	0.405	n.s.
Niche firms	-0.913	0.251	***	-0.369	0.394	n.s.
Public enterprises	-0.948	0.286	***	-0.392	0.397	n.s.
Econ. think tanks	-0.923	0.301	**	-1.145	0.545	*
Publ. advisory actors	-0.481	0.256	n.s.	-0.136	0.403	n.s.
Publ. welfare org.	-1.290	0.302	***	-0.960	0.443	*
Publ. welfare mov.	-1.515	0.304	***	-1.445	0.611	*
<i>Countries (ref=Switzerland)</i>						
Austria	-0.251	0.118	*	-0.048	0.139	n.s.
France	-0.483	0.116	***	-0.127	0.140	n.s.
Germany	-0.304	0.123	*	0.047	0.140	n.s.
Netherlands	-0.274	0.123	*	-0.157	0.162	n.s.
U.K.	-0.064	0.121	n.s.	-0.208	0.148	n.s.
<i>Arenas (ref=Janus-faced)</i>						
Input	0.036	0.089	n.s.	0.098	0.104	n.s.
Output	0.080	0.086	n.s.	-0.040	0.105	n.s.
Constant	1.013	0.220	***	0.419	0.365	n.s.
N	333			286		
Adjusted R ²	0.26			0.21		
<i>F statistics</i>						
Overall model	4.32		***	3.15		***
Actors	4.52		***	3.85		***
Countries	4.35		***	0.87		n.s.
Arenas	0.44		n.s.	0.84		n.s.

Notes: Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors and levels of significance from OLS regression on the level of actors. Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.001 .

First of all, table 8.3 allows for a test of whether institutional contexts, actor characteristics or both have an impact on the policy position taking. As the significant F statistics for the actor and country variables show, both are important to explain the policy position taking on economic liberalization in the model. The arena variables, however, are not significantly explaining parts of the variation in positions on both international and domestic liberalization if we control for country and actor effects. Nevertheless, a combination of actor-specific characteristics and the institutional context seems suitable to predict the outcome of public debates in terms of policy position taking. This reflects the initial conceptualization as suggested by the heuristic model outlined in chapter 1, which assumes a joint impact of institutional varieties and actor strategies.

With respect to the actor variables, there are basically three distinct groups which can be matched with the expected debate coalitions: the pro-market mainstream, the neomercantilists, and the traditional left. First, some actors do not significantly differ from the IGO actors in terms of their positioning on both dimensions. Thus, the following actors can be perceived as affiliated to the mainstream: EU actors, foreign executives from emerging markets of which the governments of China and India are typical examples, national executives, chambers of commerce, peak employer associations, liberals, Christian democratic and conservative parties, global players, i.e., companies from the top 2000 corporations worldwide, and public advisory actors. All these actors were expected to be members of the pro-market mainstream and, accordingly, the third-way or neoliberal coalition.

A second camp of actors is substantially opposing liberalization on both dimensions. Private and public sector unions, communists and left socialists, as well as public welfare organizations and movements do as expected adhere to the traditional left coalition that fiercely fights both aspects of economic liberalization. Rather puzzling, however, is the same finding for the white collar organizations which were hypothesized to belong to the third way coalition and the economic think tanks, suggested adherents of the neoliberal coalition. Yet, as a matter of fact, white collar organizations are, on the one hand, dominated by the French umbrella organization for white collar workers and engineers (*UNSA*), which is traditionally skeptical of liberalization reforms. On the other hand, the *Marburger Bund*, Europe's biggest medical association, which went sev-

eral times on strike against the new collective wage agreement for the public services in Germany in the second half of 2006 plays an important role in this category as well. These two actors alone made up for more than one third of all statements, which substantively pulls the position towards refusal of economic liberalization. And with respect to economic think tanks, organizations which among others provide expertise to trade unions like the Dutch *Centraal Planbureau* are among the most prominent.

The neomercantilist group of actors which are supportive of domestic liberalization but opt for protectionism is larger than expected. Not only, as hypothesized, the right wing populists, farmer organizations, and small business organizations, but also foreign executives from advanced economies, both categories of public administrations, judiciary actors which earlier were found to be ambivalent regarding overall economic liberalization, legislatures, niche and public enterprises, experts, and the mainstream left parties (greens and social democrats) belong to this coalition.

First, this means that there is exceptionally strong opposition to the neoliberal dominance on the international liberalization dimension. Second, it points to the fact that many actors who were suggested to form the third way did actually only move on the domestic dimension towards more liberal positions and did not fully approach the mainstream. And third, a quite large group of actors, namely the foreign executives from advanced economies, public administrations, experts, niche firms, judiciary actors, and legislatures do not actually reinforce the mainstream, as was expected by the hypotheses. Their policy positions are protectionist. Thus, in terms of actor categories, the neomercantilist coalition has the majority in the debate. This, in turn, means that the pro-market mainstream is so strong that the position in the five of six countries is liberal-leaning only because the most successful actors in terms of going public – the national executives, global players, and EU actors – adhere to it (see chapter 6).

With respect to countries, all except the U.K. are less liberal than Switzerland on the international dimension. On the domestic dimension, by contrast, there is no substantial deviation among the countries. This means that, *ceteris paribus*, the most important result with respect to the countries is the comparatively weaker embracement of internation-

alization in France, Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands, while the six countries do not significantly differ in their overall climate towards domestic aspects. As for the arenas, there are no differences between the output arenas and the other two sites of political structuring with regard to both aspects of liberalization when controlling for actors and countries. The institutional context of arenas thus matters much less than countries.

7.4 The Coalitional Settings in the Six Countries

We have seen that there is a divide into a liberal mainstream, a traditional left coalition, and neomercantilists with respect to the policy position taking in the public debate on economic liberalization over all six countries. While the main hypothesis concerning neoliberal dominance is thus largely met on this aggregate level of analysis, the evidence will have to be modified when the debate coalitions are examined for the single countries. This corresponds to one of the main purposes of this study, namely to examine how the general trend towards liberalization in Western Europe is reintegrated into the national spheres of publicly debating economic liberalization.

The following analyses as presented by Figure 8.4 start with the examination of the actors' policy position taking by country. The centers of the grey circles indicate the respective actors' position on the two dimensions weighted by issue importance and the distribution of statements across articles, while the size of the circles show the salience of actors, i.e., the relative frequency of statements made by the respective actors, which sum up to 100 percent for each country. Finally, the dashed circles present the debate coalitions as found by a cluster analysis of the salience weighted positions.

The number of clusters was previously determined using an improved kmeans cluster analysis. The approach tackles two unfortunate properties of the ordinary kmeans clustering algorithm. First, the definition of a starting configuration is needed, which then is subject to a confirmatory analysis. If no starting configuration is given, kmeans randomly defines cluster centers. This, however, returns unstable and often suboptimal results, both statistically and substantively. Since the actors used in this analysis are too heterogeneous to suggest a starting configuration, this

is a major difficulty. To fix this problem, we apply an algorithm called `kmeans++` as proposed by Arthur and Vassilvitskii (2007). `Kmeans++` calculates optimal cluster centers by minimizing the average squared distances for all data points to the cluster centers before the actual clustering is started. This leads to stable clustering solutions.

The second hurdle of ordinary `kmeans` clustering is the fact that it requires the a priori definition of the number of clusters. Usually researcher speculate about the numbers of clusters. Yet in this case, this number is less clear. For example, it not evident whether we will find a third way coalition in every country or whether the pro-liberalization forces form one coalition. To determine the most adequate number of clusters more solidly, we compare different cluster solutions by their ranking on the Dunn index, a measure suggested by Dunn (1974).² The `DUnn` index indicates the ratio between the smallest distance between actors of different clusters and the biggest distance between actors of the same cluster (see definition in table B.1. and the documentation in tables C.3 and C.4 in the appendix). These calculations yielded four clusters in the case of France, Germany, and the Netherlands, three for the U.K. and Austria as well as two in the case of Switzerland.

There are significant idiosyncrasies in the patterns of the debates across the single countries. First of all, in all countries except France, the upper right corner of the debate space – the area of support for both aspects of liberalization – is most densely populated. In the U.K., the lower half of the debate space even is almost deserted. There is no significant opposition to international liberalization here and actors thus mainly differ with respect to their positions on the domestic dimension.

² In R, the Dunn index calculation calculation is implemented in the package *clvalid*.




Figure 7.4 How Debate Coalitions Form from the Actors' Going Public and Policy Position Taking by Country

Notes: Article and issue weights applied; Actors with less than 5 statements not included; Labels: adm.=General administrations, adm.eco.=Economic administrations, chris.con.=Christian democrats and conservatives, eco.think=Economic think-tanks, EU=EU actors, for.adv.=Foreign executives advanced economies, for.em.=Foreign executives emerging markets, glob.play.=global players, IGO=IGO actors, judic.=Judiciary actors, nat.ex.=National executives, niche=Niche firms, peak=Peak employer associations, pop.right=Populist right parties, pub.adv.=Public advisory actors, pub.ent.=Public enterprises, pub.union=Public sectors unions, priv.union=Private sector unions, sm.bus.=Small business associations, soc.dem.=Social democrats, welf.mov=Public welfare movements, welf.org=Public welfare organizations, white.col.=White collar organizations.

We proceed with the presentation of each actor's importance and policy stance across the countries. In the general scheme over all countries, the most important actors for the pro-market mainstream are the national executives, the EU actors, and the global players. Moreover, these actors in general are located close to each other in terms of their positions. However, there is also considerable variation with regard to these actors' positions across the six countries, which also allows to explain the country differences.

National executives are fully supporting liberalization in the coordinated market economies, i.e., in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. In the U.K., national executives are ambivalent towards domestic liberalization. As it turns out, this can be attributed to the U.K. government's outspoken disapproval of the privatization of the Royal Mail, which was debated for years before being approved in 2010. An idiosyncrasy of the German debate is the strong salience of the parties. Both the social democrats and the Christian democrats and conservatives (the *Union*) are among the most important actors. This is an even more astonishing result given that party affiliated actors that have an executive function are not included in these party categories.

In France, national executives are ambivalent on the international dimension, mainly because they frequently argue in favor of the creation of "national champions", corporations created above all in the energy and pharmaceutical sectors for the purpose of being competitive on the global markets. This confirms earlier accounts of a state entrepreneurialism in France ([Schmidt, 2009](#)), i.e., that the French public authorities deviate from their counterparts in the other countries because they more explicitly strive to maintain control over their national economic affairs.

Additionally, global players are adding to the heterogenous picture. They mostly embrace economic liberalization. However, in the Netherlands, they are ambivalent, and in the U.K. oppositional with respect to domestic issues. These stances mainly stem from the global players opposition to liberalization measures in the energy market in the case of the Netherlands and the support of bailouts in the case of the U.K. With respect to the EU actors, only their involvement in the Austrian debate is ambivalent on the international dimension.

The peak employer associations, chambers of commerce, as well as the christian democrats and conservatives are also rallying behind the pro-liberalization mainstream. Moreover, the christian democratic and conservative parties are the only actor type which is distinctly pro-liberalization in all six countries. As with regard to national executives, peak employer associations instead are ambivalent towards domestic liberalization in the U.K. because they were reluctant to support the privatization of the Royal Mail as well. Niche corporations are pro-liberalization in Austria, the U.K., and Germany. Yet, in Switzerland and France, they are actually slightly opposing domestic liberalization, while they are clearly protectionist in the Netherlands and ambivalent towards international liberalization in France.

Liberal parties, which were expected to be a firm pro-liberalization force, are surprisingly heterogenous in their positioning across the countries. In the U.K. and France, they are slightly opposed to international liberalization, but in Germany, they are fiercely speaking out against domestic liberalization. This position results from oppositional statements regarding privatization. Legislative bodies, as they are present in public debates detached from specific party affiliations, only play an important role in Switzerland, where they considerably enforce the liberal mainstream.

Public advisory actors are, as expected, members of the camp fully supporting liberalization in Austria, the U.K., and Switzerland. In Germany and France, however, they are ambivalent or in opposition of international liberalization. Here, public advisory actors are criticizing the lack of regulation in the financial markets and of democratic control over globalization in general. In the Netherlands, by contrast, public advisory actors are opposing domestic liberalization, mainly because they are against liberalization in research and education. Finally, administrations are surprisingly skeptical of international liberalization, only in Switzerland and the U.K., they are in favor of this aspect.

Foreign executive and international actors do not exhibit a clear pattern, since their positions are rather scattered over the debate space. Executives from developing countries are as expected mainly pushing for liberalization reforms, reflecting the increasing demands of emerging markets for entry into Western European markets, especially in the agricultural sector. Only in Germany they intervene against domestic

liberalization. The latter is similar to the position of most foreign executives from advanced economies: in Austria, the U.K., and Germany they are not protectionist but object several deregulation programs on the domestic dimension, e.g., with respect to air traffic control. Finally, IGO actors are, as anticipated, mostly affiliated to liberal positions, with the exception of the Austrian debate, where they have an interventionist stance.

The populist right plays an important role only in Switzerland and Austria. Yet, as suggested by the neomercantilist hypothesis, they take protectionist stances and promote domestic liberalization at the same time. In France and the Netherlands, the other countries with an important right-wing populist movement, they abstain from the debate, which points to the fact that not economic issues but immigration and European integration are at the core of their political programs. In contrast to theoretical expectations, small business associations and farmers' organizations are liberal on both dimensions in Austria, the U.K., Germany, and Switzerland. The French farmers, however, in line with the expectations, follow the neomercantilist approach of opposing globalization while being pro-liberalization in domestic aspects. Rather surprisingly, the public welfare organizations, are also mainly protectionist, at least in Austria and Switzerland, two of the three countries where they actually have a voice in the debate at all. In these two countries, they join the neomercantilists. In addition, state enterprises, as expected, frequently disapprove of liberalization reforms. They oppose liberalization on domestic issues in Austria, the U.K., France, and the Netherlands, while they are hostile towards internationalization in Germany and Switzerland.

With regard to the social democrats, governmental responsibility is key to explain the country differences. In the U.K. during the whole period under study and in Germany during most of it, the social democrats were in office, which is reflected by their distinctly liberal positions on domestic liberalization. In Germany, social democrats are even clearly in favor of both aspects of liberalization. In all other countries, social democrats are fiercely opposing domestic liberalization reforms. Thus, contrary to the expectations, the majority of the social democrats did not shift towards the liberal right corner of the debate. Especially in France, but also in Austria and Switzerland, they enforce the traditional left position.

As expected, both private and public sector unions are rather consistent in their full opposition to economic liberalization in most countries. Only in the U.K. and Switzerland private sector unions are not opposing international liberalization. Where present, the communists and left socialists (France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland), white-collar professional organizations (Austria, U.K., France, Germany) as well as the public welfare movements (only Switzerland) are joining trade unions in terms of their policy positions.

Additionally, there is a number of less important actors in terms of their going public which additionally have no consistent position. The greens only enter the debate in Germany, where they are neomercantilists, and Switzerland, where they join the radical left. Judiciary actors are protectionist in Austria and the Netherlands, but distinctly internationalist in Switzerland. Further, the German judiciary actors promote the side of the full challengers. Economic think tanks, finally, are protectionist in Austria, interventionist in Germany, full challengers in France, and liberal on both dimensions in the Netherlands and Switzerland.

However, the many actor positions as such do not tell us much about the potentials for policy changes in the individual countries. To this aim, we have to consider how the actors' policy position taking plays out in terms of the constellations among the positions. Which debate coalitions do the actors establish in the policy subsystem of economic liberalization? To get a more condensed idea of the multitude of actor positions, a cluster analysis was performed to reveal how the diverse positions aggregate into more concise debate coalitions. As already mentioned, this is indicated by the dashed circles in figure 8.4. Additionally, figure 8.5 shows the average policy position and salience by coalition. All coalitions are labeled on the basis of their policy stances on the two dimensions and in accordance with the expectations formulated in chapter 4.




Figure 7.5 Policy Positions and Saliency of Debate Coalitions by Country and Dimension

Notes: Average positions and 95 % confidence intervals; Article weights applied for all calculations.

Since the coalitions are inductively generated, an additional coalition not anticipated by the expectations in chapter 4, the interventionists, has to be introduced. The interventionist coalitions are opposing domestic liberalization but are in support of international liberalization. The interventionist coalitions are theoretically unexpected, but this should not be over-interpreted since they have a very low saliency in the three countries they appear (7.8 percent in the Netherlands, 9.0 percent in Germany, and 12.5 percent in Austria). With regard to the mainstream coalitions, all coalitions with moderate positions (between 0 and 0.5) are defined as third way coalitions, whereas coalitions with a more radical stance are labeled as neoliberals.

The reason for the relatively strong anti-liberalization attitudes in France is now explicit, especially in terms of the general protectionist climate. Here, we do not only find no neoliberal coalition, but also all coalitions except the third way decidedly oppose international liberalization. Moreover, the salience of the mainstream coalition is the lowest of all countries. Overall, there thus does not seem to be a clear majority in favor of international liberalization reform here.

In each country except France the mainstream consisting of the third way coalition and the neoliberals clearly prevails with an overwhelming share in salience. This dominance of the mainstream is remarkable in Switzerland and the U.K., where its relative frequency exceeds 80 percent (83.2 and 91.6 percent, respectively). In Switzerland, the traditional left coalition is responsible for only 16.8 percent of the statements. And although the overall policy position in the U.K. was not most liberal, it can be described as such on the basis of this analysis, since the oppositional traditional left coalition in the U.K. is only slightly opposing international liberalization reforms and accounts for only 8.4 percent of the public debate. Thus, it becomes clear that the potential for pro-market reforms is highest in these two countries.

Austria and the Netherlands (here with two liberal mainstream coalitions), in contrast, have a dominant mainstream of about 75 percent (78.8 and 74.6 percent). The main difference between the two pro-liberalization coalitions in the Netherlands is the radical support of liberalism by the smaller neoliberal coalition and the only moderate support of the third way. Together with the neoliberal coalition from Germany and the French neomercantilists, the Dutch neoliberal coalition shows the most radical support of domestic liberalization.

In Germany, finally, we find a more complex coalitional setting. Besides a comparatively weak neoliberal coalition with 66.9 percent, the traditional left coalition in Germany exhibits a very pronounced stance against both aspects of economic liberalization. This, of course, is part of the explanation why Germany has the second highest polarization in its public debate. In addition, Germany has the largest neomercantilist coalition. As we have seen, protectionist actors are present in the debate in all countries, but there they mostly integrate into the traditional left or third way coalition. It thus seems that, except in Germany and

France, protectionists are important actors in the debates but do mostly not succeed in forming actual debate coalitions.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter set out to explore the policy position taking of all actors participating in the public debate on economic liberalization on different levels. With respect to countries, it was first revealed that the debates in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.K. are especially supportive of international liberalization. The Netherlands, however, cannot be counted as liberal-leaning, since its overall position is more negative than in Austria and Germany. Switzerland and the U.K., instead, show indeed very pro-market debates since their mainstream coalitions gains over four-fifths of all policy statements.

France, finally, stands out in its opposition of economic liberalization in general. The French reluctance to liberalize suggests that this country's character of a state-led economy imposes a considerable obstacle for neoliberal dominance. Especially with regard to the aspects of international liberalization, the French are rather skeptic with respect to a further opening of the economy. Moreover, the public debates in France and Germany, the two countries with the biggest economic problems during the observation period of this debate analysis, are most polarized. This was expected at least for France with its polarized pluralist media system ([Hallin and Mancini, 2004](#)). Also notable is the high conflict intensity of the debate in Austria and the Netherlands. In these coordinated market economies, the public debate thus seems to constitute a valve contrasting the otherwise rather consensual economic interest intermediation: by going public, the actors involved in the debates attempt to pressure their opponents and thus influence the bargaining processes. In the U.K., finally, public debates are least polarized, since – at least on the international dimension – no significant challengers are present.

The findings from the analysis of the influence of arenas completely confirm the expectations, although the distinction in specific sites of the policy process does not that strongly shape the debate compared to the influence of countries and actor characteristics. The majority of the challengers of economic liberalization policies enters the public debates in the input arenas, where the overall policy positions are most skepti-

cal and also polarization is highest. In Austria, France, and Germany, there further is a large discrepancy between a highly skeptical climate in input arenas and a much more liberal context in the janus-faced and output arenas. In these countries, the articulation of opposition in the input arenas does not seem to resonate with the decision making on and implementation of policies in the other arenas, which poses a problem with regard to input legitimacy ([Scharpf, 1999](#)).

Turning to the actors policy position taking, it stands out that the results of the overall debate and the single countries rather contrast each other. The dominance of pro-liberalization stances was confirmed several times. Most of all the EU actors, national executives and global players reinforce the pro-market mainstream. Additionally, as expected, the trade unions lead the traditional left coalition by most clearly opposing economic liberalization. With regard to the main forces on the neomercantilist right, niche firms and farmer associations seem to be as important as populist right parties, which only play an important role in Switzerland and Austria. Moreover, not only a rightist protectionism camp exists. Also the third way actors, most notably the green and social democratic parties, are opposing international but not domestic liberalization. This might be caused by their strive for an extension of the welfare system at the European level. The lack of a comprehensive social security framework at the European level is a constant concern for mainstream left actors ([Helbling et al., 2010](#)).

As far as the differences between the overall and country level analyses are concerned, we found the expected three-fold constellation of a pro-market mainstream as well as the neomercantilist and traditional left challengers when studying the debates from the six countries combined. On the country level, however, a new coalition in the form of the interventionists emerged in the public debates in Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria. In general, however, opposition mainly arises in the form of the traditional left and neomercantilists also on the country level. In the two countries U.K. and Switzerland, we only find the traditional left that is pitted against the liberal mainstream. Furthermore, in Germany and the Netherlands, a neomercantilist coalition reinforces the opposition. In short, conflicts across Western Europe mainly focus on internationalization, even they are differently reintegrated into public disputes of the single countries.

8

Valence Campaigning: The Logic of Actor References

So far, the analyses of the discursive strategies have been dealing with the going public and policy position taking of the actors engaging in the economic liberalization debate. This chapter will take on the third strategy. Actors not only campaign to make their policy positions heard, they also try to change their valence, i.e., their reputation and credibility in the public debate ([Laver and Sergenti, 2011](#)). However, actors only succeed in influencing the policy process via the public arena if they are credible contestants in the respective policy subsystem. Thus, besides their policy position taking, the actors' valence in terms of credibility and perceived competence is key for actors to successfully articulate their interest. This is especially important since mass media filter the access to the debate according to the news value of actors, which increasingly depends on their reputation independent from the policy in question. Actors therefore have to engage in valence campaigning to enhance their own valence and, in turn, need to influence the valence of other actors.

More precisely, this chapter is concerned with how actors address each other by direct references. After a general overview of valence campaigning across countries and arenas, the analysis will proceed with the valence campaigning by the individual actors. The major expectation in this regard is that negative references prevail in the public debate on economic liberalization. And we will indeed find that that actors mainly keep themselves busy with the attempt to decrease the valence of their competitors.

After the presentation of the actor references in general, the chapter will subsequently turn to a network analysis in order to examine the va-

lence campaigning strategies in detail. We thus assume that the valence campaigning by all actors sums up to a directed network of positive and negative statements. This analysis not only reveals which actors are especially important in terms of actor-specific references, but also who is more often the sender and who more frequently figures as the addressee in the valence network. The chapter concludes with a study that shows how consistently the logic of valence campaigning corresponds to the coalitional setting as identified with regard to policy position taking in chapter 8.

8.1 Valence Campaigning by Countries and Arenas

A first general expectation with respect to valence campaigning refers to the increasing mediatization of politics. More specifically, it is suggested that negative campaigning has become the prevailing mode of actor-specific interaction in public debates (e.g., [Norris, 2000](#)). Beyond that, the analysis of valence campaigning allows an additional assessment of the debate's conflict intensity in the single countries and arenas. Indeed, negative actor references can be understood as a sign of an aggressive climate with regard to the interactions in the public debate. Accordingly, table 9.1 shows the average values of valence campaigning, i.e., the aggregated actor references by country and arenas.

Table 8.1 *Valence Campaigning by Countries and Arenas*

	Overall	FR	A	DE	NL	CH	UK
Input	-0.46	-0.64	-0.44	-0.46	-0.17	-0.46	-0.58
Janus-faced	-0.36	-0.74	-0.14	-0.09	-0.61	-0.09	-0.41
Output	-0.14	-0.14	+0.20	-0.26	-0.38	-0.14	-0.20
Overall	-0.32	-0.48	-0.03	-0.23	-0.51	-0.19	-0.34
N	1554	90	538	339	144	154	356

Notes: Average positions of actor-actor statements; Article weights applied for all calculations; Country weights applied for overall calculations.

The most notable result is the strong tendency of negative campaigning in almost all arenas and in all countries. In Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, however, this negativity of the public debate is less pronounced (-0.03, -0.19, and -0.23). Furthermore, the only substantial exception to the prevailing negative campaigning are the output arenas

in Austria, where the actors apparently interact decisively positively with each other (valence of +0.20). With regard to the output arenas in the other coordinated market economies (CME), however, two of them actually are the most conflict-laden ones (in Germany with -0.26 and in the Netherlands with -0.38). Thus, while France again turns out to be a high conflict country, especially Austria shows a much more restrained debate. Notably, three countries with a democratic corporatist tradition (Austria, Germany, and Switzerland) have a comparatively moderate debate. The exception of the Dutch debate can be explained by the time specific influence of the referendum on the European constitution (see below). The U.K., which was the least conflictual country in terms of issue polarization, shows a rather aggressive debate climate with respect to valence campaigning.

As far as the overall results are concerned, the findings from the analysis of polarization are only partly confirmed. The input arenas again are the most conflict-intense arenas (-0.46). Yet the janus-faced arenas, in contrast to the expectations on conflict intensity and results on polarization, are not the least conflict intense arenas. This deviating result, however, is mainly due to the exceptionally negative valence positions in the janus-faced arenas of France (-0.74) and the Netherlands (-0.61).

Actually, the French and Dutch janus-faced arenas are generally the most negative ones, and the reason for this is most likely time specific: Both France and the Netherlands had a direct democratic vote on the European Constitution during the time period of this study. As will be shown in the context of the network analysis of the actors' valence campaigning, a strong blame shifting from national public authorities which wanted to distract from their responsibility to the international and European actors took place in these countries. This mechanism thus likely caused the exceptionally negative position, since the janus-faced arenas are heavily populated by national public authorities.

8.2 How Actors Engage in Valence Campaigning

Let us now turn to the question how valence campaigning plays out according to specific actor characteristics. On the one hand, we want to know which actors are the strongest negative campaigners and which are the more consensual forces in the debate. On the other hand, we suggest

that actors try to enhance their own valence in the debate while striving to reduce the valence of their competitors. In other words, we expect the self-references to be more positive than references to other actors.

Figure 8.2 shows the average valence positions of the references to other actors as well as self-references only (references within the same actor category) for the basic actor categorizations. Additionally, the consistency of these positions in terms of the deviations from zero and each other is indicated by the 95 percent confidence intervals. As with countries and arenas, the strong tendency towards negativity is the most obvious feature of valence campaigning, since the density of positions is higher on the left-hand side.




Figure 8.1 Overall and Self-Referred Valence Campaigning

Notes: Average positions and 95% confidence intervals: Article and country weights applied for all calculations; Positions from actors with less than 5 statements are not considered for the calculations.

As expected, most actors pass more criticism on other actors than on representatives of their own actor category. For four of the 14 cate-

gories (IGO actors, national executives, judiciary, and legislatures), self-references needed to be excluded because they have less than five statements. These public authority actors thus seem to be less inclined to campaign for their own valence in the debate.

Nevertheless, seven out of the remaining ten actors show a much more positive stance towards themselves. With regard to EU actors, parties and public welfare groups, this difference between overall and self-references is most substantial, but also trade unions, experts, corporations, and business associations significantly intervene more negatively into the debate when they do not refer to themselves.

Only foreign executives, public administrations, and professional organizations are more heavily attacking members of their own actor group than all other actors. However, this is not surprising. All three categories consist of a considerably heterogeneous set of actors. Professional organizations include a broad range of interest associations, e.g., farmer and white-collar organizations, which are regularly divided over economic liberalization policies. In a similar vein, the different branches of public administrations, e.g., the departments of trade and social affairs, are probably defending very different interests and are thus at odds with each other. Foreign executives, finally, are obviously a fragmented category as well. The interests of a multitude of variously oriented governments from all over the world are represented here.

Interestingly, the national executives and corporations, who are the two most important drivers of the pro-market mainstream, are the only actors which overall apply a positive campaigning strategy. Although these valence positions are only slightly positive and do not significantly deviate from an ambivalent stance, all other actors are markedly more inclined to use negative campaigning. Negative campaigning is thus not only the generally preferred strategy in the debate on economic liberalization, but also much more often applied by challengers of the neoliberal dominance as well as less important actors in terms of their going public.

8.3 Valence Campaigning Networks

As already outlined, the statements related to the valence campaigning of actors can be perceived as directed relationships in a debate net-

work. Consequently, the actors responsible for the statements can be seen as vertices (or knots) in the network of the public debate on economic liberalization. They are either the sender, if they are the subject in actor-actor statements, or the addressee, if they are the object. This allows us to empirically test two aspects. First, the findings regarding the resource argument for the actors' general going public can be tested, i.e. whether the same actors loom high in terms of their going public and valence campaigning. And second, we are able to study the role of the fine-grained actor categories as senders and addressees of actor references.

Figure 9.1 indicates the actors' closeness centrality, a common measure of the importance of vertices in networks. Closeness centrality measures the mean geodesic distance (i.e., the shortest path) from a specific actor to all other actors in the network (Bonacich and Paulette, 2001; Csardi, 2008). This means that actors with a short geodesic distance to other actors have a high centrality (see definition in Table B.1. in the appendix).

The actor-actor statements allow for the calculation of three different types of the closeness centrality of actors, because an actor can be important as speaker, namely as the subject of the core sentences, or as addressee of the statements. Thus, the actors' importance as subjects and objects was calculated separately, but also the overall closeness centrality was determined. The size of the pie charts in figure 9.1 thus indicates the overall closeness centrality of an actor in the network of actor references. As shown in table C.5 in the appendix, closeness centrality equals percentage points and runs from 53.8 (farmer associations) to the maximum centrality of 100 percent (foreign executives from advanced economies). Thus, the more central an actor is in the network, the bigger the pie chart. In addition, the pie charts show the ratio between the closeness centrality as addressee (light gray) and the centrality as sender (dark gray), i.e. whether an actor was more often the subject or the object of the actor-specific statements.




Figure 8.2 The Importance of Actors in Valence Campaigning Networks

Notes: Closeness centrality, overall and by subject or object status; A detailed description of the calculation of closeness centrality is provided in section 5.4; The exact results are listed in table C.5 in the appendix.

Valence campaigning reveals a different distribution of importance in comparison to the going public (see section 7.3). Closeness centrality is highest for the foreign executives from advanced economies (100 percent), and also niche firms are very important in the network (96.6 percent). On the contrary, the most important actors in terms of going public, national executives and global players, only come second and third in terms of their closeness centrality (96.6 and 87.5 percent). Furthermore, the ratio between the subject- and object-related closeness centrality illustrates why niche corporations and foreign executives are so central to the valence networks. They are much more frequently the addressee of other actors' statements. Thus, they are not important because they actively direct a lot of statements to competitors but because they are major targets of the other actors' campaigning efforts.

As in terms of the overall going public, the two mainstream party families, i.e., the social democrats as well as the Christian democrats and conservatives, are the dominant parties (closeness centrality of 77.8 and 82.4 percent, respectively). However, given that the Christian democrats and conservatives are more important here than the social democrats, issue ownership does not influence the parties' importance in the debate with regard to valence campaigning. This also holds for the liberal parties which are substantially more peripheral in terms of their closeness centrality than with respect to their going public.

In comparison with their overall salience in the debate on economic liberalization, peak employer associations, private sector unions and public advisory actors are also considerably important in the valence networks (73.3, 80.0 and 77.8 percent, respectively). This also confirms the insights from the analysis of the going public with regard to the left challengers: the private sector unions are the only notable actor from the traditional left coalition.

Most actors exhibit a balanced ratio between subject- and object-related statements. However, EU and IGO actors, public administrations, legislatures, communists and left socialists, right-wing populists as well as global players are more often the addressee than the sender. Since foreign executives from advanced economies and emerging markets as well as IGO and EU actors are more likely to be blamed than they attribute responsibility to other actors, it seems that the transnational level is especially heavy under criticism. Moreover, the radical parties

on both the political left and right are also preferably used as scapegoat by other actors.

Tellingly, national executives are very important as blamers in the valence networks. Similarly, all interest associations as well as the mainstream right parties (liberals and Christian democrats and conservatives) show a stronger inclination for negative campaigning than being the target of it. The valence positions for all actors as listed in table C.6 in the appendix show that the EU and foreign executives from advanced countries on the one hand, and the fringe parties on the other hand, are heavily criticized by these actors. In sum, this dynamic resembles the notions of blame shifting in European politics (see [Moravcsik, 1994](#); [Zürn, 2006](#)). National public authorities and the mainstream right parties try to assign the blame for unpopular consequences of policy making on economic liberalization to the international and European level and – on a smaller scale but nevertheless visible – to the communists and left socialists as well as the populist right.

8.4 Coalition-Specific Valence Campaigning

As for the other discursive strategies, the analysis of the debate coalition formation is a major research goal also in terms of valence campaigning. In this context, it is of course of interest whether the coalitions found in terms of policy position taking and going public correspond to the expectations of valence campaigning strategies. The aim of the final analysis in this chapter is thus to find out whether the debate coalitions identified in chapter 7 are important for the explanation of the actors' valence positions. Figure 8.3 shows the average of the valence positions and their 95 percent confidence intervals with respect to statements within each coalition and across coalitional borders. The coalitional memberships are the same as established in the analyses over all countries section 7.3. More precisely, we distinguish three coalitions: a pro-market mainstream, a traditional left coalition and a neomercantilist camp.




Figure 8.3 Coalition-Specific Valence Campaigning

Notes: Average positions and 95% confidence intervals; Article and country weights applied for all calculations.

It was expected that the actors use less negative campaigning strategies with regard to their fellow campaigners in the same coalition. This is the case for the mainstream and especially the members of the traditional left coalition, which shows a sharply negative stance while being consensual to actors affiliated to the same coalition. Both of these coalitions indeed seem to apply a coherent valence campaigning strategy, since it corresponds to their policy positions. The counterfactual result for the neomercantilists – the position for statements made within the coalition is slightly more negative than the position regarding other coalitions – may be due to the very heterogenous composition of this coalition. It entail actors as diverse as mainstream left parties and right wing populists, which certainly have no interest to campaign in favor of each other. Even if they share the policy position on economic liberalization, they deviate on other high-profile issues like immigration or European integration (Kriesi et al., 2012). If there are polarized conflicts on other issues, cooperation in a debate coalition thus seems difficult.

8.5 Conclusion

This chapter has considered how actors compete in the public debate in terms of valence campaigning. The first notable result is the strong tendency of negative campaigning in almost all arenas and in all countries. Offensive strategies to reduce the valence of competitors prevail, especially in the input arenas. With regard to the country differences, the results only partly corroborate the evidence found with respect to the conflict intensity. France and the U.K. are countries with a high negativ-

ity in their public debates on economic liberalization. The coordinated market economies, by contrast, have a rather consensual overall climate in terms of valence campaigning. As for arenas, however, the results match the the evidence from the study of policy positions in chapter 7. Input areas tend to be the most conflict-laden with regards to both indicators.

Due to the strong trend of negative campaigning, it is not even the case that all actors refer to their own category in a positive way. The most important actors of the mainstream, however, accomplish to present themselves in a good light. Furthermore, as expected, most actors criticize other actors more than the representatives of their own actor category. This also holds with respect to the debate coalitions, since the majority of actors uses a less aggressive campaigning strategy towards their fellow campaigners than against the members of other coalitions.

An intriguing result is the blame shifting found in the network analysis. National public authorities and the mainstream right parties try to shift the blame for the consequences of policy making on economic liberalization to the international and European levels, niche firms, and the communists and left socialists as well as the populist right. The actors mostly responsible for economic policy making supposedly thus attempt to blame the international and European actors for unpopular measures, corporations for misled liberalization reforms, and radical parties for politically unsuccessful reform proposals.

9

How the Public Debate is Perceived: Framing Economic Liberalization

The positioning on specific policies and with regard to valence only partly reveal the complexity of public debates. Only frames, understood as justifications of policy statements that cue the public to the basic values and norms of the actors, can grasp the full meaning of conflict in a public debate (Enyedi, 2005; Surel, 2000; Hoeglinger et al., 2012). The empirical chapters of this study are thus concluded by the analysis of the framing of the debate on economic liberalization. More precisely, the distribution of frames is studied across countries, arenas, actor characteristics, and coalitional constellations. Since frames are constructed according to their resonance with central societal themes (Kriesi et al., 2009), they were conceptualized in chapter 4 as sets of justifications reflecting values and norms that belong to three distinct schools of political-economic thought: liberal, social democratic, and mercantilist frames. Corresponding to the findings on the neoliberal dominance so far, we expect liberal frames to prevail in the debate. Further, it will be revealed in this chapter that the framing patterns are inversely related to the overall climate in terms of policy positions across the countries and arenas. We thus find less liberal frames in pro-market countries and arenas.

This chapter will also explore whether the actors employ framing strategies which are consistent with their policy positions. The analysis of policy position taking has identified a coalitional constellation consisting of mainstream adherents, traditional left challengers, and neomercantilists. Consequently, we expect members of these coalitions to show a distinct framing strategy which is in line with the coalitional orientation. We hypothesize that traditional left actors are emphasizing social democratic frames, while members of the pro-market mainstream should

limit themselves mainly to liberal frames. Neomercantilists, finally, are obviously expected to resort more heavily to mercantilist frames. The analyses will again begin with the effect of countries and arenas on the framing of economic liberalization, before the actors and coalitions come under further scrutiny.

9.1 Framing by Country

How are ideological beliefs distributed across the six countries? Figure 10.1 presents the three basic frame categories (liberal, mercantilist, and social democratic) as they are used in the different countries to justify statements on economic liberalization. It is anticipated that liberal frames are the most often used frames in all countries, especially in the U.K., the Netherlands, and Switzerland which should be more liberal-leaning also in terms of their framing pattern. In France, however, justifications related to intervention and protection should be relatively frequent as well, reflecting its opposition towards economic liberalization. Therefore, the bars in figure 10.1 additionally distinguish between frames used in the context of supporting and opposing statements.

The expectation that liberal frames are predominant is largely met. Overall, this framing strategy makes up for 44.3 percent of all frames, and has a share of more than 50 percent of the frames used to justify supporting positions. However, with regard to the opposition to economic liberalization, the distribution of the three frame categories is balanced and social democratic framing is even slightly more important than liberal frames. Thus, especially when it comes to the pursuit of economic liberalization, the majority of statements are justified with liberal frames. This reflects the consistency of framing with the neoliberal dominance in the public debate on economic liberalization. In addition, social democratic frames are clearly more often used in relationship with opposition to economic liberalization. In all countries except the Netherlands and the U.K., they make up for more than one third of all statements for the opposition.




Figure 9.1 Framing of Economic Liberalization by Country

Notes: Article weights applied for all calculations; Country weights applied for overall numbers; -=opposition, +=support.

Turning to the framing by country, however, quite the opposite than what was expected is to be the case. The U.K., Switzerland, and also the Netherlands all have significantly lower shares of liberal frames for both oppositional and supportive statements than the countries perceived as less liberal (Germany, Austria, France). Moreover, Germany is the most liberal country in terms of the frame pattern in both types of statements. Further, mercantilist frames are more important in the Netherlands, Switzerland and the U.K. to underline support of liberalization reforms than in the other three countries. It thus seems that exactly in those countries which traditionally have less interventionist and protectionist policies (the liberal-leaning countries), actors seem to highlight the corresponding mercantilist values comparatively more often.

In sum, as far as framing is concerned, there is a much less frequent use of liberal frames in the countries which are liberal-leaning in terms of policy positions and their coalitional setting. This therefore suggests a complementary role of frames in the debate: a pro-market policy climate is more heavily shaped by social democratic and mercantilist frames. In other words, where the neoliberal dominance is especially strong, the

framing is more heterogenous and dissenting ideas are more often raised.

These findings can be enriched by the examination using the fine-grained frame categorization. The analysis is shown in table 10.1 along with a chi-square test indicating whether the differences with respect to the framing strategies across the countries are significant. The high significance of the chi-square value indeed reveals that the differences among the countries are substantial. This points to the fact that there are strongly diverse debate cultures. Thus, although liberal frames overall are most important in all countries, there seems to be no distinct congruence with respect to the distribution of core beliefs across countries. Moreover, this points to the validity of the accounts on persisting divergent paths among Western European countries ([Kitschelt, 1999](#)).

The numbers in table 10.1 show that not the moral universalist (economic freedom and social justice) and identitarian (protectionist) aspects, but the utilitarian justifications are intensely used. Prosperity is the most applied justification (32.4 percent), followed with a considerable distance by social protection (18.4 percent) and interventionist frames (16.1 percent). In general, the debate on economic liberalization is thus driven by very pragmatic and instrumental beliefs. Within the dominant liberal category, prosperity-related arguments are more important than economic freedom frames. Especially in Austria (38.5 percent) and the Netherlands (36.7 percent), these patterns of justifications clearly prevail in the debate. Furthermore, economic freedom is only shaping the German debate in a substantive way. Similarly to the Netherlands, only liberal frames have a share of more than 20 percent in Germany. This makes these two coordinated market economies the most influenced countries in terms of liberal thinking at the beginning of the 21st century, a result that was rather expected for the U.K. and Switzerland.

Table 9.1 *Framing Economic Liberalization by Countries*

		Overall	FR	A	DE	NL	CH	UK
Liberal	Prosperity	32.4	31.1	38.5	33.7	36.7	25.4	29.2
	Economic freedom	11.9	9.7	8.5	22.8	10.1	10.1	9.9
Social democratic	Social protection	18.4	27.9	20.7	17.7	11.1	16.1	15.9
	Social justice	8.9	5.1	9.8	10.2	13.2	8.1	7.0
Mercantilist	Interventionist	16.1	12.1	11.1	9.1	12.8	26.9	25.2
	Protectionist	12.3	14.1	11.4	6.5	16.1	13.4	12.8
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N		7156	1472	805	879	648	2441	920
Pearson's χ^2		52.15 *** (25 DF)						

Notes: All shares in %; Article weights applied for all calculations; Country weights applied for overall calculations. Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.001 .

Yet, Switzerland and the U.K. show a very similar pattern, which again sets these countries apart just like with respect to the policy positions and debate coalitions. On the one hand, they have a considerable share of interventionist frames (26.9 percent and 25.2 percent). Combined with the similarly high number of prosperity frames, these two countries rather astonishingly show a distribution which could have been expected for the French debate: interventionism paired with the emphasis of economic growth. As already mentioned, however, the framing on the level of countries seems to run contrary to the policy positions. In short, the core beliefs in liberal-leaning countries are centered on interventionist growth. In these countries, mercantilist frames are thus combined with liberal ones to an argument of economic promotion.

Finally, the pragmatic aspects of the social democratic frame category (social protection) are most heavily used in France and Austria (20.7 and 27.9 percent). Both countries thus show a combination that resembles a third way strategy: prosperity is linked to social security. Moreover, although protectionist frames make up the second highest share in France, the two mercantilist categories are not most important in the two countries which traditionally have the strongest state with respect to economic policy making. Nevertheless, the label social market economy seems to resonate best with regard to the ideological climate in France and Austria.

9.2 How Frames Differ across Arenas

Countries are only one part of the institutional context and arenas, i.e., the sites structuring the policy process with their specific sets of institutional norms and rules, are shaping the course of debates on economic liberalization as well. As with regard to the country analyses, the first figure (10.2) illustrates the aggregated frame categories by opposition and support. We assume the social democratic frames to be more closely connected to the opposition, while mercantilist and liberal frames are related to the support of economic liberalization policies.




Figure 9.2 Framing by Arenas as well as Support and Opposition

Notes: Article and country weights have been applied.

The graphs indicate that the importance of liberal frames does not vary much as a function of the arena, but – as found before – is mainly a function of the position, i.e., if the support or the opposition of economic liberalization is the subject of framing. Proponents of economic liberalization heavily underline the need for economic liberalization in every arena with liberal justifications. This stands in contrast to the opposition which brings up about 10 percentage points less liberal frames.

In line with the theoretical expectations, social democratic frames are most often used in input arenas, and especially in combination with op-

positional statements. Finally, mercantilist frames, as anticipated, are most important for the janus-faced arenas, since these arenas by definition are the sites of state intervention. Both opposition and support are more intensely justified by mercantilist frames than in other arenas. However, the actors engaged in the debate in the janus-faced arenas, mainly public authorities, are more likely to refer to intervention and the national interest when opposing liberalization.

Turning to the framing patterns by arenas for the fine-grained level in table 10.2, the insignificant chi-square value confirms that, in contrast to the country context, arenas overall do not significantly influence the choice of framing. Hence, while the institutional context of arenas significantly determines the going public and valence campaigning strategies, the sites where the policy process takes place have no substantial relationship with policy position taking and the distribution of ideological beliefs.

Nevertheless, there are still notable differences between single categories. The input arenas stand out in their higher share of moral-universal frames. More precisely, economic freedom and social justice are more frequently used in this arena (14.6 percent and 10.9 percent). This means that the input arenas are rather the realm of normative conflicts over fundamental values regarding the nature of democratic capitalism, while there is more pragmatism in the other arenas. This nicely matches the results from the polarization analysis, which revealed that conflicts are more intense in the input arenas. We thus add that that conflicts not only more polarized, but also more normative in the input arenas.

The janus-faced arenas show a higher share of protectionist frames than the other arenas (14.6 percent). These patterns of justifications are reflecting the interests of both national public authorities and supranational public authorities, which can be assumed to be keen to refer to the regional or national interest. In a similar vein, interventionist frames are most important for the janus-faced arenas (20 percent) which corresponds to the institutional character of the janus-faced arenas. Policy decisions are taken at this stage of the policy process, which increases the use of frames related to the role of government. The output arenas, finally, are dominated by prosperity arguments (36.8 percent). This is not surprising, given that corporations are very much pursuing their business logic in this site of the public debate.

Table 9.2 *Framing Economic Liberalization by Arenas*

		Overall ^a	Input	Janus-f.	Output
Liberal	Prosperity	31.6	26.6	30.3	36.8
	Economic freedom	11.7	14.6	11.1	10.4
Social democratic	Social protection	19.3	24.9	15.2	20.2
	Social justice	8.1	10.9	8.6	5.4
Mercantilist	Interventionist	17.7	15.8	20.0	16.1
	Protectionist	11.6	7.2	14.7	11.1
Total		100	100	100	100
N		4805	1163	1984	1658
Pearson's χ^2		11.07 n.s. (10 DF)			

Notes: ^a The difference in the overall figures compared to the table showing the framing by countries (table 10.1) stems from missings, i.e., the arena affiliation could not be observed for all statements. All shares in %; Article and country weights applied for all calculations. Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.001 .

9.3 How the Debate is Perceived by Actors

Let us turn the focus to the actors and how they differ in terms of their framing strategy. First and foremost, we are interested in the actors' motives to participate in debates, i.e., in their underlying values driving their engagement in the public debate. As with countries and arenas, we assume that the pro-market mainstream pursues a mainly liberal framing strategy, while the traditional left challengers are assumed to more frequently use social democratic frames. The neomercantilists should exceptionally often employ protectionist frames, while we expect public authorities to resort comparatively often to interventionist frames. Table 10.3 presents the actors' use of the six fine-grained frame categories. More specifically, the numbers are relative frequencies which were calculated using country and article weights. In fact there is substantially more variation in the argumentative patterns of the individual actors than with regard to countries and arenas, as the highly significant chi-square value indicates. Actor characteristics are thus so far the most important factor relating to the distribution of framing strategies in the debate on economic liberalization.

First, there are many actors with a strong liberal framing. In the case of IGO actors, business associations, professional organizations, and corporations, these frames even exceed 50 percent of all frames. Additionally, EU actors, public administrations, and experts have a combined

share of over 45 percent with respect to the two liberal frame categories. And except of professional organizations, these actors also have a solid pro-liberalization policy stance and are thus applying a framing strategy that is consistent with their affiliation to the mainstream.

More specifically, actors with an exceptionally high share of prosperity frames can especially be highlighted. This applies to IGO and EU actors, public administrations and corporations, which all have a share of prosperity frames which is higher than 40 percent. Additionally, professional organizations use 45.6 percent of all their frames for economic freedom, which reflects the high number of organizations representing the high-skilled self-employed in this category.

However, mainstream actors also show considerable heterogeneity with regard to other than liberal frames. The public authority actors in the upper half of table 10.2 strongly resort to interventionist justifications as well, insisting on their importance in regulating the economy. The exception are foreign executives who apply a less interventionist framing strategy. Additionally, in the lower half of the table, professional organizations and parties also have a comparatively high share of interventionist justifications. In sum, however, not only the adherence to a coalition therefore is correlated with a specific framing, but also the role of the actors in the policy process. Public authorities, which are at the center of decision making processes, also justify their positions disproportionately often with an interventionist argumentation.

In addition, public administrations almost never resort to moral and identitarian frames: protectionism, economic freedom, and social justice make up for only 20.4 percent of all frames used by them. This is also the case for the judiciary actors, which – besides some few mentions of social justice frames – completely stay away from moral and identitarian frames. According to their institutional role, both actors thus try to intervene only very pragmatically into the debates.

Table 9.3 *How Actors Frame Economic Liberalization*

	IGO actors	EU actors	Foreign exec.	National exec.	Public admin.	Judici- ary	Legis- lative
Liberal	Prosperity Economic freedom	45.2 15.5	42.7 5.0	28.9 12.0	30.2 10.2	40.2 6.1	23.4 14.2
Social democratic	Social protection Social justice	1.7 13.6	10.3 7.0	9.5 14.1	15.7 6.8	17.2 6.3	15.9 11.8
Mercantilist	Interventionist Protectionist	21.6 2.3	19.5 15.5	10.6 24.9	17.2 19.8	22.2 8.1	18.9 15.7
Total percentage		100	100	100	100	100	100
N		148	561	397	950	307	86
	Business assoc.	Trade unions	Prof. org.	Parties	Corpo- rations	Experts	Publ. welf. actors
Liberal	Prosperity Economic freedom	29.3 21.1	15.3 5.4	20.1 45.6	21.3 13.1	48.5 12.7	11.1 8.5
Social democratic	Social protection Social justice	12.2 6.4	48.2 12.9	11.3 4.2	24.3 9.2	14.1 2.1	26.7 41.3
Mercantilist	Interventionist Protectionist	11.7 19.4	12.9 5.4	17.3 1.5	21.8 10.3	14.8 7.8	8.7 3.7
Total percentage		100	100	100	100	100	100
Pearson's χ^2	469.50 *** (65 DF)						
N	615	591	148	1096	1367	698	140

Notes: All shares in %; Article and country weights applied for all calculations. Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.001 .

A second pattern is observable for the foreign and national executives as well as the business associations. These actors combine an exceptionally high share of prosperity frames with a relatively rare use of protectionist frames. As a matter of fact, they emphasize the need for regulating cross-border economic activities to gain national or regional wealth. Furthermore, business associations, not surprisingly, add a lot of economic freedom justifications, and, as already mentioned, national executives additionally point to their role as regulators by emphasizing interventionist frames.

Even on this aggregated level of actor categories, two challenging actor types can be identified through their heavily use of social democratic frames. These are the trade unions and public welfare groups. Over 60 percent of their frames relate to social democratic justifications. However, the two actors exhibit different preferences to use the two social democratic frame categories. While trade unions strongly rely on the pragmatic arguments of social protection, public welfare groups highlight the moral aspects, i.e., social justice frames.

The remaining two actors, i.e., the parties and experts, pursue a very balanced framing strategy. Although experts have a relatively high share of prosperity arguments and parties use social protection frames more often, the differences between specific frame categories are not as clear-cut as for other actors. The parties show an even more even distribution of justifications: the pragmatic arguments all make up for around 20 percent and the moral-universalist and identitarian frames amount to around 10 percent each. Most of all, this indicates that these actor categories are very heterogeneous, which makes a follow-up analysis necessary that applies more fine-grained actor classifications in order to reveal more variation connected to actor characteristics.

The more detailed analysis is presented in figure 10.3. The graphs are based on count model regressions on the frame usage by actors, controlling for the effects of countries and arenas. More specifically, the bars indicate the average of the predicted number of frames, which allows for a direct comparison across the actor as well as frame categories.

Table C.8 in the appendix reports the corresponding coefficients, standard errors, and levels of significance, while table C.7 presents the diagnostics for the choice of the specific count model used for the single

frame categories. Further, the theoretically possible number of observations would be 1080, since the number of frames used was calculated for the two sub-categories of each frame, the usual thirty actors, all six countries, and the three arenas ($2 \times 30 \times 6 \times 3=1080$). However, because not all combinations exist in the data, the actual number of observations is between 260 and 316.

For two simple reasons, count models perform well for this kind of analyses. The dependent variable, i.e. the frequency of frame usage by actors, is heavily skewed. There are many actors who never or only rarely mention a specific frame and few actors with a very high number of mentions. Figure C.2 in the appendix clearly shows the skewness of the independent frame variables. This disqualifies an OLS regression model (Long, 1997). In addition, an alpha dispersion parameter test is necessary to define the most feasible count model. This test allows to discern between the two common count regression models – poisson and negative binominal regressions. If alpha is significant, the dependent variable is overdispersed and a negative binominal regression is more appropriate than a poisson model (Long and Freese, 2006).




Figure 9.3 Framing by Actors

Notes: Averages of the number of predicted frames from count regression models on the usage of frames by actors, controlling for countries and arenas. Country and article weights applied.

To begin with, the fine-grained public authority actor categories mainly show a more heterogeneous framing pattern as with respect to the aggregate classification. In four cases, liberal frames are most often used, followed by mercantilist frames, and social democratic frames only come third. Besides the foreign executives from advanced economies, economic administrations, and judiciaries, this also applies to the, in terms of their going public, very important EU actors. Furthermore, the use of liberal frames of the EU actors and national executives is most distinctive together with the global players. All exhibit an average of about 10 or more with respect to the predicted liberal framing strategy. As already shown before, this means that the pro-market arguments have profoundly affected the public authorities in all countries.

Yet also the function of public authorities as regulators is heavily shaping their use of patterns of justification, as the importance of the mercantilist frames for these actors shows. These frames are most important for the IGO actors, foreign executives from emerging markets, national executives and legislatures. The case of the national executives is telling, since these are the main responsible actors for reforms regarding economic liberalization. Thus, they are especially called upon to justify that the state is able to make a difference in economic policy making.

Another deviating pattern of justifications is found for the non-economic administrations, which emphasize social democratic frames most. However, these actors are only marginally relevant for the frame usage in general, as their low average numbers of predicted frames show. This, of course, has to do with their low going public in the debate, but does additionally mean that they are reluctant to engage in the framing contests in specific.

With respect to the interest associations, as anticipated, a clear distinction of the trade unions' framing strategy and frame usage by the business interest associations can be made. The differentiation into peak employer and small business associations as well as chambers of commerce reveals that the peak employer associations are also frequently picking up mercantilist frames, while the chambers of commerce often employ a social democratic framing strategy. Small business associations, by contrast, only very rarely use other frames than liberal ones. Further, the farmer and white collar organizations affiliate with the business interest associations in their emphasis of liberal frames. This sets them apart

from the public and private sector unions which both predominantly use social democratic frames. Therefore, along with the communist and left socialist party family, they seem to be the most consistent actors for the traditional left, since they not only oppose the pro-market mainstream with respect to policy positions and valence campaigning, but also pursue a compatible framing strategy. Moreover, the private sector unions and the most important single actor category for this kind of justification.

Turning to the parties, which were previously found to be a very balanced actor in terms of the values they raise to justify policy positions, a considerable variation within this category is now indeed observable. The two dominating party families, the social democrats and the Christian democrats and conservatives, are important actors for the use of all frames. Yet, the social democrats, not surprisingly use social democratic frames clearly more often than the other justifications, while the Christian democratic and conservatives mainly employ a pro-market framing strategy.

The green parties are the only party family which prevailingly emphasizes mercantilist frames, but also social democrats employ this framing strategy more often. This may be explained by their membership of the two mainstream left parties in the neomercantilist coalition. As we have seen with respect to their policy position taking, they are against international liberalization but support domestic liberalization. Their strive against a neoliberal European and international order thus also entails a protectionist framing strategy. As for the smaller parties, the communists and left socialists show a clear pursuit of social democratic frames in the debate. The liberals and right-wing populists, by contrast, clearly use liberal frames most frequently and thus join the pro-market mainstream. As for the latter, this is inconsistent to their policy position taking, since they clearly take neomercantilist positions.

The final group of actors are the ones external to the political system in a narrower sense. The various types of companies do not substantially differ from each other, except that global players emphasize mercantilist justifications comparatively more often. The biggest corporations and not the public enterprises, thus emphasize the role of the state in the economy. Economic think tanks are more balanced in their framing than public advisory actors. More precisely, they use social democratic

frames similarly often than the other two patterns of justification. This contradicts the theoretical expectation that the former are much more partisan to the mainstream than the latter, but confirms the results from the analyses of policy positions, where economic think tanks were clear opponents of economic liberalization.

As for public welfare actors, finally, they show a deviating framing pattern. While liberal frames are slightly more important than social democratic ones for the public welfare organizations, i.e., charity organizations and churches, mercantilist ones are most frequently used by the public welfare movements. Neither category uses social democratic frames most, which would correspond to the hypothesis. These two actors therefore are not able to pursue their supposedly preferred framing strategy.

9.4 Core Beliefs of the Debate Coalitions

So far, we have seen how the framing on economic liberalization is shaped by the countries' and arenas' institutional contexts as well as the specific actor characteristics. The following examination of the debate coalitions' framing completes the analysis. More precisely, this analysis will reveal whether coalitions as previously found on the basis of the actors' going public and policy positioning strategies as well as confirmed in terms of valence campaigning also share the same ideologies in the debate. If this is the case, the existence of specific coalitional constellations in the debate on economic liberalization is confirmed for all four discursive strategies. To this purpose, table 10.4 reports the distribution of frames across the three main coalitions as established in chapter 8.

The mainstream shows a consistent framing strategy and, quite plausibly, it is the coalition most often resorting to prosperity frames (36.9 percent). Yet it also uses more interventionist and protectionist frames than the other coalitions, which points to the importance of public authority actors for this coalition, most notably the EU actors and national executives. With regard to the traditional left coalition, its framing strategy differs as anticipated from the mainstream in two crucial aspects. On the one hand, it uses much less frequently liberal justifications and, on the other hand, it strongly emphasizes both categories of the social democratic ideology. Further in line with the theoretical expectations,

Table 9.4 *Framing by Coalitions*

		Mainstream	Traditional left	Neomercantilist
Liberal	Prosperity	36.9	16.8	31.4
	Economic Freedom	10.9	9.0	15.0
Social protection	Social protection	12.8	40.8	18.2
	Social justice	8.3	16.2	6.7
Mercantilist	Interventionist	16.3	11.3	17.9
	Protectionist	14.8	5.9	10.8
Total		100	100	100
N		3943	985	2227
Pearson's χ^2		37.87 *** (10 DF)		

Notes: All shares in %; article and country weights applied for all calculations. Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.001 .

the traditional left also employs mercantilist frames less often than the other two coalitions.

Furthermore, and contrary to the hypothesis on the consistency of positions and frames, neomercantilists use less protectionist frames. Hence, they do not seem to be able to pursue their preferred framing strategy and it seems that the mainstream coalition is successfully imposing its dominant framing on them. This is further evidence for the inconsistency of the neomercantilist coalition, since we have already seen that the neomercantilist coalition does not pursue a concise valence campaign.

All coalitions, finally, consistently emphasize the pragmatic frame categories more pronouncedly. This points to the fact that, in contrast to debates on cultural issues like immigration or political issues like European integration, economic liberalization is rather disputed in a comparatively more technical and instrumental way.

9.5 Conclusion

This chapter provided a comprehensive assessment of the importance of framing strategies in the public debate on economic liberalization. As a matter of fact, the actors, coalitions, and countries, but not the arenas, significantly relate to some of the variance regarding the framing strategies. With some few but important exceptions, the ideological landscape

of the debate matches the findings on going public, policy position taking, and valence campaigning.

In line with the neoliberal dominance in the policy making on economic liberalization, liberal framing is the preferred strategy. In particular, members of the pro-market mainstream also apply a solid framing strategy which is consistent with their policy position taking. With respect to the opposition against economic liberalization, especially the traditional left, such justifications related to prosperity and economic freedom are less important. Challengers of neoliberal dominance from the traditional left prefer social democratic frames. This most forcefully plays out in the input arenas. Reflecting their status as the major challengers in the debate, the most important actors with respect to this framing strategy are the trade unions.

Protectionist frames, contrary to the expectations, are not the preferred framing strategy of the neomercantilist coalition. As with interventionist frames, the use of protectionist justifications relates more to the involvement into decision making processes, since public authority actors frequently use them. Interventionist and protectionist frames are therefore most closely connected with the mainstream, which emphasizes its actual governance responsibility. Moreover, mercantilist frames are most important for the janus-faced arenas, i.e., the sites where policy decisions are made.

Although the overall distribution of frames is not significantly related to the arena structure of the public debate, the high salience of normative conflict in the input arenas point to the high polarization found in the analyses on policy positions. With respect to the countries, an unexpected mechanism regarding the relationship between country characteristics and the public debate seems to be at work for the framing of economic liberalization. More precisely, there is a complementarity, since the usage of pro-market frames is higher in countries which are less liberal-leaning in terms of policy positions and their coalitional setting. The U.K. and Switzerland, the countries which have a pro-market climate of the debate, exhibit a high share of interventionist frames. While liberal justification clearly prevails in Germany and the Netherlands, social democratic frames add to liberal frames in France and Austria. This leads to a pattern which may be described as third way.

10

Conclusion: The Strength and Limits of Neoliberal Dominance

This study took care of the public debate on economic liberalization. First and foremost, it has been shown that a public debate is more than a background noise for the more institutionalized debates in parliaments and decision making processes by the public authorities. In other words, the role of public discourse for the politics of economic liberalization was empirically explored and not left to bold and oversimplifying speculation (see Schmidt). On the one hand, a public debate can systematically be linked to the institutional context and the particular interests of the participating actors. On the other hand, public discourse is organized discourse, since specific debate coalitions are at work which clash over the scope and meaning of economic liberalization reforms. Thus, the study enhanced our knowledge on public discourse as motor of change in a specific policy subsystem and has shown that it is necessary to include all arenas of policy processes and all actors into consideration. This is an often made but rarely implemented demand in comparative research ([Bartolini, 2005](#); [Sabatier and Weible, 2007b](#)).

More precisely, the analyses were sensitive to the regulatory, organizational, and communicative scope of the public debate. A restriction of the regulatory scope of conflicts to the national level, for instance, would have led to the neglect of transnationalization, i.e., the conflicts on the international dimension of economic liberalization and the important role supra- and international actors have in today's policy making processes on economic liberalization. By consistently considering transnationalization, the analyses have avoided the methodological nationalism often found in comparative political science ([Beck and Grande, 2007](#)). And a restriction of the organizational scope of conflict to the political arenas, in contrast, would have left business actors and their exceptionally

important role for opinion making processes aside. Solid empirical evidence on how business publicly tries to influence policy making processes is rare. The communicative scope of what debate analyses usually cover, finally, was extended by the concept of valence campaigning. Actors do not only try to get access to debates (going public), make their demands (policy positions taking) and try to manipulate the second-order aspects of these demands (framing), they also engage in public debates to enhance their ascribed competence and reputation in the particular policy subsystem.

In most general terms, the findings point the considerable neoliberal dominance in the economic liberalization debate, which has been found in terms of all four discursive elements. Nevertheless, the basic story on the nature of the economic liberalization debate is one of conflict. The public debate is the forum for the articulation of a broad range of interests and neoliberal dominance is thus not hegemonial in the sense that there is a widespread consensus among the actors (see [van Apeldoorn, 2002](#)). Neoliberal dominance is challenged by two debate coalitions, which articulate their demands sometimes quite consistent and strong. Further, the strength of neoliberal dominance depends on the institutional context. Most notably in France and input arenas, the opposition is fiercer.

This study has quarried insights on the structure of the public debate and the how the four discursive strategies are related to the institutional context of countries and arenas as well as actors and coalitions. Regarding structure, the three characteristics transnationalization, accessibility and dimensionality were explored in chapter 6. In terms of transnationalization we found that it affects all countries similarly strong with a salience of international, supranational, and foreign actors of about 30 to 50 percent. Thus, less than two thirds of statements made in the public debate on economic liberalization originate at the national level. As expected, France and Switzerland show a debate that takes place considerably more often at the domestic level. The state-led economy (France) and non-EU member state (Switzerland) are thus less affected by transnational participation in the debates.

The accessibility hypothesis could be largely confirmed as well. Three of the four coordinated market economies included into the study have lower entry barriers to the debate, since a broader variety of actors is

successful with their going public strategy. Switzerland with its participatory institutional design is the prime example of accessibility. The direct democratic institutions and informal decision making processes should thus be mentioned in the same breath as easy access to debates. Moreover, this refers to a general characteristic of coordinated market economies, since the higher accessibility in the economic liberalization debate confirms results already found for public debates on abortion and European integration (Ferree et al., 2002; Helbling et al., 2012). The comparatively more consensus-oriented policy processes in these countries usually entail the strive for a broader backing of decisions, which also fosters the going public of actors at the fringe of the political system.

As suggested in the historical outline of chapter 2, the findings on the dimensions show that a simple left-right model of political contention is not accurate to capture the debate on economic liberalization (see Milner and Judkins, 2004; Dutt and Mitra, 2005). In consequence of the internationalization of the economies and the corresponding transnationalization of conflicts as well as the continuing structuring capacity of the class divide, the debate is structured into two dimensions. We found that state intervention to ensure social security (domestic liberalization) and state intervention to protect national sovereignty (international liberalization) are two different aspects of economic liberalization. This structuring is mainly due to the still virulent opposition of the traditional left on both aspects of liberalization and the surprisingly forceful resistance of neomercantilists against international liberalization. In terms of the link to the existing research, this gives credit to the welfare literature which emphasizes the domestic origins of the debate as well as the globalization literature that highlights the internationalization of public conflicts.

Chapter 6 also covered the analyses on going public. Overall, resourceful actors in terms of institutionalized channels or public relation capacity clearly are more visible. As expected by the resource argument, the two actors with the highest standing are the national executives and corporations. Moreover, in the U.K., Switzerland, and the Netherlands, going public is thus a more important tool for public authorities to influence the policy process. As for the U.K., this is due to its majoritarian political system (Lijphart, 1999). Similarly, the centralized style of corporatist policy making in the Netherlands and the weak role of parties and the legislature in Switzerland gives public authorities a central

role in the debates in these countries ([Woldendorp and Keman, 2007](#); [Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008](#)). With regard to business interests, big business clearly prevails and small businesses, often praised as the pillar of Western European economies, have almost no voice at all.

There are, however, also dynamics which can be interpreted according to the mobilization thesis, according to which institutionally disadvantaged actors attempt to influence the political decisions indirectly by getting the public involved ([Wolfsfeld, 1997](#)). Unions are especially strong in the U.K. and France, where they traditionally have difficulties to access the crucial sites of political decision making. And corporations do well in Austria and Germany, where their interests are usually expected to be integrated into the political realms via business associations.

Furthermore, issue ownership seems to play an important role for the strength of parties in the debate. More precisely, the going public of social democrats and the radical left parties is fostered by economic liberalization. Compared to their electoral success, these parties are considerably stronger in the public debate. Social democrats and the radical left try to be especially visible on the domestic dimension, which pits proponents and opponents of state intervention to protect the welfare state against each other.

The general notion of neoliberal dominance is corroborated in the analyses of policy position taking in chapter 7. The overall position in the public disputes regarding economic liberalization in Western Europe is predominantly positive. Especially the U.K. and Switzerland have quite strongly pro-market leaning overall climate of their debates. However, there is such a substantial opposition in every country that arguments regarding a hegemonic pro-liberalization discourse in Western Europe seem overstretched. Most notably, France stands out as the only country opposing economic liberalization in general. The remaining countries lie between the two extremes, but show a moderately pro-market overall position. In sum, the configuration of countries established by the averages of policy stances confirms expectations derived from the comparative political economy literature on varieties of capitalism and neocorporatist systems of interest intermediation ([Hall and Gingerich, 2009](#); [Schmidt, 2009](#); [Visser and Afonso, 2010](#)).

Yet not only country differences with respect to political-economic in-

stitutional settings were explored in chapter 7. The propositions taken from media system theories regarding the conflict intensity came under scrutiny, too (see [Hallin and Mancini, 2004](#)). Matching the expectations, the debate in the U.K. is the least conflictive, while France has the most polarized debate on economic liberalization. The high polarization found in the Netherlands conflicts the hypothesis, yet it can be explained by reason that the Dutch voted on the referendum for the European Constitution during the time period selected for the debate analysis. The three remaining corporatist democratic countries (Austria, Germany, and Switzerland) have a more moderate debate.

The central finding with regard the arenas is that the overall climate in the janus-faced and output arenas is favorable to economic liberalization. But this does not apply to the input arenas. Neoliberal dominance thus gets strongly challenged in the realms of electoral competition, parliamentary debates, political protests, and direct democratic votes. Moreover, the strong articulation of opposition in their input arenas is responsible for the high conflict intensity of the debates in France and Germany.

On the level of actors, the empirically found debate coalitions largely reflect the theoretically expected constellation between a pro-market mainstream (consisting of third way and neoliberal actors) and neomercantilist and traditional left challengers. The mainstream is reinforced by the IGO and EU actors, foreign executives from emerging markets, national executives, chambers of commerce, peak employer associations, liberals, Christian democratic and conservative parties, global players, and public advisory actors. Although there are country specific deviations, all these actors show pro-market positions on both dimensions in the calculations over all six countries. Private sector unions are the pillar of the traditional left coalition which struggles against economic liberalization on both the international and domestic divide. They are joined by public sector unions, communists and left socialists, public welfare organizations, and, surprisingly, the white collar organizations and the economic think tanks.

The neomercantilist coalition, which is supportive of domestic liberalization but opts for protectionism, is stronger than expected. Here, a closing of ranks from mainstream left actors, public authority actors, and some actors from the political right is observable. Not only, as hypothe-

sized, the right wing populists, farmer organizations, and small business organizations, but also foreign executives from advanced economies, both categories of public administrations, judiciary actors, legislatures, niche and public enterprises, experts, and the mainstream left parties (greens and social democrats) belong to this coalition. This coalition is quite salient and thus a forceful challenger of neoliberal dominance, but it is very inconsistent in terms of valence campaigning and framing. How the formation of this coalition is playing out, i.e., whether this coalition becomes better organized or again falls apart, remains an open question for further research.

In sum, based on propositions grounded in a historical elaboration of the debate, a combination of actor-specific characteristics and the institutional context seems suitable to predict the outcome of the public debate on economic liberalization. This reflects the initial conceptualization as suggested by the heuristic model outlined in chapter 1. We not only identified idiosyncrasies of country and arena that were largely consistent across the four discursive strategies, but also the existence of specific coalitional constellations in the debate on economic liberalization is confirmed for all four discursive strategies.

Appendix A

Classifications

A.1 Actor Classifications

Table A.1 *Aggregation of Organizations to Actor Types: General List of Affiliations*

IGO
Annual Summits (G-7, G-8, G-10, G-20); Bank for International Settlements; European Fair Trade Association; International Air Transport Association; International Labour Organization; International Monetary Fund; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; World bank; World Trade Organization; World Health Organization.
EU actors
Council of the EU, European Commission, European Council (Ecofin, Gaerc, Epsco etc.).
Foreign executives^a
<i>Advanced economies:</i> Australia; Belgium; Canada; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxemburg; Malta; Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Slovakia; Slovenia; South Korea; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; U.K.; U.S.A.
<i>Emerging markets:</i> Argentina; Benin; Bolivia; Brazil; Burkina Faso; Chile; China; Croatia; Cuba; Egypt; Guatemala; Hong Kong; India; Indonesia; Iran; Israel; Malaysia; Mauritius; Mexico; Montenegro; Nigeria; Pakistan; Paraguay; Philippines; Romania; Russia; Senegal; Serbia; Singapore; South Africa; Sri Lanka; Syria; Taiwan; Tanzania; Thailand; Turkey; Uruguay; Venezuela; Vietnam; Zambia.
National executives
National, regional and local executives (names not specified) and associations of municipalities and regions, examples: the “österreichische Gemeindebund” (A), “interkantonale Konferenz” (CH), “Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten” (NL).

(continued on next page)

Notes: Parties are listed separately in Table A.2, companies in Table A.3. This is an inductive list and only actors which were annotated by the content analysis are indicated. Sometimes, this of course leads to slight overlaps of the categories. Since the single statements and not the actors listed here are the basic units of the calculations used throughout the book, this list serves only the purpose of a proper documentation. The Actors named by unspecific terms in the newspaper documents, e.g., “developing countries” for foreign executives, although coded and aggregated, are not indicated here. ^aIn their own country, public authority actors were of course coded as national executives.

*Aggregation of Organizations to Actor Types (continued).***Public administrations**

Economic administrations (central banks, business development, competition, finance and revenue authorities): Österreichische Nationalbank (A); Österreichische Übernahmekommission (A); Österreichische Industrieholding (A); Austrian Business Agency (A); Finanzmarktaufsicht (A); Übernahmekommission des Bundes (CH); Bundesamt für Privatversicherungen (CH); Eidgenössische Bankenkommision (CH); Eidgenössische Steuerverwaltung (CH); Finanzkommission (CH); Greater Zurich Area (CH); Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (CH); Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (D); Bundeskartellamt (D); Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde (D); Deutsche Bundesbank (D); Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich (D); Conseil Economique et Social (F); Algemene Rekenkamer (NL); Autoriteit Financiële Markten (NL); Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NL); Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (UK); Bank of England (UK); Competition Commission (UK); Financial Services Authority (UK); UK Trade & Investment (UK); HM Revenue & Customs (UK); Federal Reserve; Federal Trade Commission; Internal Revenue Service; Bank of Italy; European Central Bank.

General administrations (infrastructure, social welfare, education and consumer protection authorities): Energie-Control (A); Forschungsförderungsgesellschaft (A); Marktamt Wien (A); Wiener Pädak (A); Bundesamt für Kommunikation (CH); Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung (CH); Bundesamt für Umwelt (CH); Bundesamt für Verkehr (CH); Preisüberwacher (CH); Bundesagentur für Arbeit (D); Bundesnetzagentur (D); Stadtwerke München (D); Comisión Nacional de Energía (ES); Agence Française de Développement (F); Agence Nationale Pour l'Emploi (F); Autorité de Régulation des Télécommunications (F); Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (F); College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens (NL); College ter Beoordeling van Geneesmiddelen (NL); Prorail (NL); Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (UK); Civil Aviation Authority (UK); NHS Foundation Trust (UK); Office of Communications (UK); Office of Fair Trading (UK); Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (UK); Pension Protection Fund (UK); Pensions Regulator (UK); Strategic Rail Authority (UK); European Aviation Safety Agency; European Research Council; European Space Agency; Police departments in Austria, UK.

Judiciary

Österreichischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof (A); Verfassungsdienst im Bundeskanzleramt (A); Bundesgericht (CH); Bundesarbeitsgericht (D); Bundesgerichtshof (D); Bundessozialgericht (D); Conseil d'État (FR); Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (UK); European Court of Justice.

Legislative

Nationalrat and Bundesrat (A); Nationalrat and Ständerat (CH); Bundestag and Bundesrat (D); Assemblée nationale (F); Staten-Generaal (NL); House of Lords and House of Commons (UK). Legislatives from other countries: Chambre des Députés (LUX); Duma (R); Congress (USA). Regional and local legislatures: Burgenländischer Landtag (A); Freiburger Kantonsrat (CH); Münchner Stadtrat (D). Commissions: Kommission für Umwelt, Raumplanung und Energie (CH); Parlamentarische Untersuchungskommission (CH); Verkehrskommission (CH); Vermittlungsausschuss (D); All-Party Parliamentary Beer Group (UK); Commons Health Select Committee and Commons Trade and Industry Select Committee (UK); Parliamentary Ombudsman (UK).

Interest groups

Chambers of commerce: Bundesverband des Deutschen Gross- und Aussenhandels (D); Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag (D); Bundesverband Deutscher Buch-, Zeitungs- und Zeitschriften-Grossisten (D); Bundesverband des Deutschen Textilhandels (D); British Chamber of Commerce (UK); Eurocommerce.

Peak, big industry and moneyed interest associations: Arbeitgebervertreter des Sparkassenverbandes (A); Automotive Cluster Vienna Region (A); Industriellenvereinigung (A); Institute of International Finance (A); Verband Österreichischer Banken & Bankiers (A); Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (A); Astag Nutzfahrzeugverband (CH); Economiesuisse (CH); Schweizerische Bankiervereinigung (CH); Schweizerischer Anlagefondsverband (CH); Schweizerischer Arbeitgeberverband (CH); Schweizerischer Baumeisterverband (CH); Suisseporc (CH); Verband Schweizer Presse (CH); Vereinigung der privaten Aktiengesellschaften (CH); Vereinigung Schweizerischer Privatbanquiers (CH); Arbeitsgemeinschaft Partnerschaft in der Wirtschaft (D); Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (D); Bundesverband Deutscher Leasing-Unternehmen (D); Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (D); Gesamtmetall (D); Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft (D); Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger (D); Telekommunikation und neue Medien (D); Verband der Bahnindustrie (D); Verband der Deutschen Automatenindustrie (D); Verband der Verbundunternehmen und Regionalen Energieversorger (D); Zentraler Immobilien Ausschuss (D); Association des Actionnaires Minoritaires (F); Association de la Transformation Laitière Française (F); Croissance Plus (F); Groupement Industriel des Constructions et Armements Navals (F); Mouvement des Entreprises de France (F); UNETEL-RST (Telecom, F); Dutch Fund and Asset Management Association (NL); Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken (NL); Nederlandse Vereniging van de Research-georiënteerde Farmaceutische Industrie (NL); Vereniging van Effectenbezitters (NL); Vereniging van Nederlandse kabelbedrijven (NL); VNO-NCW (Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen und Nederlands Christelijk Werkgeversverbond, NL); Association of British Insurers (UK); Association of Private Client Investment Managers and Stockbrokers (UK); Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (UK); British Bankers' Association (UK); British Energy (UK); British Venture Capital Association (UK); Bundesverband deutscher Banken (UK); Bundesverband Informationswirtschaft (UK); Confederation of British Industry (UK); Institute of Directors (UK); London Investment Bank Association (UK); Publishers Association (UK); Associazione Bancaria Italiana; Cefic (European Chemical Industry Council); European Automobile Manufacturers' Association; European Information and Communications Technology Industry Association; European Metalworkers' Federation; GSM Europe; International Federation of the Phonographic Industry; Union of Industrial and Employer Confederations of Europe.

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*Aggregation of Organizations to Actor Types (continued).***Interest groups**

Small business associations: Grüne Wirtschaft (A); Österreichische Hotelierversammlung (A); Ring Freiheitlicher Wirtschaftstreibender (A); Bündner Bergbahnen (CH); City-Vereinigung (CH); Fédération des syndicats hôteliers de Haute-Savoie (F); Gastro Suisse (CH); Hotelleriesuisse (CH); Luzern Tourismus (CH); Schweizerischer Gewerbeverband (CH); Schweizerischer Tourismusverband (CH); Swiss Retail Federation (CH); Unternehmer-Vereinigung Wetzikon (CH); Verband öffentlicher Verkehr (CH); Verband Schweizerischer Gemüseproduzenten (CH); Vereinigung Bahnhofstrasse (CH); Centre des Jeunes Dirigeants d'Entreprise (F); Comité Richelieu (F); Confédération Générale du Patronat des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (F); Union française des industries textiles (F); Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Mittel- und Grossbetriebe des Einzelhandels (D); Interessenverband Deutscher Zeitarbeitsunternehmen (D); Deutscher Hotel- und Gaststättenverband (D); Tarifgemeinschaft deutscher Länder (D); Verein kommunaler Unternehmen (D); Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks (D); Zentralverband Deutscher Schornsteinfeger (D); Bescherming Rechten Entertainment Industrie Nederland (NL); Bouwend Nederland (NL); Federation of Small Businesses (UK); Interprovinciaal Werkgeversverband (NL); Koninklijke Vereniging MKB-Nederland (NL); Association of Convenience Stores (UK); Association of Independent Music (UK); Forum of Private Business (UK); Usability Professionals' Association (UK); International Visual Communications Association.

Private sector unions and umbrella associations: Arbeiterkammern (A); AUA Bordbetriebsrat (A); Christgewerkschaft (A); Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten (A); Gewerkschaft Hotel, Gastgewerbe, Persönlicher Dienst (A); Gewerkschaft Metall-Textil-Nahrung (A); Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (A); Comedia (CH); Personal Union SAir Holding (CH); Schweizerischer Gewerkschaftsbund (CH); Travail Suisse (CH); UNIA (CH); Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (F); Confédération générale du Travail (F); Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (F); Loysel (F); Sud (Solidaires Unitaires Démocratiques, F); Syndicat des Travailleurs Corses (F); Syndicat Interprofessionnel de Travailleuses et Travailleurs (F); Union Nationale des Syndicats Autonomes (F); Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (D); Betriebsräte (Daimler-Chrysler, Siemens, Continental, D); IG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie (D); IG Metall (D); SPD-Gewerkschaftsrat (D); Verdi (Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft, D); Alternatief voor Vakbond (NL); Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond (NL); Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging (NL); Amicus (UK); Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematograph and Theatre Union (UK); Britain's General Union (UK); National Union of Journalists (UK); Prospect (UK); Public and Commercial Services Union (UK); Rail, Maritime and Transport Union (UK); Scottish Trades Union Congress (UK); Trades Union Congress (UK); Transport and General Workers' Union (UK); Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (UK); European Trade Union Confederation; Fédération des Travailleurs et Travailleuses du Québec; Union Network International.

Public sector unions: Gewerkschaft der Eisenbahner (A); Gewerkschaft für Post- und Fernmeldebedienstete (A); Aktion Gsundi Gsundheitspolitik (CH); Dachverband Schweizer Lehrerinnen und Lehrer (CH); Gewerkschaft Kommunikation (CH); Personalverband des Bundes (CH); Schweizerischer Eisenbahn- und Verkehrspersonal-Verband (CH); Schweizerische Verband des Personals öffentlicher Dienste (CH); Swisspersona (CH); Verband Schweizerischer Polizei-Beamter (CH); Betriebsräte Landesentwicklungsgesellschaften (D); Gewerkschaft Deutscher Bundesbahnbeamten und Anwärter (D); Transnet (D); Fédération Indépendante et Démocratique Lycéenne (F); Fédération Syndicale Unitaire (F); Syndicat National des Personnels de Direction de l'Éducation Nationale (F); Algemene Bond Van Ambtenaren and Katholieke Bond van Overheidspersoneel (NL); Vakcentrale voor middengroepen en hoger personeel (NL); VVMC Vakbond voor Rijdend Personeel (NL); Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (UK); Communication Workers Union (UK); Jennie Lee Students' Association (UK); Unison (UK).

Farmer associations: Landwirtschaftskammer Österreich (A); Schweizerischer Bauernverband (CH); Arbeitskreis Deutsche Grenzlandwirte (D); Badischer Landwirtschaftlicher Hauptverband (D); Deutscher Bauernverband (D); Confédération paysanne (F); Coordination rurale (F); Jeunes Agriculteurs (F); European Farmers (COPA-COGECA).

White collar associations: Bundeskammer der Architekten und Ingenieurkonsulenten (A); Rechtsanwaltskammer Österreich (A); Vereinigung österreichischer Staatsanwältinnen und Staatsanwälte (A); Federatio Medicorum Helveticorum (CH); Kaufmännischer Verband (CH); Apothekerkammer (D); Berufsverband selbständiger Buchhalter und Bilanzbuchhalter (D); Marburger Bund (D); Confédération Française de l'Encadrement - Confédération Générale des Cadres (F); Fédération Hospitalière de France (F); Syndicat national unifié des impôts (F); Landelijke Huisartsen Vereniging (NL); Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (UK); British Medical Association (UK); Family Law Bar Association (UK); General Council of the Bar (UK); Law Society (UK); Union des Syndicats et Associations Professionnelles Indépendants Européens.

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*Aggregation of Organizations to Actor Types (continued).***Experts**

Economic research institutes and think tanks: BAK Basel Economics (CH); International Institute for Management Development (CH); Institut Constant de Rebecque (CH); Ifo Institute for Economic Research (D); Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln (D); Institut für Makroökonomie und Konjunkturforschung (D); Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitut (D); Zentrum für europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (D); Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (F); Centre lillois d'études et de recherches sociologiques et économiques (F); Institute nationale de la statistique et des études économiques (F); Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (F); Centraal Planbureau (NL); Bruegel (Think tank); Centre for European Policy Studies; Centre for European Reform; World Economic Forum.

Public advisory and research institutes and cultural experts: Rat für Forschung und Technologieentwicklung (A); Akademien der Wissenschaften (D); Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (D); Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (D); Académie des sciences (F); Conférence des Présidents d'Université (F); Institut National Agronomique (F); Institut National de la santé et de la recherche médicale (F); Université Claude-Bernard Lyon I (F); Expertenkommission für eine Elektrizitätswirtschaftsordnung (CH); ETH Lausanne (CH); Institut für Publizistikwissenschaften und Medienforschung UZH (CH); Schauspielhaus Zürich (CH); Schweizerische Vereinigung für Landesplanung (CH); Veterinärmedizinische Fakultät Zürich (CH); Adviesraad voor Internationale Vraagstukken (NL); Algemene Energieraad (NL); Instituut voor Verantwoord Medicijngebruik (NL); Hanzehogeschool Groningen (NL); Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat (NL); Stuurgroep Sectorplan Wetenschap Technologie (NL); Vereniging van Universiteiten (NL); Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (NL); Royal Commission of Lord Sutherland (UK); the Scotsman (UK).

Public welfare organizations

Aid organizations and churches: Ökosoiales Forum (A); Behindertenzentrum Wabe (CH); Brot für alle (CH); Caritas (CH); Evangelisch-reformierte Kirche (CH); Kulturstadt Jetzt (CH); Schweizerisches Arbeiterhilfswerk (CH); Schweizer Tierschutz (CH); Stiftung für ganzheitliche Betreuung (CH); Stiftung St. Martin (CH); Deutscher Mieterbund (D); Evangelische Kirche (D); Mieterforum Ruhr (D); Komitee für eine sichere Spitalversorgung (D); Volksinitiative für sichere Wohnungen und Arbeitsplätze (D); Emmaus (F); Maison de la Jeunesse et de la Culture Chamonix (F); Commission Tabaksblad (NL); Nederlandse Patienten en Consumenten Federatie (NL); British Council (UK); Campaign for Real Ale (UK); Church of England (UK); Oxfam (UK); Save the children (UK); UnLtd (UK); Which? (UK); Harvard Foundation; Rockefeller Foundation; Transfair; Greenpeace; WWF.

Global justice movements: Aktionskomitee Galmiz (CH); Attac; Basel Action Network (NL); Das andere Davos (CH); Ecology & Development (D); Mexiko-Plattform (A); Via Campesina; World Social Forum; World Economy.

Table A.2 *Aggregation of Party Actors to Party Families*

Parties	Country/ Level
Communists and radical socialists	
KPÖ (Communist Party of Austria)	A
PCF (French Communist Party), Force Ouvrière (Workers' Force)	F
Die Linke (The Left), DKP (German Communist Party)	D
Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party)	NL
AL (Alternative List), Solidarités (Solitarities)	CH
Greens	
Die Grünen (The Greens)	A
Les Verts (The Greens)	F
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The Greens)	D
GroenLinks (Green Left)	NL
Green Party	UK
Grüne Partei (Green Party)	CH
European Greens	EP
Social democrats	
SPÖ (Social Democratic Party of Austria)	A
PS (Socialist party)	F
SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany)	D
PvdA (Labor Party)	NL
Labour Party, Scottish National Party	UK
SPS (Social Democratic Party of Switzerland)	CH
Party of European Socialists	EP
Liberals	
Liberales Forum (Liberal Forum)	A
UDF (Union for French Democracy)	F
FDP (Free Democratic Party)	D
D66 (Democrats 66), VVD (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy)	NL
Liberal Democratic Party	UK
Die Liberalen (The Liberals), GLP (Green Liberal Party)	CH
Alliance of Liberals & Democrats for Europe	EP
Christian democrats and conservatives	
ÖVP (Austrian People's Party)	A
UMP (Union for a Popular Movement)	F
CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic/Christian Social Union)	D
CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal)	NL
Conservative Party	UK
CVP (Christian Democratic People's Party), EVP (Evangelical People's Party), CSP (Christian Social Party)	CH
European People's Party	EP
Radical and populist right	
FPÖ (Freedom Party), BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of Austria)	A
Front National (National Front), MPF (Movement for France)	F
Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn)	NL
United Kingdom Independence Party	UK
SVP (Swiss People's Party), Lega (League of Ticinesi), SD (Swiss Democrats), EDU (Federal Democratic Union)	CH

Notes: Only parties that were annotated in the content analysis are included in the classification. Only one small party, the Frysk Nasjonale Partij (Frisian National Party), could not be classified. It is characterized by a distinct regionalist ideology that does not match the more general categories defined here. However, this exclusion should not affect the results since there are only very few statements of this party in the data set. Labels: A=Austria, F= France, D=Germany, NL=the Netherlands, UK=United Kingdom, CH=Switzerland, EP=European Parliament.

Table A.3 *Classification of Companies*

Finance-law-IT
<i>Global:</i> ABN Amro; Accenture; AGF; AIG; Allianz; Aon Consulting; AVIVA; AXA; Banca Popolare Italiana; Bank Austria; Barclays; BNP Paribas; Buck Consultants; Credit Suisse; Delta Lloyd; Deutsche Börse; Deutsche Bank; Dexia; DWS; Electronic Data Systems; Ernst & Young; Erste Bank; Erste Sparinvest; Euronext; EVN; FBD; Fortis; Friends Provident; Gagfah; GE Money Bank; Goldman Sachs; Grant Thornton; HSBC; HypoVereinsbank; IBM; Immofinanz; ING; KPMG; Land Securities; Legal & General; Lehman Brothers; Lincoln Financial Group; Lloyds Banking Group; London Stock Exchange; Man Group; Microsoft; Morgan Stanley; Morley Fund Management; National Australia Bank; Postfinance; PricewaterhouseCoopers; Prudential; Rabobank; Raiffeisenbank; Royal Bank of Scotland; Salomon Oppenheim.
<i>Niche:</i> 3i; ABP; Addleshaw Goddard; Allen Overy; Annington; AT Kearney; Atradius; AWS; Bank Burgenland; BAWAG; BDO Stoy Howard; Blackstone; Bysoft; Capital Regional; Casino Austria; CDC-Ixis; Centaurus; Cesmo consulting; Collins Steward Tullet; CSC; Eversheds; Fortress; Grazer Wechselseitige; Hammerson; Hellman Friedman; Hypo Alpe Adria Bank; IBA Health; Kathreinbank; Kohlberg Kravis Roberts; LAC London Asia Capital; Liberata; Macfarlanes; Maxdata; Meind Bank; Messe Frankfurt; Montagu Private Equity; Oxford Innovation; Partouche; Partygaming; Paulson; Permira; PGGM; Porr-Solutions; Proxinvest.
<i>State:</i> Landesbank Berlin.
Retail-tourism
<i>Global:</i> Aldi; ASDA; IKEA; Interio; KarstadtQuelle; Kaufhof; Marks & Spencer; Metro; Morrisons; REWE.
<i>Niche:</i> AVA-Edeka; Boden; BQ; Citydisc; Dawsons; Denner; DM Drogerie; Gate Gourmet; John Lewis; Kuoni.
Social services
<i>Niche:</i> Birmingham University; Evangelischer Sozialkonzern Augustinum; Rhön-Klinikum; Yale Foundation.
<i>State:</i> Fachhochschule Steyr; Universitätsspital Bern; Schweizerische Unfallversicherungsanstalt; Capital City Academy.
Transport-communication
<i>Global:</i> Aéroports de Paris; Abertis; Air France; Alitalia; Alltel; AUA; Axel Springer; BBA Aviation; Bertelsmann; BMG; British Airways; British Telecom; Continental; Delta; Deutsche Post; Deutsche Telekom; DHL; Faurecia; France Télécom; Frankfurt Airport; KPN; Lufthansa; Mobilkom; News Corporation; One; Orange; Rail Cargo Austria; Reuters.
<i>Niche:</i> AZ-Medien-Gruppe; BLS Cargo; Casema; Chiltern; Competence Call Center; Copenhagen Aitport; Easy Jet; Eurotunnel; Future; IPA plus; Kabel1; Lenzerheide Bergbahnen; Märkische Allgemeine; N 24; ProSieben Sat1 Media; Railtrack; Redmail.
<i>State:</i> BBC; British Airports Authority; Connexxion; Deutsche Bahn; ÖBB; Österreichische Post; La Poste; London Underground; Nederlandse Spoorwegen; Network Rail; ORF; RATP; Rotterdamse Elektr. Tram; Royal Mail; Swiss Post; Vienna International Airport.
Chemistry
<i>Global:</i> Akzo Nobel; Amgen; Aventis; BP; British Plaster Board; Celgene; Ciba; Clariant; Dow Chemical; DSM; Eastman Kodak; ENI; Gas Natural; GlaxoSmithKline; Henkel; Lafarge; L'Oréal; Novartis; OMV; Roche.
<i>Niche:</i> Altana; Amag; ATS; Filtrona; Ipsen; KCW; Kollo Silicium Carbide; Lenzing; Medicom; RHI.
<i>State:</i> Gaz de France; Gazprom; Rosneft.
Electricity-construction
<i>Global:</i> Areva; Bilfinger Berger; Centrica; E.ON; Endesa; Essent; Hochtief; Holcim; Iberdrola; National Grid; Power-One.
<i>Niche:</i> Eneco; Heijmans; Nuon.
<i>State:</i> Électricité de France; Enel.
<i>(continued on next page)</i>

Notes: All classifications are based on the situation in time period from 2004 to 2006. The list indicates all firms annotated by their proper names and not by collective terms, e.g., “watch industry” or “pharmaceutical sector”. For the sector classification of companies which are active in more than one sector, only the main line of business was considered. Labels: Global=Global player, Niche=Company operating in a niche market or domestic-oriented business, State=Largely state-owned, see Table B.1 for an explanation of the categories. Since the single statements and not the corporations listed here are the basic units of the calculations used throughout the book, this list only serves the purpose of a proper documentation.

Classification of Companies (continued)**Food-textile-wood**

Global: Altadis; Associated British Foods; Austria Tabak; British American Tobacco; Cadburry Schweppes; Danone; Heineken; LU; Nestlé.

Niche: Amer Sports; Bata; DIM; Emmi; Francas; Gelco; Heindl; Isosport; Palmers; Panzani; Pfanner; San Carlo.

Metal-machinery

Global: AEG; Airbus; Alcan Pechiney; Alcoa; Arcelor; Böhler-Uddeholm; BAE Systems; BenQ; Black und Decker; Boeing; Bombardier; Bosch; Corus; Daimler-Chrysler; EADS; Electrolux; Ford; General Motors; Givaudan; Hewlett-Packard; Jaguar; Lada; Land Rover Jaguar; Magna; MG Rover; Mittal Steel; Motorola; Norsk Hydro; Peugeot; Philips; PSA Peugeot-Citroën; Renault; Rolls Royce.

Niche: Aldel; DCN; Fendt; Grillo-Werke; Imerys; Leoni; Lexmark; Marconi; Mayflower; Novomatic.

State: Nanjing Automobiles.

Agriculture-mining

Niche: RAG.

A.2 Classification of Frames and Issues

Table A.4 *Allocation of Justifications to Frame Categories*

Intervention
Market failure; fiscal policy; bureaucracy; political efficiency; international relations; public goods (education, infrastructure etc.); interventionism in general; economic delinquency (clandestine employment, black market etc.); delinquency in general; security in general; corruption; political stability; inflation policy.
Social protection
Employment protection; labor disputes and strikes; reducing unemployment; job quality; occupational health; social dumping; stakeholder interests; social security in general; consumer protection; individual well-being in general; labor relations and union agreements.
Prosperity
Innovation; economic prosperity in general (of individuals, companies or sectors); wealth in general; free trade; liberalization; globalization; investments; profits; corporate management; competitiveness; research and development; economic progress.
Protection
Protectionism; relocation abroad and foreign take-overs; loss of traditions; answer to globalization; benefit for domestic or local business; national identity; nationalism; national autonomy; national sovereignty; national interest in general; xenophobia; immigration.
Social justice
Human dignity; democratic and participatory principles; equality of opportunity; poverty relief (as a moral duty); cultural diversity; gender equality; minority rights; exploitation; peace; solidarity with developing countries; public welfare; noncommercial values; humanitarian law; social justice in general; socialist ideology.
Economic freedom
Economic self-interest; entrepreneurial success; blessing of capitalism and free markets; freedom of economic activity in general; neo-liberal ideology; individual responsibility; entrepreneurial freedom; freedom of choice.
<i>Notes:</i> Contrary to the issues and actors, the frame annotation relied on closed categories, i.e. a general classification system was established before the coding. For the analyses, however, the classification was regrouped into the categories shown here.

Table A.5 *Classification of Issues****International deregulation in general***

International deregulation in general: coordination of the European Single Market (e.g., Stability and Growth Pact); European Constitution; global economic policy fora and critics (e.g., WEF, open forum davos, World Social Fora); international authorities (WTO, IMF, G-8 etc.); more social European Union (Social Charter); more social globalization (fair trade); politically or democratically controlled economic globalization; re-regulation of policies on the European or international level; regulation of international issues (patent laws, genetic engineering, copyright, energy security, terrorism); stability of the global economy; third way (bringing globalization and welfare in line).

Trade and international labor market deregulation: Cassis de Dijon principle (free movement of goods); coordination of labor regulation at the European and international level; deepening the European Single Market; employment protection of temporary foreign workers and other foreigners; EU directives (e.g., regarding working time); import quota or other import restrictions; priority for natives regarding employment standards, wages etc.; regulation related to free trade and tariff agreements (bilateral and multilateral); subsidy programs; WTO regulations.

Financial market deregulation and flexible tax regimes: banking secrecy; banking supervision; central bank issues (independence and international cooperation); European Monetary Union; fiscal reforms in general and regarding business taxes in specific; interest, monetary, and exchange rate policies; measures against financial crises; private finance initiatives; protection of investors; regulation enhancing competitiveness of financial centers and stock exchanges; regulation of credit business; regulation of financial markets in general; regulation of hedge funds and private equity funds or other institutional investors; regulation of insurances; sales taxes; tax amnesties; tax competition; tax cooperation on the European or international level; tax fraud; tax regulation with regard to all kinds of financial products.

Internationalization

Economic globalization in general: adaption to globalization pressures; export risk insurances; export subsidies; inducement of competition in general; international expansion of public enterprises; internationalization and Europeanization of production; internationalization of companies or whole industries (e.g., loans to produce in China); neo-liberal world order (in an economic sense); offshore outsourcing; relocation.

Liberalization of trade and free movement of labor: cutbacks of agricultural subsidies (also with respect to the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union); decreasing border controls; deepening of the European Single Market; enhancement of trade relations (e.g., via multilateral or bilateral free trade agreements); establishment of free trade zones; free movement of persons in general and the establishment or extensions of agreements (e.g., the Schengen agreement); higher participation of foreigners (e.g., high-skilled or low wage workers); immigration policies; liberalization of the European service sector (e.g., Bolkestein directive); lowering costs for international trade (e.g., lowering fees on parallel imports); opening of national markets for trade in general and specifically (e.g., airline); priority for natives regarding employment opportunities; reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers in general and specifically (e.g., on textiles or agricultural products); WTO negotiations and disputes.

Opposition to the sheltering of national economies: defense against foreign take-overs in general; Golden or majority share for national shareholders or the government; market access for foreign business; "national" or "European champions" (state-led mergers to prevent foreign takeovers); priority for domestic businesses in public contracts; state subsidies for strategic industries and companies (e.g., defense or aircraft industry); transfer of property to foreigners.

Locational promotion

Enhancing tax competition and free capital movements: against double taxation; attracting foreign investments and liberalization of capital movements; coordination of regional and local tax regimes; degressive taxes; ethical or ecological considerations concerning taxation; flat-rate tax regimes; promoting tax competition in general; reduction of stamp taxes and taxes on capital gains and property; reduction of top income tax rates; tax arbitrage policies; tax cuts and reforms in general; tax exemption for specific activities (e.g., public trusts and non-profit associations); taxes on business in general and specific (e.g., taxes for small and medium-sized businesses, multinational corporations, or services).

Locational promotion in general: advancing prestigious projects; cutting prices (road pricing, roaming etc.); development of specific regions in general; enhancing competitiveness (of countries, regions, or cities); fostering educational elites; image campaigns; improving transport and other infrastructure; Lissabon Agenda (EU innovation reform programs); promoting research and development (public and private, e.g., biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, or alternative energies); promoting special economic areas; promoting specific industries overseas (e.g., tourism); provide new jobs at specific locations.

(continued on next page)

Notes: This is an inductive list and only issues which were annotated by the content analysis are indicated. Sometimes, this of course leads to a slightly overlapping categorizations. Since the single statements and not the issues listed here are the basic units of the calculations used throughout the book, this list only serves the purpose of a proper documentation. The direction of the single policy positions was adapted so that a positive polarity always means a pro-liberalization position.

*Classification of Issues (continued)***Privatization**

Austerity programs; better collaboration between research institutes or public administrations and private businesses; compensation and health insurances; downsizing of the public sector in general; e.g., in health care; end of public monopolies (e.g., railways or gambling); energy and tourist infrastructure; energy or telecommunication businesses; full or partial privatization of media (press, television, radio); health care; initial public offerings or sale of public enterprises (or parts of them); nationalization of companies or industries (e.g., in the energy business or area of education); police departments; police tasks; postal services; postal services and armament industries; public administration in general; public housing; public-private-partnerships; reduction of subsidies by the state in general; reforms of public services for more efficiency; regulation of privatized businesses; restructuring of public enterprises; state banks; telecommunication industries; transport infrastructure (highways, railways, airports etc.); universities; waste management.

Domestic liberalization

Liberalization of national markets in general: fostering entrepreneurial responsibility; inducing more competitiveness; liberalization of markets in general; liberalization of whole industries or sectors (e.g., the gambling industry); market mechanisms as a general principle.

Flexible wage and pension regimes: demands for higher wages (sectors, industries, or individual corporations); early retirement (for the whole economy, sectors, industries or single corporations); incentive wage; income equality (regarding gender, sectoral, or age disparities); low wage jobs; lowering retirement age; minimum wages; more decentralized and flexible wage setting; pay freezes; pension protection schemes (insurances or funds); state subsidies of wages (e.g., for part-time employment); unemployment benefits; wage bargaining in general; wage restraints in hard times.

Industry support: bailouts of industries; encouraging start-ups and other financial incentives to employers; fostering of investments; rescue of production sites; state support in bankruptcy processes; support of sectors, industries, and companies in crises (e.g., airlines, farmers, craftsmen, small and medium-sized businesses).

Labor market deregulation

anti-discrimination regulations (for foreigners, non-residents and disabled persons as well as regarding gender equality or age); dismissal protection; flexible working time legislation in general; general labor market reforms; maternity and fraternity leave; night work; occupational disability guidelines; opening hours of retail businesses and gastronomy (e.g., Sunday or evening shopping times); paid vacations (e.g., new public holiday or minimum paid holidays); reduction of administrative costs with respect to labor regulations; reduction of working time in general; regulation of apprentice and other on-the job training; regulations regarding the work week (40 hours, 35 hours etc.); temporary and part-time work; worker protection from health risks (e.g., prevention of accidents or ban on smoking).

Retrenchment of restrictions in general

Deregulation of national markets in general: complementary regulations to liberalization and privatization projects; corporate governance codes of conduct in general; exorbitant manager salaries; less red tape in general; less state interventions in general; social and ethical values as corporate guidelines; transparency and sustainability of management decisions.

Opposition to social partnership and job security: bans on recruitment; bipartite or tripartite negotiations; co-determination rights (of single workers or work councils); corporatism in general; government job guarantee; international collaboration of unions; job cuts; job security in general; labor peace and social partnership in general; reinstatements; reorganization of companies; right to strike; sectoral agreements (on multi-sectoral, national, or plant level); severance payments or other compensation; social plans in case of dismissals; special employment services and professional training for laid-off employees; strikes or other coordinated campaigns by unions.

Loosening competition restrictions: antitrust laws and measures (concerning the whole economy, sectors, industries or single companies); distortion of competition; price controls; mergers (only of national companies); sale of business units; take-overs (hostile and friendly).

Appendix B

Additional Classifications and Formal Definitions of Indices

Table B.1 *Definition of Levels of Origin and Company Types*

<i>Level of origin</i>	
National	All statements from actors of the country under consideration which are not affiliated with either the European or international level.
Foreign	Horizontal transnationalism: an actor's statement is classified as foreign, if the actor is from another country than the one under consideration.
European	Vertical transnationalism I: statements from actors affiliated to the European Union (mostly public authorities, but also European parties, interest groups and think tanks.)
International	Vertical transnationalism II: statements from actors affiliated to international organizations and multinational corporations.
<i>Company type^a</i>	
Global (global player)	The firm is among the top 2000 public companies of the world according to the Forbes magazine or private companies with an economic strength comparable to the ranking. The ranking is based on the performance of the companies on the four metrics sales, profit, assets and market value.
State (state-owned)	State-owned enterprises (at least to a substantial degree).
Niche (niche-domestic)	Mostly domestically or regionally oriented businesses or firms operating in smaller market niches.

Notes: ^aSource: Forbes (2010) and own inquiries.

Table B.2 *Index Definitions: Polarization, Dunn index, Kmeans++ Weighting, and Closeness Centrality*

Index	Definition	Description
Polarization	$P = \sum_{k=1}^k \omega_k (\chi_k - \bar{\chi})^2$	ω_k is the salience of actor k , χ_k is the position of actor k on the issue, and $\bar{\chi}$ is the weighted average position of all actors on this scale, where the weights are again provided by the actor-specific salience.
Dunn index	$D = \frac{d_{min}}{d_{max}}$	d_{min} denotes the smallest distance between two actors from different clusters, and d_{max} the largest distance of two actors from the same cluster.
Kmeans++ weighting	$K = \frac{D(x')^2}{\sum_{x \in \chi} D(x)^2}$	K is the probability that we choose a center x' that is proportional to the overall potential of this center. Since $D(x)$ is the shortest distance from a data point x to the closest center already defined, the selection of x' with K is closer to the optimal clustering solution than an a priori selected cluster center.
Closeness centrality	$C = \frac{ V -1}{\sum_{i \neq v} d_{vi}}$	C is defined by the inverse of the average length of the shortest paths d to and from all the other vertices i in the graph. If there is no direct path between vertex v and i then the total number of vertices ($ V $) is used in the formula instead of the path length.

Appendix C

Additional Analyses

Table C.1 *Criteria for Count Model Selection For Actor Regressions on Going Public as Used in Figure 6.1*

	Mean	Variance	Ln alpha test		Model
			ln alpha	Pr> z	
International	10.55	239.22	-0.212	*	Negative binominal
Domestic	6.82	85.12	-0.486	***	Negative binominal

Notes: Levels of significance: + ≤ 0.1 , * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.005 .




Figure C.1 Histograms for Dependent Variables in Actor Regressions on Going Public as Used in Figure 6.1

Table C.2 *Results of Count Regression Models on the Going Public by Actors as Used in Figure 6.1*

	International			Domestic		
	Negative binominal			Negative binominal		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
<i>Actors (ref = national executives)</i>						
IGO actors	-1.376	0.377	***	-2.319	0.559	***
EU actors	-0.148	0.314	n.s.	-1.042	0.310	***
For. exec. adv. economies	-0.426	0.315	n.s.	-1.929	0.363	***
For. exec. emerging markets	-1.004	0.387	**	-2.765	0.488	***
Econ. administrations	-1.151	0.366	**	-1.873	0.394	***
Other administrations	-1.951	0.393	***	-1.985	0.379	***
Judiciary	-1.363	0.459	**	-1.779	0.465	***
Legislatures	-1.090	0.376	**	-1.142	0.376	**
Chambers of commerce	-2.405	0.475	***	-3.049	0.754	***
Peak empl. assoc.	-1.295	0.329	***	-1.478	0.316	***
Small bus. assoc.	-2.290	0.384	***	-3.250	0.459	***
Private sector unions	-0.900	0.326	**	-0.503	0.281	n.s.
Publ. sector unions	-2.707	0.472	***	-1.871	0.331	***
Farmer org.	-2.075	0.454	***	-3.017	0.715	***
White collar assoc.	-1.999	0.434	***	-1.997	0.381	***
Communists/Left soc.	-2.140	0.475	***	-2.007	0.418	***
Greens	-2.358	0.555	***	-2.141	0.390	***
Social democrats	-0.757	0.327	*	-0.942	0.292	***
Liberals	-1.691	0.372	***	-1.753	0.362	***
Christian dem./Cons.	-1.044	0.339	**	-1.243	0.307	***
Right-wing populists	-1.381	0.422	***	-1.443	0.426	***
Global players	-0.259	0.323	n.s.	-1.156	0.317	***
Niche firms	-0.725	0.317	*	-1.062	0.291	***
Public enterprises	-1.743	0.391	***	-1.287	0.297	***
Econ. think tanks	-2.096	0.431	***	-2.511	0.637	***
Public advisory actors	-1.426	0.331	***	-1.125	0.304	***
Public welfare org.	-2.128	0.431	***	-2.687	0.461	***
Public welfare mov.	-1.771	0.439	***	-2.562	0.778	***
<i>Countries (ref = France)</i>						
Austria	-0.436	0.190	*	-0.183	0.190	n.s.
Germany	-0.065	0.193	n.s.	-0.050	0.181	n.s.
Netherlands	-0.017	0.190	n.s.	-0.368	0.213	n.s.
Switzerland	0.342	0.186	n.s.	-0.099	0.187	n.s.
U.K.	0.042	0.189	n.s.	-0.435	0.203	*
<i>Arenas (ref = Input arenas)</i>						
Janus-faced	0.327	0.163	*	-0.080	0.145	n.s.
Output	0.375	0.165	*	0.008	0.156	n.s.
Constant	3.065	0.273	***	3.338	0.246	***
N	333			286		
Wald tests						
Overall model	196.41	***	DF=35	173.74	***	DF=35
Actors	166.46	***	DF=28	167.21	***	DF=28

Notes: Coefficients, robust standard errors and levels of significance of count regression models on the level of actors; Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.005 .

Table C.3 *Dunn Indices of Different Cluster Solutions to Determine the Number of Coalitions as Used in Figure 8.4 and 8.5*

Country	2 cluster	3 cluster	4 cluster
France	0.270	0.263	0.290
Austria	0.197	0.306	0.300
Germany	0.120	0.221	0.537
Netherlands	0.242	0.187	0.369
Switzerland	0.320	0.209	0.200
U.K.	0.197	0.306	0.300

Table C.4 *Cluster Centers of Coalitions Calculated by Kmeans++ as Used in Figure 8.4 and 8.5*

Country	1 st center		2 nd center		3 rd center		4 rd center	
	int.	dom.	int.	dom.	int.	dom.	int.	dom.
France	-0.614	-0.922	0.270	0.280	-0.740	-0.095	-0.496	0.922
Austria	0.206	-0.192	0.279	0.601	-0.607	-0.121		
Germany	0.458	0.686	-0.902	-0.721	0.328	-0.556	-0.610	0.471
Netherlands	-0.566	-0.175	0.243	0.947	0.335	0.129	0.390	-0.692
Switzerland	-0.131	-0.743	0.312	0.427				
U.K.	0.169	0.052	0.431	0.711	-0.227	-0.854		

Note: Labels: int.=international liberalization, dom.=domestic liberalization.

Table C.5 *Closeness Centrality Overall and by Subject or Object Status as Used in Figure 9.1*

	Overall centrality	Subject centrality	Object centrality
IGO actors	60.9	47.5	52.5
EU actors	82.4	44.9	55.1
For. exec. adv. economies	100.0	38.9	61.1
For. exec. emerging markets	60.9	47.9	52.1
National executives	96.6	65.1	34.9
Econ. administrations	75.7	46.3	53.7
Gen. administrations	62.2	46.9	53.1
Judiciary	62.2	52.6	47.4
Legislatives	70.0	45.7	54.3
Chambers of commerce	57.1	51.4	48.6
Peak employer assoc.	73.7	50.6	49.4
Small business assoc.	68.3	52.1	47.9
Private sector unions	80.0	51.9	48.1
Public sector unions	65.1	52.0	48.0
Farmer organizations	53.8	51.7	48.3
White-collar organizations	59.6	51.0	49.0
Communists/Left socialists	60.9	47.6	52.4
Greens	62.2	50.0	50.0
Social democrats	77.8	49.4	50.6
Liberals	65.1	51.5	48.5
Christian dem./Conservatives	82.4	51.3	48.7
Populist right	62.2	48.0	52.0
Global players	87.5	48.6	51.4
Niche firms	96.6	44.8	55.2
Public enterprises	73.7	50.0	50.0
Econ. Think tanks	60.9	49.0	51.0
Public advisory groups	77.8	51.8	48.2
Public welfare organizations	60.9	53.0	47.0
Public welfare movements	62.2	54.3	45.7

Notes: Numbers in %; Subject centrality + object centrality=100 %.

Table C.6 *Valence Campaigning: Positions Between Actors*

subject/object	adm. adm.	adm. eco.	chris. con.	com. soc.	comm. comm.	eco. think.	EU farm.	for. adv.	for. em.	global play.	greens	IGO	judic.	legisl.
adm.														
adm. eco.		-0.9			-1		-0.61	-0.54		-0.08				
chris. con.	1	-1	0.66	-1			0.51	-0.34	0	-0.53	-0.48	-1	1	
com. soc.		-1		1				-0.51						1
comm.								-0.82						
eco. think.						-0.51		-0.76						
EU	-0.84	-0.56	0.3				0.61	-0.5	0.01	-0.24		1	1	0.33
farm.							-0.91	-1						
for. adv.	-1	-1	-1			-1	-0.49	-0.73	0.27	0.06		0.26		
for. em.							-0.02	-0.45	1	-0.2		0		
global play.	-0.42	-0.6	-1	0.6			-0.57	-0.5	1	0.09	-1		1	1
greens			-0.2					-1			1			
IGO		-1					-0.3	-0.37	-0.46			0.12		
judic.							-0.3	-0.89		-0.5			0.5	-1
legisl.		0.17					0.65	-0.79						1
lib.			0.45	-1				-0.83		-1	1			-0.02
nat. ex.	0.77	0.06	-0.33	-1	1	0.36	-0.53	-0.39	1	0.24	-1	-1	-1	-0.68
niche	0.43	0.53	-0.35	-0.83		-1	-0.56	-0.18	-1	-0.54				1
peak	-0.51	-0.75	-0.27	-0.66	-1			-0.53		-0.59	-1			-0.44
pop. right			-0.4	0.27				-0.85						
priv. union	-0.26	-1	-1			1	-1	-0.8		-0.35				-1
pub. adv.	-1	-1	-1				0.75	-0.71	1	-0.19	1	-0.56		-1
pub. ent.		-1	-0.5	1	-1	1	-1	-0.51		0.16	-1			
pub. union	-1	-0.72	1					-0.72						
sm. bus.		-0.56				1	-0.67	-0.41	-1					
soc. dem.		-1	-0.09			1	-0.41	-0.94		-0.77	0.24			1
welf. mov.								-1		-1		-1		-1
welf. org.		-1						-1						
white col.			-1					-0.74	-1					
subject/object	lib.	nat. ex.	niche	peak	pop. right	priv. union	pub. adv.	pub. ent.	pub. union	sm. bus.	soc. dem.	welf. mov.	welf. org.	white col.
adm.			-0.47	0		1		-0.7						
adm. eco.			-0.66	0.5			-1	-0.18		0		-1		
chris. con.	0.09		-0.5	-1	-1	-1		-1			-0.12			
com. soc.			1	1	1				1					
comm.			-0.8	-1										
eco. think.			-0.83					0.12	-1		-1			
EU			-0.43					-0.5			-0.33			
farm.							-1							
for. adv.		-0.06	-0.59				-1	0.37						
for. em.		0.94	-1											
global play.	-1		0.66	1	1	0.19	1	-0.28	-0.9		0.33			
greens	-1		0.15		-1			-1			-0.6	-1	1	
IGO			-0.54											
judic.			-0.15	0.5		-1	-1	-1			0			
legisl.										1	0.03			
lib.	0.13		-0.82				1			-0.03				
nat. ex.	1		0.31	-0.74	-1	0.06	0.06	-0.03	1	-0.03	0.19	-1	-0.17	
niche			0.47	1	-1	-0.43	0.62	-0.28			-0.68	-1	0.42	
peak			1	0.3		-0.55	-1			-1	-0.29		-0.1	
pop. right	-1		0.33	-0.57	-0.2	-0.19	-0.58	-0.42	1	-0.63	-0.11	1	0.11	
priv. union	-1		-0.74	-1		-0.26	0.08		0.5		-0.71			
pub. adv.			-0.39	-1		-0.07		0.71	-0.19		0.16			
pub. ent.			0.22	-0.32		-0.23		-0.23	1	1	0			
pub. union			-1			-0.25			1		-1			-1
sm. bus.			-1			-0.52			1		0			
soc. dem.	-1		-0.69	-1	-1	1	-1	-1	1		-0.17		-1	
welf. mov.			-1		-1	1					1			
welf. org.			-0.76					-0.5				1		
white col.			-0.55	1		-0.08			-0.25				1	-1

Table C.7 *Criteria for Count Model Selection For Actor Regressions on Framing Reported in Table C.7 and Used in Figure 9.3*

	Mean	Variance	Ln alpha test		Model
			ln alpha	Pr> z	
Liberalist	6.60	73.37	-0.642	+	Negative binominal
Social democratic	5.05	38.05	-0.749	n.s.	Poisson
Mercantilist	5.10	36.03	-0.732	n.s.	Poisson

Notes: Levels of significance: + ≤ 0.1 , * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.005 .

Table C.8 *Results of Count Regression Models on the Frame Usage by Actors as Used in Figure 9.3*

	Liberalist			Social democratic			Mercantilist		
	Negative binominal			Poisson			Poisson		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
<i>Actors (ref = national executives)</i>									
IGO actors	-1.009	0.237	***	-0.777	0.338	*	-0.795	0.422	n.s.
EU actors	0.198	0.364	n.s.	-0.184	0.320	n.s.	-0.370	0.273	n.s.
For. exec. adv. economies	-0.318	0.226	n.s.	-0.624	0.258	*	-0.782	0.239	***
For. exec. emerging markets	-0.936	0.287	***	-0.298	0.323	n.s.	-0.682	0.337	*
Econ. administrations	-0.886	0.277	***	-0.729	0.314	*	-1.158	0.292	***
Other administrations	-1.441	0.374	***	-0.985	0.349	**	-1.683	0.312	***
Judiciary	-0.638	0.331	n.s.	-0.643	0.521	n.s.	-1.070	0.351	**
Legislatures	-0.892	0.379	*	-0.925	0.435	*	-0.986	0.397	*
Chambers of commerce	-0.943	0.318	**	-0.408	0.256	n.s.	-1.516	0.280	***
Peak empl. assoc.	-0.889	0.229	***	-0.996	0.301	***	-1.189	0.253	***
Small bus. assoc.	-0.758	0.346	*	-1.424	0.259	***	-1.825	0.395	***
Private sector unions	-0.92	0.246	***	0.314	0.292	n.s.	-0.912	0.334	**
Publ. sector unions	-1.335	0.224	***	-0.316	0.263	n.s.	-1.376	0.230	***
Farmer org.	-1.037	0.449	*	-0.831	0.219	***	-1.565	0.304	***
White collar assoc.	-0.987	0.288	***	-1.115	0.303	***	-1.839	0.733	*
Communists/Left soc.	-2.233	0.497	***	-1.265	0.414	**	-2.398	0.267	***
Greens	-1.661	0.274	***	-1.451	0.343	***	-1.464	0.481	**
Social democrats	-0.815	0.258	**	-0.099	0.341	n.s.	-0.773	0.311	*
Liberals	-0.806	0.399	*	-1.344	0.273	***	-1.545	0.312	***
Christian dem./Cons.	-0.676	0.222	**	-0.516	0.247	*	-0.850	0.257	***
Right-wing populists	-0.432	0.469	n.s.	-1.027	0.428	*	-1.309	0.351	***
Global players	0.161	0.265	n.s.	-0.636	0.353	n.s.	-0.489	0.333	n.s.
Niche firms	-0.355	0.261	n.s.	-0.097	0.284	n.s.	-0.838	0.273	**
Public enterprises	-0.396	0.290	n.s.	-0.879	0.328	**	-1.249	0.286	***
Econ. think tanks	-1.331	0.372	***	-1.114	0.449	*	-1.428	0.267	***
Public advisory actors	-0.682	0.219	**	-0.877	0.302	**	-0.846	0.243	***
Public welfare org.	-0.942	0.418	*	-0.662	0.407	n.s.	-1.599	0.479	***
Public welfare mov.	-0.98	0.221	***	-0.585	0.415	n.s.	-0.575	0.193	**
<i>Countries (ref = France)</i>									
Austria	0.447	0.177	*	0.482	0.256	n.s.	0.443	0.207	*
Germany	0.795	0.186	***	-0.071	0.277	n.s.	0.489	0.280	n.s.
Netherlands	-0.054	0.210	n.s.	-0.122	0.237	n.s.	-0.186	0.183	n.s.
Switzerland	-0.223	0.171	n.s.	-0.470	0.231	*	0.405	0.186	*
U.K.	-0.047	0.181	n.s.	-0.356	0.248	n.s.	0.328	0.200	n.s.
<i>Arenas (ref = Input arenas)</i>									
Janus-faced	-0.048	0.135	n.s.	-0.235	0.174	n.s.	0.366	0.174	*
Output	0.127	0.154	n.s.	-0.003	0.192	n.s.	0.100	0.169	n.s.
Constant	2.194	0.221	***	2.268	0.278	***	2.000	0.233	***
N	316			260			276		
Wald tests									
Overall model	299.70	***		152.20	***		181.60	***	
Actors	120.11	***		112.38	***		145.89	***	

Notes: Coefficients, robust standard errors and levels of significance of count regression models on the level of actors; Levels of significance: * ≤ 0.05 , ** ≤ 0.01 , *** ≤ 0.005 .




Figure C.2 Histograms for Dependent Variables in Actor Regressions on Framing as Used in Figure 9.3

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